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ABSTRACT
Whereas the newly surveyed field of economic criticism, in literary and 
cultural studies, has been dominated by studies employing new historicist 
approaches in the analysis of past cultural or economic moments, this thesis 
examines the representation of economics in contemporary culture, and 
employs post-structuralist critical theory in its discussion of the unstable 
borderline between economics and culture, or text and context.
Acknowledging that contemporary economic discourse regularly employs the 
term ‘market’ as a synecdoche for the economy as a whole, the thesis focuses, 
in particular, on representations of the financial economy in narrative texts 
from the late 1980s to the present. Through close readings of novels by Jane 
Smiley, Michael Ridpath, and Don DeLillo, as well as the film narratives Wall 
Street and Boiler Room, and the artwork of J. S. G. Boggs, I argue that 
contemporary cultural texts which represent the financial economy are always 
working out the borderlines between text and context, between the fictional 
and the real, or between the rational and the irrational. Since both narrative 
and financial speculation exploit the unstable border between the fictional and 
the real, this post-structuralist reading of the narrative representation of 
economics also seeks to undermine the certainties of rational economic 
science, which posits the possibility of referentiality in the pursuit of a finite 
knowledge about the world it represents, and in the stories it tells.
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Introduction
Living On... Counterfeit Money: The Borderlands of Economic Criticism
I begin with an image from an art catalogue depicting the exhibited work of the 
American money/performance artist J. S. G. Boggs, or simply Boggs, as he is 
usually known (fig. 1). The image is of an art installation featuring a series of 
documents encased in heavy black frames, arranged in an ordered fashion and 
displayed on the white walls of a contemporary art gallery. There are seven 
frames in total; they are of differing sizes and some (though not all) of them 
appear to contain that most everyday of objects -  paper money -  French 
currency, in fact, from the days before the Euro. In the middle of the frames, 
draped on a plastic coat hanger and suspended from a simple nail in the white 
wall, is a blue towelling dressing gown -  the kind supplied by up-market 
hotels. The exhibit, which dates from 1989, is strangely quiet as to its making, 
apparently inviting the viewer to make connections between the elements 
displayed serenely in the separate frames, to play detective and solve the 
mystery of the blue gown, our only clue its enigmatic title: ‘Life and Times’. 
The story of the exhibit, which itself is in fact only the eventual outcome of 
Boggs’ artwork, rather than the artwork itself, is the story of a complex 
transaction enacted by Boggs, an action which transits the borderline between 
art and money, and everyday life.
If I am correct in my opening supposition that Boggs takes framed paper 
money to be art, then a radical conjunction is being established here between
Figure 1: J. S. G. Boggs. ‘Life and Times’ (1989) from Olson, ed., J.S.G. Bozzs: 
Smart Money (Hard Currency). Exhibition catalogue, p. 23.
the fields of economic and aesthetic representation. Money is being made to 
signify in at least two different registers -  as paper currency and limited edition 
print; as token of value and as valuable token. Calculable money, surely a 
signifier of the whole rational discipline of economics, becomes incalculable, 
irrational, potentially priceless ‘art’. In order to read Boggs’ exhibit it is 
necessary to take account of these borderlines crossing the work; however, I 
would like to begin, somewhat paradoxically, by first enclosing Boggs’ work 
in another conceptual frame -  that of critical theory. In so doing I wish to 
establish the possibility of a form of reading which could take account of 
works like Boggs’ ‘Life and Times’: aesthetic, literary or cultural 
representations which seek to comment upon the discourse of our everyday 
economic life. I hope to establish that this kind of reading, which some have 
called economic criticism, is all the richer for an investment in the subtleties of 
poststructuralist critical theory.
In order to establish this theoretical framework, I wish to examine the 
following passage from Jacques Derrida’s parallel essays, published in English 
in 1979, entitled ‘Living On. BORDER LINES’:
If we are to approach a text, it must have an edge. The question of the 
text, as it has been elaborated and transformed in the last dozen or so 
years, has not merely ‘touched’ [...] all those boundaries that form the 
running border of what used to be called a text, of what we once 
thought this word could identify [...] What has happened, is a sort of 
overrun [debordement] that spoils all these boundaries and divisions 
and forces us to extend the accredited concept, the dominant notion of a
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‘text,’ of what I still call a ‘text,’ for strategic reasons, in part [...] Thus 
the text overruns all the limits assigned to it so far (not submerging or 
drowning them in an undifferentiated homogeneity, but rather making
them more complex, dividing and multiplying strokes and lines) all
the limits, everything that was to be set up in opposition to writing 
(speech, life, the world, the real, history, and what not, every field of
reference to body or mind, conscious or unconscious, politics,
economics, and so forth).1 
A certain history is established in this lengthy statement, the history of literary 
criticism and of critical theory, as its frame of reference has expanded, and 
continued to expand, overrunning the limits previously assigned to it -  that of 
the explication o f the formal structures of the literary or cultural text. The 
expansion of theory into fields other than the literary, the concomitant 
expansion in the notion of the province of textuality, was not or has not been, 
Derrida tells us, a matter of straightforward colonisation, with the attendant 
eradication, in the famous phrase, of everything outside the text. It is not a 
question, then, of doing away with all the boundaries, ‘not submerging or 
drowning them in an undifferentiated homogeneity’, but rather o f working out, 
as Derrida continues in the same passage: ‘the theoretical and practical system 
of these margins, these borders, once more, from the ground up’.2
Taking Derrida’s parenthetical list as a starting point, the relationship between 
writing and economics (along with ‘body or mind’, consciousness, politics,
1 Jacques Derrida, ‘Living On. BORDER LINES’, trans. by J. Hulbert, in Deconstruction and 
Criticism, ed. by Harold Bloom et al. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), pp. 75-176 (pp. 
83-4).
2 Ibid, p. 84.
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etc.) figures in this passage in the traditional sense as a ‘field of reference’ -  
with economics providing an order of background information that writing may 
appropriate for narrative purposes but which would always remain external to 
writing and separate from its processes. Nevertheless, and in line with 
Derrida’s predictions, in the last twenty-five years or so there has been a 
renewed concerted effort to ‘work out’ this particular margin. While some of 
this work has resulted in a redrawing of the borderlines, others have tried to 
transgress them. This thesis represents one such effort. Prior to summarising 
my own argument, however, I will review some of the previous efforts to think 
through the critical implications for a newly permeable borderline between 
economics and those fields which enact a kind of writing upon it, through the 
medium of artistic representation -  literature, artwork, or film. I will also 
discuss further Boggs’ particular transgression of the of the art/money border 
in support of my argument for a deconstructive approach.
One of the most significant interventions in the borderlands between 
economics and aesthetics has been the emergence of the field of study calling 
itself new economic criticism within Anglo-American cultural and social 
theory, since at least 1991. New Economic Criticism is the title o f an ongoing 
project involving academic researchers across a range of disciplines, including, 
in the main, literary theory and economics. Developing from a panel at the 
Midwest MLA in 1991, the first interdisciplinary New Economic Criticism 
conference was held in 1994, and a collected reader o f the same name followed 
in 1999.3 The proceedings of a second conference, held at the University of
3 Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen, eds, The New Economic Criticism: Studies at the 
Intersection o f  Literature and Economics (London: Routledge, 1999).
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Exeter in 1998, were published in a special issue of New Literary History, on 
economics and culture, in 2000.4 As the organisers of the first conference and 
editors of the reader, Mark Osteen and Martha Woodmansee, put it, this cross- 
disciplinary approach grew out of their realisation that there were manoeuvres 
taking place on both sides of the border. Along with an emerging body of 
literary and cultural criticism interested in economics as both a field of 
reference for and a set of tropes within literary and cultural texts, a parallel 
movement within economics was opening that discipline up to an awareness of 
its own dependence upon rhetorical, literary, and discursive structures. These 
parallel movements were not, o f course, necessarily new, and the editors of 
New Economic Criticism provide a comprehensive critical history of 
interdisciplinary work between literature and economics up to 1999.5 While I 
rely in large part on their account, I wish to question, nevertheless, the 
theoretical parameters defined by Osteen and Woodmansee in their survey of 
the ‘fertile fields for cultivation’ which, they claim, the terrain of economics 
offers for literary critics.6
The late seventies and early eighties saw several important studies of the 
intersection between economics and aesthetics which foreshadowed what 
Osteen and Woodmansee would come to call new economic criticism. They 
draw attention, in particular, to the work of Marc Shell, Walter Benn Michaels 
and Jean-Joseph Goux, as having ‘laid the foundation for virtually all of the
4 Economics and Culture: Production, Consumption, and Value (= New Literary History, 31 
(2000)), pp. 231-378.
Mark Osteen and Martha Woodmansee, ‘Taking Account of the New Economic Criticism:
An Historical Introduction’, in The New Economic Criticism (see Woodmansee and Osteen, 
above), pp. 3-50.
6 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 4.
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literary economic criticism that has followed’.7 Both Shell and Goux, whose 
work was not translated into English until the 1990s, conduct historical 
enquiries into the changing relationship between economic and aesthetic forms, 
as that relationship has been represented in philosophical and literary writings. 
Shell’s ongoing investigation, represented in his books: The Economy o f  
Literature (1978), Money, Language, and Thought (1982), and Art and Money 
(1992), focuses principally on the monetary form itself, rather than economics 
per se, and examines its occurrence in a diversity of texts ranging from 
medieval manuscript to political rhetoric, classical and enlightenment 
philosophy, ancient coins, renaissance paintings or contemporary artwork.8
Shell’s numerous examples often overwhelm his theoretical insights, as John 
Vemon points out, making him difficult to summarise.9 Nevertheless, one of 
Shell’s key insights arises from his tendency to view both monetary and 
linguistic symbolization as ‘complementary or competing systems of tropic 
production and exchange’, so that ‘money not only is one theme, metaphoric 
content, or “root metaphor” in some works of language, but also participates 
actively in all’. Thus, his argument contends: ‘[it] is not that money is talked 
about in particular works of literature and philosophy (which is certainly the 
case), but that money talks in and through discourse in general.’10 Shell’s 
assertion of the general applicability of this thesis is questioned by Vemon, 
who also points out that Shell does not adequately address the most important
7 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 14.
8 Marc Shell, The Economy o f  Literature (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993); 
Money, Language, and Thought: Literary and Philosophic Economies from the Medieval to the 
Modern Era (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Art and Money (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995).
9 John Vemon, ‘Money of the Mind’, boundary 2, 12 (1983), 243-247.
10 Shell, Money, Language, and Thought, p. 180.
question raised by his work: ‘which is ontologically prior: the logical forms of 
thought, of which money and quantitative thinking seem to be one example 
[...], or money itself, which gives those forms material existence?’11 This 
query, which addresses the nature of the relationship between economics and 
aesthetics, has proved pertinent for all subsequent economic criticism, such that 
the significance of Shell’s work may be located simply in having provoked the 
question. In addition, Shell’s meticulous cataloguing of the influence of money 
on both the form and content of Western language and thought has been 
valuable, Osteen and Woodmansee note, in that it has ‘opened seemingly 
infinite avenues for future work’. Their list includes:
the study of money as art, symbol and medium; the concurrent origins 
of money and certain political and linguistic systems; the intertwined 
history of coinage and logic; the nature and cultural significance of 
credit, debt and usury, and the latter’s relationship to national and 
ethnic identities; the political economy of art.12
Jean-Joseph Goux, whose work I will consider in more detail in Chapter Five, 
is equally interested in the ‘intertwined history’ o f money and language, both 
of which he understands, post-Saussure, as modes of symbolization based on 
exchange. In Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud Goux is particularly 
concerned with what he sees as the historical coincidence of transformations in 
the monetary form and concurrent shifts in notions of meaning (language) and
11 Vemon, ‘Money of the Mind’, p. 245.
12 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 16.
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subjectivity (psychoanalysis).13 From gold money, which serves as both 
treasure and token, to circulating paper whose value depends on the gold to 
which it refers, to inconvertible paper money, and finally dematerialized 
electronic money, he claims that ‘the history of the money function is marked 
by a progression toward abstraction and convention’.14 Goux’s historical 
analysis focuses on moments of rupture, as one mode of symbolization gives 
way to another. Thus, in The Coiners o f  Language, he reads the work of Gide, 
Valery, and Mallarm6 as expressive of a modernist crisis of representation 
regarding the real which is structurally homologous to the contemporaneous 
rupture in monetary signification occasioned by the abandonment of the 
convertibility of paper money to ‘real’ gold.15 Goux’s historical model has, 
rightly, been criticized as ‘somewhat mechanical’;16also, while praising the 
‘richness’ o f Goux’s inquiry, Jacques Derrida ‘wonders nevertheless’ to what 
extent shifts in monetary or linguistic signification can be strictly linked, via 
analogy, to a story of literary periodization.17 The difficulty, of course, is that 
examples can always be found which pre-date the historical ruptures proposed, 
as Reynaud-Pactat points out via her reading of Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, 
where the circulation of promissory notes registers the instability of scriptural
1 Smoney despite the presence of a gold-standard.
13 Jean-Joseph Goux, Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud, trans. by Jennifer Curtiss 
Gage (Ithaca: Cornell, 1990). Originally published as Freud, Marx: Economie et Symbolique 
(Paris: Seuil, 1973) and Les Iconoclastes (Paris: Seuil, 1978).
14 Goux, Symbolic Economies, p. 49.
15 Jean-Joseph Goux, The Coiners o f  Language, trans. by Jennifer Curtiss Gage (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1994). Originally, Les Monnayeurs du Langage (Paris: Galilee, 
1984).
16 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 16.
17 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. ‘Counterfeit Money ’, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 110, n 1.
,s Patricia Reynaud-Pactat, ‘Jean-Joseph Goux and the Metaphor of The Promissory Note in 
Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary’, Diacritics, 18 (1988), 69-80. See also Thomas DiPiero, 
‘Buying into Fiction’, Diacritics, 18 (1988), 2-14.
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Nevertheless, Goux also usefully makes connections, not discussed by Shell, 
between modes of linguistic and literary representation and contemporaneous 
economic structures. Thus, in ‘Banking on Signs’, Goux links the modernist 
transformation from realism to abstraction in literary representation not only to 
the ‘dematerialization’ of money from gold to paper, but also to a transition 
from one form of capitalism to another:
Economists and historians are generally in agreement today in locating 
in the first decade of the twentieth century a qualitative economic 
transformation: the passage from liberal (or industrial, or competitive) 
capitalism to the capitalism of monopolies and huge trusts. In this 
historical turn, banking capital dominates industrial capital.19 
This shift prefigures the rise of the financial economy, which became 
increasingly virtual, and increasingly dominant over the industrial sector, as the 
twentieth century progressed. While Goux is mainly concerned with literary 
examples from the early part of the twentieth century, he also contemplates 
elsewhere the late-twentieth century configuration between linguistics, 
economics and aesthetics. Here, he presumes a historical trajectory from real to 
symbolic, finally completed by Nixon’s removal of the dollar from the gold- 
standard in 1971. This instituted an international system of floating exchange 
rates, and, a ‘symbol economy’ consisting of instantaneous, intangible 
electronic transactions, which, he argues, is accompanied by the ‘threatening 
fracture between the real and the symbolic’ characteristic of postmodern 
culture.20 In Chapter Two, I will examine the apparent dominance of the
19 Goux, ‘Banking on Signs’, Diacritics, 18 (1988), 15-25 (p. 17).
20 Jean-Joseph Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality in Postmodern Capitalism’, in 
Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge, ed. by Stephen Cullenberg, Jack Amariglio and 
David F. Ruccio (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 166-81, p. 166.
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financial economy over the ‘real’ industrial economy in contemporary culture, 
and, in Chapter Five, I seek to raise some questions concerning Goux’s neat 
conflation of the virtual economy with a postmodern aesthetic.
The historical surveys conducted by Shell and Goux, while doubtless 
disputable, usefully develop an approach to economic criticism which views 
the economy as having both thematic and formal significance for aesthetic 
representation. Their work also calls attention to the fact that the relationship 
between economics and culture has changed over time, resulting in particularly 
rich seams of investigation at specific periods. Much of the work described as 
literary economic criticism has, unsurprisingly, focused on the kind of 
transformational moments outlined by Goux, in an effort to explore the 
changing relationship between money and language described by Shell. 
Particularly ‘fertile fields’ have been eighteenth and nineteenth century studies, 
making detailed engagement with such work largely outside the purview of this 
thesis. Osteen and Woodmansee argue that the eighteenth century has proved 
of interest because the disciplinary divisions to which we are now accustomed 
were not yet present in the cultural period which saw the emerging discourse of 
classical political economy and the birth of the novel.21 In this vein, for 
example, Sandra Sherman explores the ‘mutually inflecting’ discourses of 
fiction and finance in the early eighteenth century, particularly through 
readings of Defoe’s fictional and economic writings, and other contemporary 
texts, while James Thompson examines the emergence of political economy 
and the novel as responses to ‘a crisis in the notion of value’ provoked by the
21 Osteen and Woodmansee, pp. 5-6.
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eighteenth-century transformation of money ‘from treasure to capital’ and 
‘from specie to paper’.22 Thompson also notes that, setting ‘classically Marxist 
work’ aside, prior studies of the relationship between economics and culture 
tends to fall into three categories: those that focus on money as content -  
elucidating monetary references within literary works; those which use money 
as a theme -  ‘exploring various economies at work in literature’, and, more 
recently, ‘studies that reach out to incorporate other discourses’, reading 
economics and literature alongside each other and in reference to an entire 
cultural framework. This final category is indicative of the new historicist 
approach, and is ‘the most prevalent form of economic criticism’, according to 
Osteen and Woodmansee.24
One of the insights of the new historicist approach is that the two sides of the 
economic-aesthetic binary were not always as far apart as they seem today. As 
the academic discipline of economics has pursued its dismal trajectory from 
political economy to the mathematical formalism of present day econometrics, 
however, the connections have been less in evidence, leading Osteen and 
Woodmansee to suggest that a ‘rift’ had occurred between the two fields.
While they locate the appearance of this division in the eighteenth century, 
they note that this is a point of debate. Thus, using similar imagery, Michael 
Tratner refers to ‘the gulf that separates political and cultural criticism from the
mainstream of economic theorizing’ which, he argues, is due to the
22 Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality in the Early Eighteenth Century: Accounting for  
Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2; James Thompson, Models o f  
Value: Eighteenth-Century Political Economy and the Novel (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1996), pp. 2-3. See also Colin Nicholson, Writing and the Rise o f  Finance: Capital Satires o f  
the Early Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
23 Thompson, pp. 4-5.
24 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 35.
25 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 5.
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increasingly technical mode of economic theory ‘in the last hundred years’.26 
Nevertheless, by applying post-Foucauldian analysis, which explores the 
reciprocal relations between discourses, and between discourse and 
subjectivity, new historicist criticism has attempted to breach the borderlines 
between economic and cultural modes of thought, which were assumed in 
earlier studies. Osteen and Woodmansee make a comparison between Norman 
Russell’s ‘old historicist’ The Novelist and Mammon and Colin Nicholson’s 
Writing and the Rise o f  Finance to illustrate this point. In the former, the 
novelist, possessed of ‘particular genius’, ‘utilize[s] the [economic] 
preoccupations and institutions of his time for his own inner purposes’;27 hence 
Russell’s mode of analysis emphasises the idea of economics as a ‘field of 
reference’ for the literary work. By contrast Colin Nicholson’s study, according 
to Osteen and Woodmansee, discusses ‘the mutual effects of literary and 
economic tropes’ and their reciprocal effect in terms of the discursive 
constitution of subjects.
Despite such attention to discursive constellations, it is not clear to me that the 
move from text to context upon which the new historicist project is predicated 
does not, in fact, ultimately result in re-inscribing the borderline between the 
literary text and its field of reference: what, in the passage I cited above,
Derrida referred to as ‘everything that was to be set up in opposition to 
writing’. The opposition between history and textuality is noted by Osteen and
26 Michael Tratner, Deficits and Desires: Economics and Sexuality in Twentieth-Century 
Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 1.
27 Norman Russell, The Novelist and Mammon: Literary Responses to the World o f  Commerce 
in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), cited in Osteen and Woodmansee,
p. 20.
Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 20; see Colin Nicholson, above.
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Woodmansee as, in the introduction to the New Economic Criticism reader, 
they make a disturbing point. In accounting for the ‘explosion’ of scholarship 
which occurred within the field of economic criticism in the 1990s, Osteen and 
Woodmansee offer multiple reasons for the emergence of this new field.
Firstly, they claim that,
within literary studies, the critical pendulum has decidedly swung back 
towards historicist methods and away from deconstruction, semiotics, 
and the other formalist approaches that prevailed in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Historicist and culturally aware literary critics have therefore 
sought new approaches derived from the methods and texts of other 
fields, one of which is economics.
The premature assassination of deconstruction, and ‘other formalist 
approaches’ within the entire field of literary studies seems to me to be 
problematic here, partly because my own inclination is to believe that there are 
fresh fields to be ‘cultivated’ down that particular track. But I have reservations 
also because of the relationship thereby set up between economics and literary 
criticism for the remainder of the paragraph. Rather than a working out of the 
borderlines, a fruitful interrogation of the limits of criticism and/or economics, 
what we have here is a pre-established relationship between two mutually 
exclusive partners working out the possibilities of a new contract of exchange. 
Economics remains an ‘other field’ from which criticism can borrow, 
reminding us of the traditional configuration of economics as field o f reference 
to the literary work. The role of the new historicist critic, then, is to spot the 
references, and analyse their effect on the subjects of the period. Yet the
29 Osteen and Woodmansee, pp. 3-4.
13
boundary between and the definition of these separate disciplines goes 
unquestioned.
Further studies, both earlier and later than the eighteenth century, have 
continued the new historicist project in economic criticism, finding parallel 
instabilities in money and writing both earlier and later than the 1700s, and 
thereby unconsciously echoing Derrida’s remarks over the difficulties in 
aligning economic ‘ruptures’ with literary periodization. Thus, Theodore B. 
Lein wand’s Theatre, Finance and Society in Early Modern England and the 
recent collection of essays Money and the Age o f  Shakespeare: Essays in New 
Economic Criticism both consider shifting notions of credit and capital and 
their effect on early modem society and culture.30 Equally, studies of 
nineteenth century literature and culture have long been concerned with the 
econo-historical context for the popularization and mass production of the 
novel form, as well as the thematic importance of money and economic 
conditions in the work of reformist writers such as Dickens, Gaskell and 
Trollope. More recent historicist work addresses the relationship between the 
burgeoning discourse of political economy and the fiction of the period, 
examining the use of fiction in the popularizing narratives of economic writers 
such as Harriet Martineau, or arguing for the specificity of the late nineteenth 
century as the moment in which contemporary neoclassical economics was 
bom.31 John Vernon’s earlier Money and Fiction adopts a more formalist
30 Theodore B. Leinwand, Theatre, Finance and Society in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Linda Woodbridge, ed., Money and the Age 
o f  Shakespeare: Essays in New Economic Criticism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
On Martineau, see, for example, Elaine Freedgood, ‘Banishing Panic: Harriet Martineau and 
the Popularization of Political Economy’ (see Woodmansee and Osteen, above), pp. 210-228; 
Brian Cooper, Family Fictions and Family Facts: Harriet Martineau, Adolphe Quetelet and
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approach, addressing the prevalence of the theme of money in the nineteenth 
century novel as the location of the problem of realism itself. Vemon adopts a 
linear narrative o f literary history, claiming that the rapidly circulating 
banknotes and expanding capitalist structures of the nineteenth century give the 
thematic representation of money in the fiction of the period a greater urgency 
not seen before or since. Perhaps not anticipating the impact of money on the 
culture of the 1980s, Vemon argues that, in the twentieth century, ‘money as a 
representation tends to disappear into what it represents: forms of power on the 
one hand and the accumulation of commodities on the other’.32
While I disagree with Vernon’s account of the disappearance of money as a 
problematic sign of reality and/or fiction in the late twentieth century, it is 
impossible to ignore the importance of the problem of mimetic representation 
and material reality in the writing of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The relationship between materiality and identity, mediated by the 
trope of money, is the theme of an important study of naturalism in American 
writing at the turn of the century by Walter Benn Michaels, the third of Osteen 
and Woodmansee’s noted precursors to recent economic literary criticism. 
Michaels finds that naturalism, in as much as it is a branch of realism, operates 
according to a kind of logic of the gold-standard: always trying to efface its 
status as writing in order to become, like gold, ‘equal to [its] face value’ -  or,
the Population Question in England 1798-1859 (London: Routledge, 2006). On culture and the 
rise of political economy and neoclassical economics see Regenia Gagnier, The Insatiability o f  
Human Wants: Economics and Aesthetics in Market Society (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000); Gordon Bigelow, Fiction, Famine, and the Rise o f  Economics in Victorian 
Britain and Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
32 John Vemon, Money and Fiction: Literary Realism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) p. 9.
33 Walter Benn Michaels, The Gold Standard and the Logic o f  Naturalism: American 
Literature at the Turn o f  the Century (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1987), p. 22.
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in Saussurean terms, both sign and referent. Nevertheless, by reading the 
operation of the money sign in the work of Theodore Dreiser and Frank 
Norris, Michaels also argues that money marks the fact that both 
representation and identity are constituted by a ‘discrepancy’ which divides 
representation from itself, and underlines the impossibility for money, writing 
or the self ever to become its ‘face value’.34 Despite its deconstructive 
overtones, Michaels’ study is cited by Osteen and Woodmansee as the 
‘inaugural foray’ into new historicist economic criticism. Marrying formal 
analysis with historical context, however, Michaels himself comments, in a 
footnote,
it is often said that the ‘new historicism’ opposes deconstruction, in the 
sense that deconstructive critics are ‘against’ history and new 
historicists are ‘for’ it. Neither of these descriptions seems to me to 
have much content. In any event, the deconstructive interest in the 
problematic of materiality in signification is not intrinsically 
ahistorical.35
Michaels is correct. The narrow, ‘formalist’, understanding of deconstruction 
has always disregarded the fact that, just like new historicism, deconstruction is 
concerned with the relationship between text and context. Indeed, ‘one of the 
definitions of what is called deconstruction’, says Derrida, ‘would be the effort 
to take this limitless context into account’.36 Context is defined, here, as ‘the
34 Michaels, pp. 21-28, pp. 139-180.
35 Michaels, p. 28, n43.
36 Jacques Derrida, ‘Afterword’, trans. by Samuel Weber, in Limited Inc (Evanston: 
Northwestern Press, 1988), pp. 111-160, (p. 136).
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entire “real-history-of-the-world’” ,37 a term Derrida uses to indicate that, 
misreadings to the contrary, ‘the concept of text or of context which guides me 
embraces and does not exclude the world, reality, history.’38 Reference to 
history or the real is not, however, a question of appealing to an external truth 
which will arrest the play of meaning in a text; rather, the ‘real-history-of-the- 
world’ is itself subject to endless interpretation and re-inscription within a 
network of differences. Thus, just like text, context is not finite, and it is the 
work of deconstruction ‘to pay the sharpest and broadest attention possible to 
context, and thus to an incessant movement of recontextualization’.39 This 
work, as I have tried to indicate from the outset, has particular resonance for 
economic criticism, in which a relation is always being assumed between texts 
and ‘real’ economic conditions we take to be external to them. To the new 
historicist claim for a return to ‘context’, we can add Derrida’s elegant 
reminder: ‘The phrase [...] “there is nothing outside the text” means nothing 
else: there is nothing outside context.’40 I do not wish to argue that new 
historicist work has not been effective in expanding the textual analysis of 
literary criticism into contextual fields. Indeed, Osteen and Woodmansee 
advocate an approach to economic criticism which would ‘combine several 
angles of attack’, eschewing solely formalist or historicist approaches in order 
to focus on both textual and contextual economies.41 Rather, I simply wish to 
underline the significance of deconstruction for that practice. In addition, 
deconstruction bears witness to the possibilities which arise from breaching the
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, p. 137.
39 Derrida, ‘Afterword’, p. 136.
40 Derrida, ‘Afterword’, p. 136.
41 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 36.
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boundaries between economics and aesthetics, in a manner not discussed by 
new historicism.
Returning, however, to my overview of fieldwork in the borderlands of 
economic criticism, I would observe that, despite Jean-Joseph Goux’s 
predictions regarding the significance of the ‘symbol economy’ for late 
twentieth-century culture, few critics have taken up the challenge to consider 
contemporary culture from the perspectives o f economic criticism. Osteen and 
Woodmansee number just nine ‘extensive studies of twentieth-century 
literature and economics’ in their survey, six of whom focus solely on 
modernism, therefore taking no account of the ‘virtual’ economy.42 Of course, 
this is partly due to the fact that many of the critics drawn to economic 
criticism employ new historicist techniques and locate their enquiry in the past. 
In addition, the increasingly technical vocabulary arising from the 
mathematisation of academic economics, noted by Tratner above, makes the 
literary discussion of economic texts difficult to accomplish. Tratner makes the 
attempt, however, employing a historicist approach in his reading of the ‘logic 
of circulation’ motivating economic and sexual discourses, but nevertheless 
concentrating on the mid-twentieth century.43 Despite this dearth of economic 
critical analysis post 1950, the economic conditions of the late twentieth 
century have had a profound motivational effect on the burgeoning field of 
historicist economic criticism. Thus, Osteen and Woodmansee claim that one 
of the factors conditioning the growth of economic criticism in the last twenty- 
five years was the economic conditions of the 1980s, when ‘discussions of
42 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 44, n31.
43 Tratner, p. 3.
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interest rates, stock market speculation, takeovers, and leveraged buyouts, and 
so on,’ focused public attention on economics in a manner unseen since the 
1930s.44 The continuous appeal to the ‘market’ in the political rhetoric of 
contemporary society has no doubt also been a contributing factor. Several of 
the resulting studies bear this out: Sandra Sherman, for example, cites the 
‘Washington bureaucracy’ and the ‘recent junk bond and Savings and Loan 
scandals’ as a motivating influence and an explanatory aside to her study of 
eighteenth century economic culture.45 Two recent studies read the cultural 
and economic climate of the late-twentieth century in more detail, although in 
each case either the market aesthetic o f the 1980s (Gagnier), or the impact of 
the marketplace on contemporary literature (Delany), is read as a comparative 
addendum to a larger historical project, whose focus remains in the past.46
The work I present here, therefore, while bearing a relation to the problems 
encountered by former studies in economic criticism, is also marked by two 
significant differences. My emphasis is on the representation of economics, in 
particular the increasingly ‘virtual’ financial economy, in narrative texts from 
the late 1980s and 1990s, and my mode of analysis will employ a 
deconstructive approach, exploring the ‘incessant movement of 
recontextualization’47 which troubles the border between economics and 
narrative, ‘reality’ and ‘fiction’. While Osteen and Woodmansee note that 
studies of contemporary culture tend to repeat ‘shibboleths like “late
44 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 4.
43 Sherman, p. xii, p. 2.
46 Regenia Gagnier, The Insatiability o f  Human Wants; Paul Delany, Literature, Money and the 
Market: From Trollope to Amis (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
47 Derrida, ‘Afterword’, p. 136.
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capitalism” or “global economy’” 48 without investigating the actual workings 
of such economic structures, they, like Goux, also call for more analysis o f the 
relationship between postmodern economics and ‘the prevalence of parody, 
pastiche and appropriation in contemporary literature and art’.49 However, I do 
not begin from the presumption that contemporary economic conditions find 
their expression in a postmodern aesthetic. It seems to me that neither language 
nor money has become as divorced from the real as Goux’s parallel narrative 
of literary and financial history seems to predict. Instead of a linear narrative 
leading towards the gradual abandonment of referentiality for money and 
language, both discourses operate in a continuous dialectic between the real 
and the conventional, I wish to suggest, which becomes more evident at 
moments of change. The model I propose is one of recurrence, as opposed to 
linearity. Thus, the tensions arising due to the introduction of the virtual 
economy, evident in the texts to be discussed, are often similar to those which 
prevailed in the eighteenth century, arising from the introduction of paper 
money, and at the beginning of the twentieth, due to the abandonment of the 
gold-standard. Indeterminacy recurs, while realism, charged, as Lyotard 
reminds us, with the task of ‘protecting consciousness from doubt’, endlessly 
recuperates this threat.50
The above review of engagements between literature and economics is 
necessarily selective, as I have tried to give an account of the shape of the field 
while noting the preponderance of historicist analysis and the consequent lack
48 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 34.
49 Ibid, p. 38.
50 Jean-Francois Lyotard, ‘Answer to the Question: What is the Postmodern?’, in The 
Postmodern Explained to Children: Correspondence, 1982-1985 (London: Turnaround, 1992), 
pp. 9-25 (p. 15).
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of studies o f contemporary culture. I have also focused in more detail on 
instances (Goux, Vernon, Michaels) where the trope of money is read as both a 
marker and a disruption of representation: an argument which, as I have 
indicated, can be found whatever the period of literary history examined. I 
focus on these instances partly to forward the argument that money is a 
recurring marker of the problematics of representation in cultural texts, and 
partly as a precursor to my own reading of Boggs later in this chapter. A 
number of other approaches have been short-circuited in this survey, all of 
which are relevant to the wider project o f economic criticism. I will not be 
addressing, for example, the issue of commodity culture and consumption, an 
economic theme which has received much attention in relation to nineteenth 
and early twentieth century literature and culture. In this field Rachel Bowlby’s 
books, Just Looking and Shopping with Freud, which focus on desire and the 
consumer subject, could be usefully read against Richard Godden’s Fictions o f  
Capital, 51 in which Godden argues that ‘the commodity and the commodified 
self are events that should be read within the class history that produces 
them’.52 Godden reads the American novels of James, Fitzgerald and Mailer 
for their depiction of late capitalism, in which ‘consumption cannot be 
divorced from production’,53 retaining, here, an account of individuals as 
subjects of history which is reminiscent of Marxist analysis.
51 Rachel Bowlby, Just Looking: Consumer Culture in Dreiser, Gissing and Zola (New York: 
Methuen, 1985); Shopping with Freud (London: Routledge, 1993); Richard Godden, Fictions 
o f Capital: The American Novel from James to Mailer (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), pp. 3-6.
52 Godden, p. 4.
53 Ibid, p. 6.
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As I have been suggesting, one of the key questions for any study of the 
relationship between economics and aesthetics is the means by which the 
relationship between the two fields is figured. Which is ontologically prior, 
asks Vernon of Shell, money or language? Is my historiography causal or 
homological, asks Sherman, o f her own work.54 These questions are pertinent 
as economic criticism attempts to establish its difference from Marxist 
criticism, in which a base-superstructure model, whereby economic conditions 
determine cultural production, prevailed. Some accounts, such as Godden’s, 
owe an allegiance to this mode of analysis. While admitting that he is in the 
minority, Terry Eagleton also defends the base-superstructure model, arguing 
that ‘it is not a claim about degrees of ontological reality; [...] The doctrine, in 
short, is about determinations’.55 Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism: Or, The 
Cultural Logic o f  Late Capitalism is perhaps the most significant study to 
apply this approach to the analysis o f late twentieth century culture, although 
he contends that ‘the interrelationship of culture and the economic here is not a 
one-way street but a continuous reciprocal interaction and feedback loop.’56
For historicist critics such as Thompson or Sherman, however, the issue of the 
relationship between economics and culture must be recast in order to reject 
‘any sense of hierarchy or determinism’.57 While there may have been, 
historically, hierarchical or political interests motivating the relationship 
between the two discourses, Thompson nevertheless rules out the suggestion
54 Sherman, p. xii.
53 See Terry Eagleton, ‘Base and Superstructure Revisited’, New Literary History, 31 (2000), 
231-240, (p. 237) for a defence o f the base-superstructure model, which was presented at the 
University of Exeter 1994 conference on Economics and Culture.
36 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic o f  Late Capitalism (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1991), pp. xiv-xv.
37 Thompson, p. 10.
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‘that one sort of discourse is logically or historically prior’.58 Although she 
does not cite him, Sandra Sherman utilises the same conceptual terminology as 
Jean-Joseph Goux, referring to the relationship between credit and fiction as a 
‘homology’.59 This attempt to discern ‘parallels and analogies between 
linguistic and economic systems’ has been, Osteen and Woodmansee claim, the 
principle upon which economic criticism is predicated.60 This thesis also 
proceeds from that general principle. For Goux, there is ‘a precise coincidence 
between monetary logic and the logic of the signifier and of the subject (as 
articulated by Lacan)’ -  in other words, a homology between money, 
representation and Lacanian psychoanalysis.61 He posits this on the basis of his 
observation that all three of these fields operate according to ‘a general logic of 
the exchange relation’, which appeals to a general equivalent -  gold, the 
linguistic sign or the phallus. While this mode of analysis is illuminating, the 
difficulty with what Osteen and Woodmansee call ‘homology hunting 
remains the same: one mode of discourse can seem to ultimately account for 
the other. Thus they argue that, even in Goux’s work, ‘the economic register 
seems for him both logically and ontologically prior’.64
I wish to argue, via my reading of Boggs, that this is not always necessarily the 
case. The comparability of art and money, coupled with the insight that they 
operate according to a similar logic, only leads to such intimations of 
determinism if we retain, however unconsciously, the idea that they belong to
38 Ibid.
39 Sherman, p. 13, pp. 14-54.
60 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 14.
61 Goux, Symbolic Economies, p. 52.
62 Ibid, p. 53.
63 Osteen and Woodmansee, p. 21.
64 Ibid, p. 17.
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separate spheres. By paradoxically re-invoking their difference in order to note 
how they are the same, we fall into the trap of assuming that one mode of 
discourse has, as Jameson accuses, ‘privileged explanatory value’.65 An 
alternative implication of the comparability between art and money, one I think 
we can trace in the work of Jacques Derrida, is that both modes of signification 
exist within the same infinite textual network of differences. By paying 
attention to the textuality of economics and aesthetics, it should become 
apparent that the division between them is discursively produced, and thus can 
never be considered a matter o f ontology.
The problem is thus that outlined by Derrida in ‘Living On. BORDER LINES’: 
the difficulty of working in the borderlands lies in the fact that, in order to be 
transgressed, borders must inevitably be re-invoked. A deconstructive approach 
does not eliminate divisions but emphasizes instead their ongoing working out, 
in an effort to ‘live on’ the borderlines. Nevertheless it is sometimes 
mistakenly read as replacing economic determinism with a new essentialism. 
This difficulty is noted in the new economic criticism reader in an essay by the 
heterodox economists Jack Amariglio and David Ruccio. They consider the 
usefulness of terms borrowed from mainstream economics within the work of 
supposedly ‘non-economic’ theorists such as Lyotard, Bataille, Baudrillard, 
and Derrida (although the distinction economic/non-economic is one they 
problematise).66 While Amariglio and Ruccio acknowledge the important
65 Jameson’s criticism of Goux from Postmodernism: Or is cited in Osteen and Woodmansee,
P- 17.
Jack Amariglio and David F. Ruccio, ‘Literary/Cultural “Economies,” Economic Discourse, 
and the Question of Marxism’, in The New Economic Criticism (see Osteen and Woodmansee, 
above), pp. 381-400. While I have been outlining the development o f economic criticism from 
a literary perspective, I wish to also note the parallel development whereby certain heterodox
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influence Lyotard and Derrida have had upon their own work, they also 
consider the problems inherent to the various invocations of a ‘general 
economy’ in the critical theory of the 1980s. By paying close attention to the 
deployment of terms such as the ‘symbol economy’ or ‘gift economy’, 
Amariglio and Ruccio come to the conclusion that even the most transgressive 
of these conceptual raiders can fall foul o f another kind of binary thinking 
which leaves the borderlines intact. Drawing on Lyotard’s own critique of 
Baudrillard, they suggest that much of what has been termed economic 
criticism, whether influenced by critical theory or not, involves a remarking of 
territories, in an effort to police the differences which mark out the aneconomic 
from the economic. In summary, they find that the theoretical encounter with 
economics is most often motivated by an effort to put economics in its place. 
The causes for this motivation should be familiar: the interrogation of 
boundaries can lead to the fear of their elimination, with the subsequent loss of 
difference related to the fear of ‘undifferentiated homogeneity’. Amariglio and 
Ruccio go on to suggest that where a policing of the borderlines is not evident, 
one finds instead a kind of reductionist essentialism and they claim to find this 
in Lyotard’s writing also, particularly in Libidinal Economy. While this reading 
of Lyotard’s work could be disputed, Amariglio and Ruccio usefully 
summarize the difficult relationship sketched out here as follows:
economists have begun to employ the perspectives of literary and critical theory to critique 
their own discipline. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the new economic criticism 
project is that it brings these voices together in the same textual location. In the next chapter I 
will consider the Rhetoric of Economics movement, particularly the work o f Deirdre 
McCloskey, who has applied narrative analysis to economic theory. The post-structuralist 
perspective of Amariglio, Ruccio and Stephen Cullenberg has been influential throughout my 
project, particularly Cullenberg, Amariglio and Ruccio, eds, Postmodernism, Economics and 
Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2001) and Ruccio and Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in 
Modern Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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the literary/cultural economies that have recently found favour are 
caught in the tension between the desire to uncover the realm in which 
markets, capital, and self-interested rationality have not penetrated and 
the fear that such a space is no longer discursively possible.67
A pertinent example of the kind of theoretical stalemate which Amariglio and 
Ruccio point to can be found in critical explorations of the concept of a gift 
economy, and discussions of the possibility of a gift economy from Mauss to 
Derrida illustrate the point. To summarise, beginning with Marcel Mauss’
Essai sur le Don in 1925, for social and economic anthropology the concept of 
the gift economy, where proved, would, at the least, provide the possibility of
/ o
an alternative economy (and a more moral one in Mauss’ terms), or, at most, 
confound the laws of economic reason where altruism is a largely an 
inadmissible concept. For Amariglio and Ruccio, however, this quest only 
results in further establishing a problematic borderline between the world of 
exchange (economics) and another world, supposedly aneconomic or 
preeconomic centered on the gift (and the relationship is often figured as 
historic).
However, one way of working through the dichotomous relationship between 
economics and (literary) economic criticism is, in fact, to pay closer attention 
to the potential offered by deconstruction. In uncovering some of this potential 
I would like to consider briefly the account of the gift offered in Derrida’s 
Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, in which Derrida discusses Mauss’ essay,
67 Amariglio and Ruccio, p. 391.
68 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms And Functions O f Exchange In Archaic Societies, trans. by 
Ian Cunnison (London: Cohen & West, 1954).
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while he also provides a reading of a short story by Baudelaire entitled 
‘Counterfeit Money’.69 Derrida’s contribution to gift theory is to interrogate 
more closely the borderline between gift and non-gift left unquestioned by 
Mauss. His finding is that the realisation or actualisation of the gift, in and of 
itself, is impossible. The concept of gift without return may seem to step 
outside the perpetual circle of economic exchange but, says Derrida, ‘the 
moment the gift would appear as gift, as such, as what it is, in its phenomenon, 
[...] it would be engaged in a symbolic, sacrificial, or economic structure that 
would annul the gift in the ritual circle of the debt.’70 Thus, once the gift is 
recognised as a gift by donor or donee, it is simultaneously no longer a gift -  
having annulled itself by entering into the logic of reciprocal exchange. In so 
proving, Derrida disables the border between gift and non-gift upon which 
Mauss’ theory relies. The question, then, is what this disabling of the borders 
implies. For Amariglio and Ruccio, it leaves Derrida open to the charge of a 
certain unacknowledged metaphysics of presence, claiming, as they do, that 
‘the impossibility of the gift for Derrida can be read [as though] the grand 
deconstructor has recourse to an omnipresent global capitalism that consumes 
everything in its wake’.71 It is not clear however, that this is necessarily the 
case, or that a deconstructive move such as Derrida enacts on Mauss’ gift 
would inevitably have such an outcome. Does the assertion of gift’s perpetual 
relation to exchange usher in the tyranny of economic calculation, removing 
forever the possibility of aneconomic space? This is the question which the 
field of economic criticism has been forced to face up to: if the motivation for 
economic criticism is not simply to show culture to be economics’ Other, then
69 Derrida, Given Time: 1.
70 Derrida, Given Time: 1, p. 23.
71 Amariglio and Ruccio, p. 391.
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how to avoid subscribing to a kind of economic reductionism and/or 
determinism? If we must give up on oppositional dichotomy, can we avoid 
undifferentiated homogeneity? Is there a way to remain on the border, while 
commenting upon it?
Returning to Derrida, and Given Time: 1, 1 suggest that we would do well to 
pay attention to the ‘perhaps’ of the following statement: ‘It only is by being 
able to be,perhaps, what it is.’ Derrida is speaking here about ‘Counterfeit 
Money’ -  the title of the short story by Baudelaire whose narrative he 
constantly returns to throughout Given Time: 7, but he is also speaking about 
narrative itself, and, finally, the production and circulation of counterfeit 
money or false specie: notes or coins. As with his explication of the gift, 
Derrida looks closely enough at counterfeit money to elucidate its mode of 
operation. The full quotation goes as follows:
Counterfeit money is never, as such, counterfeit money. As soon as it is 
what it is, recognized as such, it ceases to act as and to be worth 
counterfeit money. It only is by being able to be, perhaps, what it is.73
Those of us who have ever unwittingly been in possession of counterfeit 
money and have had it recognized as such by an on-the-spot waiter or 
shopkeeper, know that this is the case -  once the money has been recognised to 
be false it must, of course, be removed from circulation, and what mysteriously 
held the power of monetary value -  pure exchange value -  is demoted almost 
before your eyes to mere substance: to paper, ink, or base metal. As with the
72 Derrida, Given Time: 1, p. 87.
73 Ibid.
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gift, then, counterfeit money, once recognized, can no longer be what it had 
claimed to be. The analogy is strained, however by the oppositional trajectory 
of counterfeit money, moving from the inside of the economic circle to outside 
it altogether, becoming what Derrida later calls a sign without signified.74 After 
this moment of recognition, then, the object (paper, metal) loses the power of 
the ‘perhaps’ which allowed it to pass for the real thing and circulate as //it  
were valuable. I suggest that this modality of the ‘perhaps’ provides a way of 
thinking through the potential for a criticism without simple oppositional 
borders but one which operates instead through the possibilities of excess, of 
the impossible overrun made possible -  a type of living on the borderlines 
which Derrida thinks through in his parallel essays of the same title. Having 
recognized, then, what Derrida calls the irreducible modality o f counterfeit 
money -  neither inside nor outside the system of value, existing only in the 
potential of the ‘perhaps’, let me return to my consideration of the work of J. S. 
G. Boggs, where I wish to suggest that Boggs’ work and alternative readings of 
Boggs’ work also circumscribe these questions regarding the borderlines 
between economic and aneconomic as well as between text (or theory of text) 
and the ‘real’ world upon which text supposedly comments.
Boggs is an artist who draws, prints, and occasionally mints his own money. 
Boggs’ bills are elaborate, facsimile, life-size drawings of actual paper notes of 
various currencies and denominations.75 The bills, which can appear accurate at 
first glance, are not (necessarily) counterfeit -  and Boggs himself is quite clear 
that they are not. On close inspection of a Boggs bill one can see the kinds of
74 Derrida, Given Time: 7, p. 93.
73 The American term bill stands here for notes, and not the bill of sale (or ‘check’ in U.S.
English) referred to later.
29
deliberate errors always used by money artists to protect themselves from 
charges o f counterfeiture, while backhandedly remarking on the curious stuff 
that is money. A typical Boggs bill, parodying the now withdrawn United 
States 1000 dollar bill, reveals many obvious errors (fig. 2).76 In the bottom 
right-hand comer, for example, Boggs has signed his own name, under the title 
‘Secret of the Treasury’, rather than Secretary. On the left-hand side the name 
W. Michael Harnett appears as the ‘Treasurer o f Art’. This marks a respectful 
reference to Boggs’ predecessor, William Michael Harnett, who specialised in 
trompe l’oeil money painting during the art-form’s U. S. heyday at the end of 
the nineteenth century, and was himself charged with counterfeiting. More 
subversively, beneath the central image of former U. S. president Grover 
Cleveland in the centre o f the bill, Boggs has written, in place of Cleveland’s
77name: ‘A lot o f lines’. The president’s image on the actual bill represents the 
power and authority o f the state, while Boggs’ humorous intervention disrupts 
this, reminding us that the engraving is ‘a lot o f lines’, collapsing its symbolic 
structure and thus reducing it to, in Derrida’s terms, a signifier without 
signified. This further serves as a disruption of paper money’s function as sign. 
Paper money originally stood in for the gold for which it could be exchanged, 
and could be read therefore as referring simply to a real or intrinsic value.
Since the widespread abandonment of a gold-standard, paper money typically
76 While Boggs* bills reproduce the actual dimensions and colours of United States currency, 
the publishers o f the catalogue from which this image was taken were forced, after intervention 
by die U.S. Secret Service, to print the images at 150% larger than actual size in order to avoid 
charges of counterfeiting. I have maintained this enlargement in the image presented here.
77 Grover Cleveland was a notorious gold-money man, a promoter o f the gold-standard in the 
debates over bimetallism and the issuing of paper currency in nineteenth century America. The 
joke is therefore on Cleveland, both in this case and in the story Walter Benn Michaels tells 
from Alfred Frankenstein’s After the Hunt (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), which relates 
that friends o f Cleveland once persuaded money artist John Haberle to paint a trompe 1’oeil 
five-dollar bill on a library table at the White House which Cleveland subsequently tried to 
pick up. Cited in Michaels, pp. 161-2.
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Figure 2: J. S. G. Boggs. Boggs bill (1990), from Olson, ed., J.S.G. Boggs: 
Money (HardCurrency). Exhibition catalogue, p. 10.
signifies the more unstable exchange value -  in terms of its purchasing power 
and the ability to exchange it for goods. This system is backed by government 
controls of course, and it is in this sense that paper money can be seen to 
represent state power through the depiction of official seals and portraits. In 
disrupting the signifying function of money, Boggs draws attention to its 
conventionality, as well as its dependence on our shared credit in the system by 
which it operates. Paper money, like art, does not have intrinsic value -  it 
merely represents value as long as we place faith in it and the state supports it. 
Shell makes the point best: ‘Credit, or belief, involves the ground of aesthetic 
experience, and the same medium that confers belief in fiduciary money (bank 
notes) and in scriptural money (accounting records and money of account, 
created by the process o f bookkeeping) also seems to confer it in art.’78 Thus, 
Boggs places a pithy aphorism in the top left-hand comer of the bill, ‘This note 
is legal art for all those who agree, see?’
Returning to the question of counterfeiture I should state that a Boggs bill will 
also only have one side -  the back is typically blank, showing Boggs’ 
thumbprint to authenticate the bill and, once transacted, the complex details of 
the transaction. It is in the transactions themselves that Boggs departs from the 
established history of American trompe l’oeil money artists such as Harnett, 
John Haberle and Otis Kaye.79 For Boggs, who, like all performance artists, 
lives on the borderline of art and life, not only draws his own money, he also 
goes out and spends it. Lawrence Weschler chronicles a typical transaction as 
follows: Boggs goes into a restaurant and has dinner with friends. When the
7* Shell, Art and Money, p. 73.
79 See Shell, ‘Representation and Exchange: America’, chapter three of Art and Money, pp. 56- 
117, for a discussion of Harnett, Haberle and Kaye.
31
bill (or check) arrives Boggs produces one of his hand-drawn notes and offers 
to pay, making it clear to his recipients that he is offering not money but art, 
and claiming that the value is uncertain but that he will arbitrarily assign it the 
dollar value which happens to be written on the note and which more than 
covers the cost o f the meal. The waiter (or shop clerk, bartender, or hotel 
manager in the case of our first image, the object of the transaction being a stay 
in a Paris hotel), is then typically drawn into a perplexing discussion on the 
meaning of money and/or art, with Boggs and his victim debating such topics 
as individual versus institutional determination of value. Incredibly, in a small 
number of cases his bill is accepted in lieu of ‘real’ cash and when this happens 
Boggs then demands exact change in ‘real money’ as well as a receipt, and he 
records all of the details of the transaction -  serial numbers for the change, 
receipt number, etc. on the back of the hand-drawn bill.
A few days later, after the recipient o f the bill has had, Boggs says, ‘some time, 
unbothered, to think about what’s just transpired’,80 Boggs will sell his half of 
the transaction -  the receipt and change -  to one of the collectors who have 
established a healthy market in his work. While Boggs’ half of the transaction 
is sold at a considerable increase in price, the artwork is not complete until it 
has been reunited with the bill transacted in the restaurant. The collector or 
their dealer then has to track down the restaurant owner and negotiate to buy 
the original bill -  and so the complex discussions proliferate as the value of the 
completed piece climbs. Once sold to a collector or museum the completed 
piece, now worth substantially more than the original restaurant meal for which
80 Lawrence Weschler, Boggs: A Comedy o f  Values (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999), p. 9.
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it was exchanged, is displayed in the manner of the opening image, ‘Life and 
Times’, with the Boggs bill, the change (now curiously removed from 
circulation and turned into artwork), the receipt, all in their separate cases and 
hung along with evidence of the object of the transaction (a menu, dressing 
gown, etc). Thus, as Boggs points out, the artwork is not merely the hand- 
drawn bill but rather the series of transactions that the bill has initiated.81
Since Boggs’ flirtation with the meaning of money and the process by which 
money means began (accidentally, he claims, in the mid-eighties), he has 
transacted well over a million dollars worth of his own money,82 a fact that has 
not gone unnoticed by those state institutions upon whom the power to confer 
value on paper usually rests. Although he has never been tried for 
counterfeiting in the United States, he has been in legal dispute with the US 
Secret Service over the return of confiscated artwork since 1992. In 1987 he 
was arrested and prosecuted for counterfeiting in both Great Britain and 
Australia, but was acquitted on both occasions, announcing after the British 
trial his intention to live entirely on his art for one year, which arduous task he 
completed in November 1988.
How, then, are we to read Boggs’ artwork? How are we to name it? From the 
opening image I have proposed that Boggs’ work exists in the borderlands, in 
the potential domain of a new economic criticism. In consequence, any reading 
is open to the potential pitfalls described above -  that of policing the borders of 
an outdated binary, or subsuming all analysis into economic determinism.
81 Weschler, pp. 68-9.
82 Weschler, p. 138.
83 Weschler, p. 116.
Thus, for example, Bruce Chambers, who commented on Boggs’ work for the 
accompanying catalogue to the Smart Money exhibition, finds that Boggs 
‘restores to money the element of trust’84 -  returning the individual 
(presumably humanist) promise to pay to the heart of what had become 
anonymous, de-personalized state control or market exchange. In this analysis, 
the aneconomic/economic binary remains intact. This seems to me 
unsatisfactory. For if Boggs offers a route out of the blindly calculating 
rationality of economics, as his year of literally living on ‘counterfeit’ money 
would seem to suggest, then he simultaneously offers a route back in, in terms 
of his ever-increasing value in the world of the art market -  in which he plays a 
very significant role as the obsessive recorder of all transactions, increasingly 
necessary as his value goes up and his work is imitated by forgers.
Furthermore, rather than establishing trust between individuals in a transaction,
Boggs’ work typically draws trust itself into question, highlighting the extent to
which conventional monetary exchange is always a risk dependent on giving
credit to a system which is inherently unstable. Moreover, Boggs asks his
victims to take a risk on him as an artist, while never revealing that he is, in
fact, making them a gift which will repay their investment many times over
(paradoxically then, a ‘true’ gift, as they do not recognize it as such). Boggs’
art, in fact, most closely circumscribes the abyssal structures established by
Derrida for both gift and counterfeit money in Given Time: 1 and thus it may
be deconstruction, after all, which bears the most potential for a reading of
Boggs’ interdisciplinary artwork. Both gift and non-gift, Boggs’ endless
84 Bruce W. Chambers, ‘J.S.G. Boggs -  The Dimensions of Money’, in J.S.G. Boggs: Smart 
Money (Hard Currency), Exhibition catalogue, ed. by Ann S. Olson, (Tampa: Tampa Museum 
of Art, 1990), pp. 7-16 (p. 12).
34
oscillation into and out of the odyssean circle of economics offers an ongoing 
working out o f the borderlines of economic and aesthetic representative forms 
‘once more, from the ground up’.85 Since Derrida reminds us that counterfeit 
never shows itself as such, it is tempting to agree with Boggs that his work 
does not cross that particular legal borderline. However, the self-conscious 
fictionality of the work also reminds one of the parallel drawn by Derrida 
between the nature of fiction and what he calls the ‘supplementary power’ of
o / r
counterfeit money. In this account, counterfeit money does not lay claim to 
the title ‘counterfeit money’ (as Boggs refuses to lay claim to it) but yet still 
‘obligates’ you (as the recipients o f Boggs bills are obligated) and in doing so, 
Derrida says, ‘nevertheless obliges you to wonder again, at least, what is going 
on and if there is money—true money, counterfeit money, counterfeit true 
money and truly counterfeit money’.87
The playful subversion present in Boggs’ work and revealed by a close 
consideration of its deconstructive potential does not, it seems to me, fall prey 
to being subsumed by either side o f the binary which has proved so 
problematic for economic criticism. Rather, the subversion folds back through 
the economic as much as the aneconomic, unsettling the values of both money 
and art. Surprisingly, this destabilising effect is most evident when Boggs’ 
work seems at its most conventional -  tamed within the glass boxes of the 
opening exhibit. Returning to the extremely conventional frames, it is possible
85 Derrida, ‘Living On. BORDER LINES’, p. 84.
86 Derrida, Given Time: /, p. 97.
87 The full quote here is: ‘But it does not present its titled claims by saying “I am (some) 
counterfeit money,” since counterfeit money is what it is only by not giving itself as such, by 
not exhibiting its titles. And in as much as it obligates it nevertheless obliges you to wonder 
again, at least, what is going on and if there is money—true money, counterfeit money, 
counterfeit true money and truly counterfeit money.’ (Given Time: 1, p. 98).
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to see now that what appeared to be money framed as art could equally be read 
as art which passes itself off as money. Arranged on either side of the blue 
gown, and read from left to right, the documents and objects displayed in ‘Life 
and Times’ also provide, as Arthur Danto notes, a ‘narrative of the transaction’ 
represented,88 while at the same time underlining the fictionality of all 
narrative, economic or otherwise. Close inspection shows the slight anomalies 
which we have now come to expect -  the apparently ‘real’ 500 franc notes in 
one of the frames have been elevated to the value of 5000, a deliberate error to 
protect against charges o f counterfeiting, but perhaps also a reminder of the 
moment on New Year’s Eve 1971 when 100 old francs were replaced with 1 
new franc -  requiring an overnight imaginative leap in our shared 
understanding of the economic sign system. Borrowing Derrida’s closing 
thoughts from Given Time: 1 and substituting Boggs for Baudelaire, we can see 
that
perhaps, then, [Boggs] reminds us of the institutionality of this 
institution, but o f an institution that can only consist in passing itself off 
as natural. He invites us perhaps to suspend, at the end of a question, 
the old opposition between nature and institution, [...] nature and 
convention, knowledge and credit (faith), nature and all its others.89 
This is the kind of economic criticism that I would like to propose. With 
Derrida’s postscript: ‘We are still saying perhaps\ 90
88 Arthur C. Danto, ‘Trompe L’Oeil and Transaction: The Art of Boggs’, in J.S.G. Boggs: 
Smart Money (Hard Currency), (see Olson, above), pp. 25-31 (p. 28).
89 Derrida, Given Time: 1, pp. 169-170.
90 Ibid.
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The analysis of economics in contemporary culture, which I attempt in this 
thesis, must also suspend oppositions in order to live on the borderlines. 
Derrida’s reading of Baudelaire’s story offers the possibility of thinking about 
not simply money, but counterfeit money as homological to narrative fiction: 
‘Everything that will be said, in the story, o f  counterfeit money [...] can be said 
of the story, o f the Active text bearing this title.’91 Counterfeit money is thus 
both a field of reference for the story, and story itself -  both theme and trope. 
This is the case because both counterfeit money and narrative fiction represent, 
in the sense of making present, what they are not -  they live on the limits of 
their signification. As Derrida puts it:
counterfeit money, is not a thing like any other, precisely, in the strictly 
determined sense o f thing; it is ‘something’ like a sign, and even a false 
sign, or rather a true sign with a false value, a sign whose signified 
seems (but that is the whole story) finally not to correspond or be 
equivalent to anything, a fictive sign without secure signification, a 
simulacrum, the double o f a sign or a signifier.
To be clear, this is not a matter o f counterfeit and fiction belonging equally to 
the category of the ‘false’ or the ‘fake’, which would imply the possibility of 
its opposite -  truth. ‘Baudelaire is not lying’, says Derrida.93 Instead, both 
counterfeit money and fiction suspend and enact the ‘old opposition’ between 
the false and the true. Both fiction and counterfeit money ‘seem’. In addition, 
since counterfeit money is only counterfeit in the condition of not giving its 
title, the homology is most appropriate where fiction is not self-conscious in its 
fictionality, hence my emphasis is on realist narrative (where the modality of
91 Derrida, Given Time: / , p. 86.
92 Ibid, p. 93.
93 Ibid, p. 94.
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the ‘perhaps’ is deployed) rather than the postmodern (in which it is openly 
displayed).
Drawing the homology between counterfeit money and fiction, Derrida also 
draws attention to the distinction between narrative and narration. The title, 
‘Counterfeit Money’, he tells us, is subject to an excess of interpretations, 
naming ‘at once the ‘thing’ (counterfeit money as thing) and the narrative of 
the story, and even the narrative act (the narration) of the narrative of the 
story’.94 The three aspects named here recall the narratological convention of 
distinguishing between two or three narrative levels: between referent (thing), 
story (narrative told) and discourse (narrative act of telling). Agreement over 
these terms has never been universal however, so that the Russian formalist 
distinction between ‘fabula’, or what is told, and ‘sjuzhet’, how it is told, does 
not always map perfectly on to the Anglo-American structuralist ‘story’ and 
‘discourse’.95 Narrative itself, then, has always been subject to an excess of 
interpretations. According to Mark Currie, some more recent narrative analysis 
has changed the emphasis to ‘narrative as a dynamic process rather than a static 
structure’,96 including Peter Brooks, who proposes the term ‘plot’ which, he 
suggests, can cut across the distinction between the two levels in order to
94 Derrida, Given Time: / ,  p. 93.
95 On the different narratological traditions see, for example, Martin Me Quillan, ‘Introduction. 
Aporias of Writing: Narrative and Subjectivity’, in The Narrative Reader, ed. by Martin 
McQuillan (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 1-33 (pp. 4-7) and Jonathan Culler ‘Story and 
Discourse in the Analysis of Narrative’ The Pursuit o f  Signs: Semiotics, Literature, 
Deconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 2002), pp. 169-187, repr. in Narrative 
Theory: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies, vol. 1, ed. by Mieke Bal, (London: 
Routledge, 2004) pp. 117-131.
96 Mark Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 142.
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‘consider both story elements and their ordering’, although he also retains a 
distinction between plot and story.97
The broader field o f narrative theory has, therefore, inevitably moved beyond 
the formalism of early structuralist attempts to discern distinct levels of 
narration. The impossibility of this task was noted early on by Barbara 
Hermstein Smith, who argued that ‘for any particular narrative, there is no 
basically basic story subsisting beneath it but, rather, an unlimited number of 
other narratives that can be constructed in response or perceived as related to
Q O
it.’ Awareness of the limitations o f narratology have led to a dispersal of 
theories focused on the problems and possibilities o f narrative reading, which 
Martin McQuillan dubs the ‘post-structuralist narrative diaspora’.99 Thus, in his 
own recent attempt to re-think the question of narrative voice, Nicholas Royle 
cites Mieke Bal, who has also lately criticised narratology’s ‘positivistic 
claims, formalist limitations, and inaccessible, idiosyncratic jargon’.100 Royle 
expresses a desire, shared with Bal, to focus instead on ‘the strange nature of 
narrative fiction as such’.101
Bearing all of the above in mind, it is my intention, in the following discussion, 
to draw upon some of the established critical vocabulary of narrative analysis,
97 Peter Brooks, from Reading fo r  the Plot: Design and Intention In Narrative (New York: 
Knopf Press, 1984), in The Narrative Reader, ed. by Martin McQuillan (London: Routledge,
2000), pp. 145-52 (p. 147).
98 Barbara Hermstein Smith, ‘Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories’ Critical Inquiry, 7 
(1980), 209-18, repr. in The Narrative Reader (see Martin McQuillan, above), pp. 138-45 (p. 
144).
99 McQuillan, ‘Introduction’, p. 7.
100 Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory o f  Narrative (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997), p. xiv, cited in Nicholas Royle, ‘The “Telepathy Effect”: Notes Toward a 
Reconsideration o f Narrative Fiction’, in Acts o f  Narrative, ed. by Carol Jacobs and Henry 
Sussman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 93-109 (249n).
101 Royle, (249n).
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while also bringing a post-structuralist perspective to bear on issues such as 
narrative voice, narrative time or the structure of classic realist narrative. Since 
narrative always exceeds the limits ascribed to it, I am not interested in tying 
narrative to a specific definition or structure. While I pay attention, variously, 
to the representation of economics as ‘the ‘thing’ [...] and the narrative of the 
story, and even the narrative act [...] of the narrative of the story’102 I view all 
of these characteristics (themes and tropes) as possibilities for narrative 
reading, rather than hierarchical structures.103 Nor have I limited the following 
discussion to purely literary narratives. While I am sensitive to generic 
differences between media, contemporary Western culture relies upon films as 
much as novels for the circulation and perpetuation of its stories, and I have 
included both here. I have also tried to give some account of the extension of 
narrative theory into traditionally non-narrative fields, a distinction with which 
this entire thesis is concerned. In the process of this discussion, I argue that a 
post-structuralist reading of the narrative representation of economics should 
undermine the claims of economic science, which posits the possibility of 
referentiality in the pursuit of a finite knowledge about the world it represents, 
and in the stories it tells.
Chapter One is both a first effort at producing a reading of a fictional text about 
economics and a thinking through of the problems and possibilities of doing 
just that. To this end, it is also a critical account of the rhetoric of economics
102 Derrida, Given Time: 1, p. 93.
103 My approach can therefore be distinguished from that o f Ian Reid who, in Narrative 
Exchanges, posits a mode o f narrative analysis borrowed from economic theory which views 
all narrative acts as ‘exchanges’, although he does not limit exchange to a simple model of 
reciprocity, arguing instead for a model of ongoing substitution and dispossession. Reid is not 
particularly interested in economic structures and theories themselves as represented in 
narrative (Ian Reid, Narrative Exchanges (London: Routledge, 1992)).
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movement's appropriation of literary criticism. The narrative turn in economics 
presumes a model o f storytelling which is ordered and author-centred; narrative 
analysis, it is claimed, should aid warring factions within the discipline of 
economics to better understand each other’s point of view. I argue that this 
account of narrative is reductive, and demonstrate by way of a reading of both 
the economic context and the narrative structure of Jane Smiley’s Moo, that, if 
economics and narrative are similar, it is in terms of their unruliness instead of 
their order.
Chapters Two and Three establish the conventions o f financial narrative, which 
is the focus for the main body of this thesis. This move from economics in 
general to representations of the financial economy in particular is justified in 
terms of the emphasis placed on market models in neoclassical economic 
theory and neoliberal public policy. Since the ‘market’ is treated as a 
synecdoche for the entire economy in both public policy and economic theory,
I focus on narratives of the market in order to examine the potential 
inconsistencies embedded in this contemporary, apparently totalising, logic.
The emphasis in these two chapters is on classic realist narrative and I consider 
how this conventional structure works to contain the uncertainty upon which 
market economics is predicated.
Accordingly, Chapter Two considers the narrative structure of Oliver Stone’s 
1987 film, Wall Street, and questions the problematic binary opposition 
between real and fictional economies upon which it depends. I argue that Wall 
Street's conventional narrative structure struggles to contain the speculative
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uncertainty of the financial economy, which threatens to deconstruct the 
opposition between the fictional and the real, and thereby disrupt both the 
narrative structure and the film’s realist credentials. In Chapter Three, through 
a reading of Michael Ridpath’s 1995 financial thriller Trading Reality, I 
further consider the lexicon of financial narrative by examining the gendered 
construction of its central character: rational economic man. The protagonist of 
both financial fiction and economic theory is a masculine ideal which depends 
upon the production and exclusion of its other -  femininity, figured as 
irrational emotion. I argue that the narrative representation of homo 
economicus inevitably displays this instability, which also makes possible the 
interrogation of economic science’s dependence on his character.
Chapters Four and Five offer readings of texts which problematise the 
conventions of financial narrative established in the thesis so far. In Chapter 
Four I examine Ben Younger’s 2000 film Boiler Room, which both repeats and 
subverts the narrative structure of Wall Street. I consider the implications of 
intertextuality for financial narrative and for the constitution of the economic 
subject. Applying Jacques Derrida’s concept of iterability, I argue that the 
excessive repetition of Wall Street in Boiler Room exposes the extent to which 
both texts depend upon a shared discourse, which undermines their pretension 
to offer the definitive account of the world they depict. Far from establishing 
the triumph of the fictional over the real in pre-millennial financial narrative, 
however, Boiler Room also undoes the opposition between the real and the 
fictional by demonstrating the discursive constitution of the economic subject, 
who nevertheless has real effects.
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My final chapter, Chapter Five, returns to the question of the speculative 
uncertainty of the financial economy by way of a reading o f Don DeLillo’s 
Cosmopolis. By both installing and subverting expectations of narrative time, 
Cosmopolis gradually departs from the conventions of financial narrative, and 
confounds the reader as the plot inexplicably unravels. The mounting financial 
crisis at the centre o f the novel’s action is thus also a narrative crisis, invoking 
the limits to any knowledge form which depends on the ability to predict, 
hence represent, the future. I argue that this crisis, inherent in all representative 
structures, also draws into doubt the confidence of economic knowledge. Thus, 
Cosmopolis troubles the stable certainties of both financial and literary 
signification, undermining the rational structures upon which economic theory 
and realist narrative depend.
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Chapter One
Models, Metaphors and Stories: Moo and Economic Narrative in the 
Postmodern Condition
In a 1997 article in Forum fo r Social Economics Warren J. Samuels and Sylvia 
J. Samuels consider their reading of Jane Smiley’s novel Moo as an economic 
model:
It is not at all odd that such a book be reviewed in a scholarly 
economics journal. In a certain technical sense, economics as an 
intellectual, even scientific, discipline is comprised of fiction(s). This 
claim is meant literally: Economic models, the stuff o f most economics 
discourse, are only limited representations of the world to which they 
are meant to apply; some of them, like general equilibrium (GE) theory, 
are acknowledged to be entirely fictional, bearing no substantial 
relationship to actual economies; much can be made of the argument 
that the categories o f economics/economic theory are largely 
metaphors. [...] Moo is, in a sense, a (fictional) model of a certain type 
of university.1
Smiley’s 1995 novel is set on an archetypal state-founded Midwestern 
American university campus in 1989:2 Moo U., as Samuels and Samuels go on 
to attest, resembles their own university, Michigan State, or Iowa State, where 
Smiley has taught. As proponents of social economics, their interest in Moo
1 Warren J. Samuels and Sylvia J. Samuels, ‘The University as a Social Economy: Jane 
Smiley’s Moo', Forum for Social Economics, 26 (1997), 69-78 (pp. 69-70).
2 Jane Smiley, Moo (London: HarperCollins, 1995). All further references are to this edition 
and will be given parenthetically.
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lies in its depiction of the interlocking concerns of an entire community (rather 
than an individual), with its consequent dramas over the allocation of 
resources, the distribution of organizational power and the ‘working out of the 
purposes, values and objectives of an institution’.3 Smiley achieves this textual 
registering of an entire community of interests by peopling her landscape with 
what David Lodge has called her ‘Dickensian abundance of characters’, 
regularly making, as he notes, ‘narrative connections between apparently 
unrelated persons’.4 While reviews of the book have often drawn such 
comparisons with nineteenth-century realism,5 the narrative voice in Moo is not 
limited to an individual consciousness -  of character or narrator. Instead, I wish 
to argue, the novel’s suppressed polyvocal structure may approach the 
totalising gesture of either classic realism or economic modelling, but it 
nevertheless bears witness to the impossibility o f such enterprises. In reading 
Moo's  narrative as an inevitably incomplete economic world-picture, I also 
wish to discuss the problematics of the act of appropriating literary narrative as 
an explanatory supplement to economic theorising, such as Samuels and 
Samuels perform above.
As discussed in the introduction, the last twenty-five years has seen an increase 
in literary and critical studies which either borrow economic terminology for 
the formal discussion of literary texts or examine the economic-historical 
context from which such texts arise. The corresponding development within 
economic theorising has seen a tendency for economists to apply certain
3 Samuels and Samuels, p. 70.
4 David Lodge, Review of Charles Dickens by Jane Smiley, The Atlantic Monthly, May 2002, 
p. 92.
Alison Lurie, in the New York Times Book Review, calls her ‘the Balzac of the late-20 - 
century American Midwest’, reprinted in Moo, inside cover.
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vocabulary and modes of inquiry from literary theory to the language and texts 
of economics. I would like to focus briefly on two such instances, relating to 
the functions o f metaphor and narrative in economic theory, in order to 
examine some of the problems and possibilities of this mode of reading. In the 
extract cited above, Samuels and Samuels contend that just as economic 
models are based on fictions, so Smiley’s fiction can be thought of as an 
economic model. Their analysis presumes the binary separation of the ‘entirely 
fictional’ from the ‘actual’, thus what novels and models share is a common 
position on one side o f the presumed division between representation and 
reality. As ‘limited’ approximations, their usefulness lies nevertheless in their 
ability to provoke thoughts about the real world, ‘providing insight into, and 
raising questions about, the human condition’.6
Diana Strassmann also employs an analogy between economics and 
storytelling, but foregrounds the problematic use of the ‘approximation’ in 
economic theory: ‘The notion of modeling as approximation [...], disguises the 
value judgements hidden behind the decision to count some phenomena as 
more important than others.’ Claiming that something is ‘approximately true’, 
she argues, is not the same thing as admitting it is ‘partially true’. Thus, while 
Samuels and Samuels make an innocuous analogy between models and maps, 
arguing that maps are necessarily reductive, Strassmann points out that this
6 Samuels and Samuels, p. 77. Gregory P. La Blanc also discusses the manner in which 
‘economic models resemble parables, fables, or metaphors’, in ‘Commentary: Economic and 
Literary History: An Economist’s Perspective’, New Literary History, 31 (2000), 355-377 (p. 
360). See also Willie Henderson, Economics as Literature (London: Routledge, 1995) for an 
account of the history o f literary economic writing in the nineteenth century; Also, Henderson, 
‘Metaphor and Economics’, in New Directions in Economic Methodology, ed. by Roger E. 
Backhouse (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 343-67; Vivienne Brown outlines an analogy 
between textuality and the economy itself, as opposed to economics, in ‘The Economy as 
Text’, in New Directions in Economic Methodology (see Backhouse, above), pp. 368-82.
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reduction, while necessary, is not innocent and should be paid attention to, as 
‘models like maps, highlight certain aspects of a situation while suppressing 
others’.7 As an alternative, Strassmann argues that economists need to accept 
the inherent incompletion of economic models, and acknowledge that ‘because 
models by their nature represent only a partial viewpoint, partiality or bias 
cannot be eliminated from theories’. She advocates instead openness to a 
multiplicity of viewpoints which would ‘more adequately [capture] the 
complexity and diversity of economic activities’.8
The rationale for the analogy between novels and models can be found in 
previous work on the literary character of economic theory, most significantly 
that o f Deirdre McCloskey, an economist whose extremely influential 1983 
article (and 1985 book) on ‘The Rhetoric of Economics’ provided the first 
thorough assessment o f the latent literariness of economic theory.9 In the 
preface to the revised second edition of the book, McCloskey describes the 
Rhetoric as ‘a poetics o f economics, focusing on metaphor’;10 her contention is 
that economic writing is essentially, necessarily, literary in character, with 
metaphor the most important figure in use. While she acknowledges the use of 
easily-identifiable, self-conscious metaphors in economic theory such as the 
‘invisible hand’, her attention is more directed to economic writing which 
believes itself to be literal or ‘nonomamental’, but is nevertheless ‘saturated’ in
7 Diana Strassmann, ‘Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of Disciplinary Authority in 
Economics’, in Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics, ed. by Marianne A. 
Ferber and Julie A. Nelson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 54-68 (pp. 55-6).
8 Strassmann, p.65.
9 Deirdre (formerly Donald) N. McCloskey, ‘The Rhetoric of Economics’, Journal o f  
Economic Literature, 31 (1983), 434-61. Later reprinted as D. N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric o f  
Economics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, revised 2nd edn., 1998).
10 D. N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric o f  Economics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2nd 
edn., 1998), p. xiii.
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metaphor. These include apparently non-poetic formulations such as references
to the ‘demand curve’ or the ‘business cycle’: buried metaphors whose users
have forgotten the persuasive work being done by a phrase which thus connects
two once apparently independent spheres.11 Such examples, drawn from the
language of economic modelling, give weight to her assertion that the model is
the economic metaphor par excellence.12 Indeed, as McCloskey shows, the
prevalence of mathematical modelling in economic theory reveals the
metaphorical structure at the heart of economic cognition: ‘Each step in
economic reasoning, even the reasoning of the official rhetoric, is metaphoric.
The world is said to be “like” a complex model, and its measurements are said
11to be like the easily measured proxy variable to hand.’
In a similar fashion to McCloskey, Aijo Klamer and Thomas Leonard 
distinguish between three levels of metaphor in economic writing: pedagogic, 
heuristic and constitutive.14 According to this terminology, pedagogic 
metaphors, such as circular flow diagrams, or imagining the expanding cosmos 
as a balloon, have a limited explanatory function in helping us to ‘get the 
idea’.15 They are used self-consciously to aid the visualisation of a complex 
theory and could potentially be replaced with more literal forms of expression. 
Heuristic metaphors, on the other hand, are the starting point for new 
analogical relationships between different spheres of thought, and are
11 McCloskey, The Rhetoric o f  Economics, pp. 40-44.
12 McCloskey, The Rhetoric o f  Economics, p. 40.
13 McCloskey, The Rhetoric o f  Economics, pp. 40-41.
14 Arjo Klamer and Thomas C. Leonard, ‘So What’s an Economic Metaphor?’, in Natural 
Images in Economic Thought “Markets Read in Tooth and Claw ", ed. by Philip Mirowski 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 20-51.
15 Klamer and Leonard, p. 34.
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indispensable, as they 'stimulate novel approaches to the known’.16 Citing 
examples such as ‘human capital’ or ‘labor market’ (sic), Klamer and Leonard 
show how these neoclassical neologisms incorporated analogies whose 
permutations have been the subject of endless academic enquiry. That this 
enquiry has, in accordance with ‘current economic practice’, taken the form of 
mathematical modelling is immaterial: for Klamer and Leonard a model ‘is 
nothing more and nothing less than an explicitly, most often formally 
articulated analogy’.17 Since Klamer and Leonard note that McCloskey uses 
analogy interchangeably with metaphor, it is possible to see that we are going 
over familiar ground here. For the rhetoricians of economics, models -  whether 
classed as analogy or metaphor -  employ a structure of representation which 
sets them into relation with the real world, whose form they do not simply 
describe, but also prescribe.
This is not necessarily news for economic theory. Klamer and Leonard cite 
Chicago economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman’s 1953 Essays in 
Positive Economics, in which Friedman defends the analogical structure of
1 fteconomic reasoning -  or reasoning ‘as i f . In his defence of economics as a 
positivist science Friedman argues that since economic modelling is in the 
business of validating hypotheses, not describing real conditions, it is 
appropriate that real life variables are treated ‘as i f  they conform to those of 
the model in question.19 For Klamer and Leonard, “‘as i f ’ reasoning’ is ‘the
16 Klamer and Leonard, p. 33.
17 Klamer and Leonard, p. 35.
1S Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1953), cited in Klamer and Leonard, p. 36.
19 Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, in Essays in Positive 
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 3-43 (pp. 40-43).
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characteristic mode of economic discourse’,20 but the predominance of the 
analogy in economic theory is not a problem for Friedman, who (like Samuels 
and Samuels above) preserves a clear-cut distinction between representation 
and reality. Thus, Friedman argues:
A theory cannot be tested by comparing its ‘assumptions’ directly with 
‘reality’. Indeed, there is no meaningful way in which this can be done. 
Complete ‘realism’ is clearly unattainable, [...] Yet the belief that a 
theory can be tested by the realism of its assumptions independently of 
the accuracy o f its predictions is widespread and the source of much of 
the perennial criticism of economic theory as unrealistic. Such criticism 
is largely irrelevant, and, in consequence, most attempts to reform 
economic theory that it has stimulated have been unsuccessful.21 
Models, then, on Friedman’s terms, are fictions: ‘limited representations’ of the 
real world. Questioning their approximation to the real -  a dangerous practice, 
whether employed by critics or practitioners of economic theory -  simply isn’t 
the point.
Milton Friedman’s justification of formalist methodology in economic science 
could appear the ultimate postmodern gesture: negating realism in favour of 
constructivism, as that is all we have. This kind of reading would derive from 
the crudest understanding of postmodern poetics, however. In fact, his anti­
20 Klamer and Leonard, p. 36.
21 Friedman, p. 41. Mark Blaug assesses the shortcomings of Friedman’s edict that economics 
should ‘test implications, instead of assumptions’, finding it a false opposition. The difficulty 
of conducting controlled experiments, he argues, inevitably leads economists back to ‘indirect 
methods o f testing hypotheses, such as examining the “realism” of assumptions [...] If 
economics could conclusively test the implications of its theorems, no more would be heard 
about the lack of realism of its assumptions.’ Such testing is, however, out of the question 
because all economic predictions are ‘probabilistic’. (Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect, 
5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 695.).
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realist argument has the paradoxical effect of preserving an essential real which 
will always exceed our textual imaginings while licensing the endless 
production of unselfconscious models in its image. Nonetheless, Friedman’s 
defence, as quoted above, does register that the dependence of economic 
discourse on representational structures has long been noted, and its 
relationship to ‘real’ conditions has been a recurrent cause for debate.22 
Consequently, any theory of economic rhetoric must do more than simply note 
the presence of analogies or metaphors in economic discourse. At an early 
conference on the consequences of McCloskey and Klamer’s work Robert 
Solow rightly argued that rhetorical analysis needed to move beyond what he 
called the “ ‘look, Ma, a metaphor” stage’.23 Rather, Solow claimed, attention 
should be paid to how specific metaphors work within economic discourse -  an 
activity that looks a lot like the continuous model refining to which so much 
economic theory is devoted. In their response to what they refer to as ‘ Solow’s 
“so what?”’, Klamer and Leonard go some way towards this.24 Moreover, they 
appear to at least consider the wider question in which I am interested here: if 
we acknowledge that economics is dependent on metaphorical structures of 
signification, what implications does this have for economic discourse in the 
postmodern condition?
Klamer and Leonard’s three part analysis of economic metaphor concludes 
with the ‘constitutive metaphor’ which, according to their model, appears as
22 For an account of recent attempts to introduce greater ‘realism’ into economic theory see 
Fabienne Peter, ‘Rhetoric vs Realism in Economic Methodology: A Critical Assessment of 
Recent Contributions’, Cambridge Journal o f  Economics, 25 (2001), 571-589.
23 Robert M. Solow, ‘Comments From Inside Economics’, in The Consequences o f  Economic 
Rhetoric, ed. by Arjo Klamer, Donald N. McCloskey and Robert M. Solow (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 31-37 (p. 34).
24 Klamer and Leonard, p. 21.
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the fundamental conceptual framework within which any knowledge-form 
characterises its relationship to the world. The discursive regime of 
neoclassical economics, for example, is based upon a constitutive metaphor 
which figures social relations as natural and thus considers them in terms 
borrowed from the physical sciences.25 Constitutive metaphors are 
fundamental, for Klamer and Leonard, because they establish the rules of the 
conversation -  rules which have become ‘entrenched’, and therefore unnoticed: 
‘Usually implicit, constitutive metaphors determine what makes sense and 
what does not; they will determine, among other things, the effectiveness of 
pedagogical and heuristic metaphors.’26 While constitutive metaphors risk 
becoming over-arching arbiters of truth here, attention to the role of 
constitutive metaphors in economic theorising gives way to an understanding 
of economics as an inevitably discursive practice. Thus Klamer and Leonard 
call for an examination of the metaphors which govern the discursive regime of 
economics and commend the work already done by Michel Foucault in this 
respect.27
As Klamer and Leonard propose the need to ‘dig’ (their term) for the 
fundamental constitutive metaphors of economic theory, it is clear that their
25 Klamer and Leonard, pp. 39-41. They reference exemplarily the work of Philip Mirowski, 
who examines the history o f economic science and its foundation on a set of metaphors 
borrowed from physics in More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as 
Nature’s Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Mirowski further 
explores the influence of cybernetics on modem neoclassical economic theory in Machine 
Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002).
26 Klamer and Leonard, p. 40.
27 Ibid, p.41. They refer specifically to Michel Foucault, The Order o f  Things (London: 
Routledge, 2002) and The Archaeology o f  Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1989). An 
overview of Foucault’s engagement with economic thought in The Order o f  Things is 
presented in Jack L. Amariglio, ‘The Body, Economic Discourse, and Power: An Economist’s 
Introduction to Foucault’, History o f  Political Economy, 20 (1988), 583-613.
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investigation suffers from an overly hierarchical approach, whereby meaning 
can be finally excavated through analysis. Nevertheless, as shown above, 
constitutive metaphor gives way to discursive practice under the pressure of 
their model, thereby opening up the possibility for a rhetorical analysis of 
economic theory which potentially acknowledges that the rules of meaning are 
shared constructions which can become fixed, but can also change, over time. 
Economic metaphors are not, as they are for Milton Friedman, inevitable 
fictions whose presence we acknowledge but can simply over-ride. Instead, 
Klamer and Leonard, taking their cue from Nietzsche, appreciate the 
significance of metaphor for knowledge formation: ‘Metaphors persist because 
we cannot think without them. It is not so much that metaphors are cognitive; 
rather, cognition is metaphorical.’ This reference to the old opposition 
between metaphor and concept highlights the stakes in play: in proving the 
persistence of metaphor in economic theory, it is important not to imagine we 
can pin metaphors down, thus turning them into substitute concepts.
Unfortunately, Klamer and Leonard seem to ultimately miss this point. Among 
the implications for metaphorical investigation they advocate is their 
suggestion that an understanding of the conflicting constitutive metaphors 
framing discursive practice could account for the pernicious quarrelling 
between schools of thought within economic theory, as well as outside it.29
28 Klamer and Leonard, p. 26. They quote Nietzsche on truth as ‘a moveable host of metaphors, 
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms’ which, ‘after long usage’ have become fixed. His 
reliance on the metaphor o f money is particularly pertinent: ‘Truths are illusions which we 
have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been 
drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as 
metal and no longer coins.’ (Friedrich W. Nietzsche Philosophy and Truth: Selections from  
Nietzsche’s Notebooks o f  the Early 1870s ed. by D. Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 84-9, cited in Klamer and Leonard, p. 26).
29 Klamer and Leonard, pp. 42-44.
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Thus, ‘the notion of constitutive metaphors offers a way to decipher the noisy, 
mixed signals that characterize communication between academic economists 
and the rest o f the world.’30 The suggestion seems to imply that, if contrasting 
discursive regimes are responsible for ‘confusion and miscomprehension’31 
between economic theorists, then an understanding of economics based on the 
rhetorical function of metaphor can clarify the confusion and, perhaps, heal the 
differences. Klamer and Leonard do not go so far as to say this (although, as 
we shall shortly see, McCloskey does) but their repeated invocation to 
‘unearth’, ‘uncover’ and ‘identify’32 the constitutive metaphors of economic 
theory to this end betrays an understanding of the metaphorical which amounts 
to little more than literal clarification.
Returning to the relationship between economics and fiction then, the 
rhetorical analysis of economic metaphors exposes a range of positions 
wherein economic theory is seen as ‘simply’ fictional, inevitably analogical or 
discursively constructed. While these approaches appear to offer promise for a 
poststructuralist reading which would trouble the border between economics 
and literature, their practitioners do not always fully embrace that potential. 
This is particularly the case with McCloskey, whose account of the role of 
narrative in economics suffers from the same desire to soothe the quarrels of 
economic theory as Klamer and Leonard do above. After briefly considering 
the features of McCloskey’s account of narrative, I will attempt to demonstrate 
how a reading of a fictional narrative about postmodern economics -  Smiley’s
30 Ibid, p. 43.
31 Ibid, p. 43.
32 Klamer and Leonard, p. 44.
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Moo -  gives space to the poststructuralist potential of a narrative approach 
which is missing from McCloskey’s version.
While the Rhetoric is most concerned with metaphor, McCloskey’s later work 
engages with the role o f narrative in economics, specifically her 1990 article 
‘Storytelling in Economics’, later included in I f  You ’re So Smart: The 
Narrative o f  Economic Expertise, which she describes as a ‘narratology of 
economics, focusing on its stories’.33 As with metaphor, narrative is, for 
McCloskey, an inevitable component of economic theory, as economists are 
humans, who use stories ‘both to explain and to understand’.34 Borrowing from 
literary criticism, she cites on this point Peter Brooks: ‘Our lives are 
ceaselessly intertwined with narrative, with the stories that we tell, all of which 
are reworked in that story of our own lives that we narrate to ourselves. ... We 
are immersed in narrative.’35 Narrative is distinguished from metaphor by 
McCloskey in terms of both its application and its explanatory power: thus, 
metaphors resemble models and are good at explaining static relations between 
elements in order to predict the future, whereas narratives are best used 
historically -  to describe the dynamic evolution of the set of relations in 
question. These two ‘modes of explanation’ are used interchangeably in 
economics, she notes, each answering to the weaknesses of the other.
33 D. N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric o f  Economics, p. xiii; ‘Storytelling in Economics’, in 
Narrative in Culture: The Uses o f  Storytelling in the Sciences, Philosophy and Literature, ed. 
by Cristopher Nash (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 5-22; I f  You’re So Smart: The Narrative o f  
Economic Expertise (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).
» 34 McCloskey, ‘Storytelling in Economics’, p. 7.
35 Peter Brooks, Reading fo r the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (New York: Vintage, 
1985), p. 3, quoted in McCloskey, ‘Storytelling in Economics’, p. 7.
36 McCloskey, ‘Storytelling in Economics’, pp. 5-7.
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The importance of storytelling for economics is demonstrated by McCloskey 
through her discussion of a number of narrative features deployed in economic 
writing, such as plot, genre, implied reader and the sense of an ending. As with 
metaphor, she finds that analysis of the literary devices used by economists 
provides a greater insight into the causes of disagreements between them, as 
they select material and organise their plot structure and conclusion (or moral) 
according to the prescriptions of the school of thought to which they are 
attached. Misunderstandings thus arise because others are unfamiliar with the 
genre rules or because they are followed inexpertly.37 Indeed, McCloskey’s 
critique is partly founded on the idea that economists are too often poor 
storytellers. A literary critical approach will, she hopes, persuade economists to 
be more self-conscious about their storytelling -  not in order to avoid narrative, 
since that would be impossible, but to be better at it.
As with metaphor, McCloskey’s acknowledgement of the inevitable presence 
of narrative in economic theory may seem to offer the possibility of a newly 
permeable border between fiction and economics, which could radicalise the 
foundation of economic science on factual description. Occasionally, her 
account seems to offer this potential, promoting, for example, a ‘theory of 
reading’ which would admit that ‘scientific prose like literary prose is 
complicated and allusive, drawing on a richer rhetoric than mere 
demonstration’.39 The dangerous complexity offered by the narrative form is 
too frequently lost, however, in the effort to fashion a narratology which would 
aid economic understanding. Here McCloskey draws her precedents from
37 ‘Storytelling in Economics’, pp. 10-17
38 Ibid, p. 20.
39 Ibid, p. 11.
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structuralist narratology. Thus, she advocates the approach of Vladimir Propp -  
classifying the categories of plot, function, or character in economic narrative -  
while also adopting Gerald Prince’s definition of the ‘minimal story’, and 
quoting Tzvetan Todorov on the typology of genre.40 It is easy to see why 
McCloskey finds these models attractive: narratology has always promised the 
possibility of a map which would tame the unruliness of narrative, dogged, as it 
is, by what Andrew Gibson calls ‘dreams of the geometric’. Tracing the 
opposition between scientific and poetic modes of thought within narratology, 
Gibson finds that, like formalist economics, narratology is concerned with ‘the 
space of the model or describable form’.41 The narrative form which lends 
itself most to this analysis is classic realism, to which McCloskey is also 
drawn. Thus, while she gladly admits that realism is, of course, fiction -  an 
‘illusion of direct experience’42 -  it is the conventional structure o f the 
nineteenth century novel which she advocates for economic storytelling: ‘Good 
empirical work in economics, [...] is like realistic fiction. Unlike fantasy it 
claims to follow all the rules o f the world.’43
McCloskey’s narratology of economics, then, is concerned to establish the 
rules for an economic storytelling which might, she says, bring peace to the 
‘grim little wars of misreading’ which are causing ‘chaos’ in economics.44 
Contrary to the public image o f science’s dependence on consensus, she points
40 D. N. McCloskey, I f  You 're So Smart: The Narrative o f  Economic Expertise (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 25-30. She cites Vladimir Propp, Morphology o f  the 
Folktale 2nd edn. trans. by Laurence Scott (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968); Gerald 
Prince, A Grammar o f  Stories (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); Tzetvan Todorov, The Poetics o f  
Prose, trans. by Richard Howard, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
41 Andrew Gibson, Towards a Postmodern Theory o f  Narrative (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1996), p. 3.
42 McCloskey, ‘Storytelling in Economics’, p. 15.
43 Ibid, p. 17.
44 Ibid, p. 20.
57
out that economic science has long been riven by disputes between different 
schools of thought. Attention to variance in storytelling techniques will, 
McCloskey claims, ‘[make] it clearer why economists disagree’.45 Some of the 
limitations of McCloskey’s approach arise because this is her projected 
outcome. Seeking clarity of opinion in the ‘grim little wars’, for example, her 
literary criticism becomes both structuralist and author-centred: concerned to 
understand the narrative strategies deployed in order to better establish the 
writer’s point o f view. Narrative is ultimately reduced to realist narrative 
which, while undoubtedly fictional, nevertheless tries for better approximations 
to the real. Instead o f opening economic narrative up to the troubling fact of its 
own construction, McCloskey reduces it to what she says she repudiates: ‘mere 
demonstration’. The effect, an inevitable result of the narratological fascination 
with the model, is to position herself outside both the narratives themselves and 
the wars resulting from them: ‘Looking on economics as poetry or fiction -  or 
for that matter, as history -  gives the economist a place to look in from 
outside.’46 Speaking from that place, McCloskey, like the narrator in a 
nineteenth-century novel, imagines an ordered world in which the literary 
approach to economics will ‘[reunify] the conversation of mankind’. This will 
produce, she says (only slightly tongue-in-cheek): ‘a universe in equilibrium 
and a happy ending’.47 Paradoxically, however, the reunification can only be 
achieved by re-invoking the border between economics and literature -  to ‘look 
in from outside’. A more poststructuralist approach to narrative would, I hope 
to demonstrate, destabilise this border, although this is unlikely to produce the 
consensus dreamt of in McCloskey’s model.
45 McCloskey, I f  You ’re So Smart, p. 36.
46 McCloskey, ‘Storytelling in Economics’, p. 20.
47 Ibid, p. 21.
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Approaching the border from the opposite side to McCloskey, Eleanor
Courtemanche equally uses narrative analysis to consider the similarities
between economics and classic realist fiction.48 Specifically, she analyses the
nineteenth-century coincidence of the popularisation of the free-market
metaphor of the invisible hand as it occurred alongside the development o f the
realist novel. As with Samuels and Samuels at the outset, Courtemanche tries
an analogical approach, although she is concerned to consider ‘why the free
market is like a novel’, rather than the other way around. Her argument is that
both the nineteenth-century novel and the free market metaphor depend upon a
‘perspectival illusion’ whereby the fantasy of a self-regulating moral and social
order is maintained through reference to an invisible force which remains
outside that oirder and comments upon it. In the case of free-market capitalism,
references to the invisible hand operate to mask the class interests being served
by the socio-economic system, and help maintain its compositional fiction that
total social good is created from the combined self-interested acts of
individuals. This, for Courtemanche, is structurally analogous to the nineteenth
century novel, in which the use of an interventionist omniscient narrator
provides a viewpoint fro m  which the chaotic detail of the characters’
experience is similarly revealed to be part of an ordered whole. In both cases
the vanishing point o f the world picture necessarily presumes another position
outside the system altogether -  that o f the theorist or author who can see and
understand the invisible forces at work: Adam Smith, Dickens or Eliot. While
Smith is describing an ideal capitalist society yet to come into existence,
Dickens and Eliot are critics of the economic conditions of their own time.
48 Eleanor Courtemanche, invisible Hands and Visionary Narrators: Why The Free Market Is 
Like A Novel’, im Metaphors o f  Economy, ed. by Nicole Bracker and Stefan Herbrechter 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005X, pp. 69-78.
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Thus, both the economic theorist and the realist novelist, Courtemanche is keen 
to point out, are interested in describing, not things as they are, but how they 
should be, so that realism amounts to an ‘artfully structured illusion [...] that 
our chaotic social order would be revealed to be morally organised if only 
imagined from the point of view of an omniscient narrator’.49
Courtemanche provides an account of the classic realist novel which chimes 
with that described by Samuels and Samuels or Deirdre McCloskey. Indeed, 
McCloskey would no doubt add that Smith was writing literature anyway, 
thereby accounting for the parallels found in the textual rendering of his social 
vision and that of Dickens. However, it is necessary to question to what extent 
realist narrative is always successful in providing a total picture of social order 
which neatly communicates the viewpoint of its creator -  either novelist or 
theorist. That Adam Smith’s disciples adopted his vision for the defence of pre­
existing social conditions which served their own interests is much recorded, 
and noted by Courtemanche.50 Roland Barthes’s analysis o f Balzac’s Sarrasine 
in S/Z  equally reveals the possibility for classic realist narrative to be inhabited 
by a plurality o f meaning which would resist the projection of a unified 
viewpoint.51 A realist novel may be like an economic model in attempting to 
impose a totalising logic but that does not mean it always succeeds in doing so.
Nevertheless, Courtemanche is correct in observing that the metaphor of the 
‘invisible hand’ was widely deployed throughout the 1990s, typically in 
defence of an even more aggressive laissez-faire free-market capitalism, and
49 Courtemanche, p. 71.
50 Courtemanche, p. 71.
51 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974).
usually employing the same perspectival illusion to conceal the actual interests 
being served. I therefore draw upon her argument here in order to question 
whether contemporary realist narrative, which happens to take those economic 
conditions as its theme, can be seen to employ the same strategies of social 
ordering as the nineteenth-century realists. Through close readings of a series 
of contemporary narratives, some of them unashamedly realist, I wish to argue, 
following Barthes, that narrative will always contain an element of 
undecidability which is ‘not a weakness, but a structural condition of narration: 
there is no unequivocal determination of the enunciation: in an utterance, 
several codes and several voices are there, without priority’. By registering 
this necessary uncertainty at the heart o f (economic) narrative, an uncertainty 
under-appreciated by McCloskey, I wish to demonstrate the destabilising 
potential released by the practice of regarding economics as a literary 
construct.
Jane Smiley’s Moo certainly takes as its subject matter the social conditions 
brought about by the neoliberal, free-market economic policies of the latter 
decades of the twentieth century. The society in question, as noted in my 
opening, is that of a Midwestern university campus -  one funded through state 
grants and thus facing a rapid economic transformation, as the state insists 
upon a series of stringent cutbacks and the university is forced to forge ever- 
stronger links with business and industrial interests, which are themselves 
subject to the invisible hand of the free market. It is useful to compare Smiley’s 
novel with David Lodge’s own campus novel, Nice Work, in order to grasp the
52 Roland Barthes, ‘Textual Analysis o f Poe’s “Valdemar”’, in Untying the Text: A Post- 
Structuralist Reader, ed. by Robert Young (London: Routledge, 1981), pp. 133-161 (p. 158).
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extent to which the market pervades the social (and, I wish to argue, narrative) 
structure of the university in Moo.53 Lodge’s Nice Work is mainly a comic 
treatment o f the relationship between industry and the university, which raises 
some background questions about the effects of economic policy on the 
institution of the university. Like Moo U., the university in Nice Work is the 
result of an earlier government funded programme of expansion, borne of 
policies no longer in fashion and now facing state cutbacks. Consequently, the 
protagonist -  young feminist literary critic Robyn Penrose -  faces job 
insecurity, while her students miss classes because they are working to fund 
themselves, staff share phones and secretaries, and there are repeated 
references to cuts to conference funding or the rationing of stationery. Set in 
the UK towards the end of the 1980s, Rummidge University is thus faced with 
similar economic conditions to Moo U. but it has yet to find the solution of 
welcoming the corporation on to the campus.
This is evident in the narrative structure of Nice Work, in which the worlds of 
industry and finance meet their fictional other -  academia. As Robyn seeks to 
secure an extension to her contract, she is forced to take part in a scheme of 
collaboration between the university and the industrial sector whereby she must 
shadow local businessman, Vic Wilcox, one day a week for one term. Their 
initial antipathy turns into a brief flirtation: thus the novel’s structure becomes 
a pleasurable oscillation between the worlds of industry and learning as each of 
the main characters observes the other with partial admiration and mock 
disdain. Apparent differences are examined and partially exploded; in one case,
53 David Lodge, Nice Work (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989).
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Charles, Robyn’s ex, becomes fascinated with the world of financial trading, 
finding it looks a lot like deconstruction: ‘It’s all on paper, or computer 
screens. It’s abstract. It has its own seductive jargon -  arbitrageur, deferred 
futures, floating rate. It’s like literary theory.’54 However, despite the 
possibilities for collaboration suggested by the novel’s conclusion and echoed 
in their brief affair, the principles of the shadow scheme remain intact in Nice 
Work -  the university and industry are separate worlds, which rarely consider 
involvement in each other. In fact, Vic intrudes on Robyn’s world by 
suggesting that the terms of the scheme should be reversed, intimating 
inappropriately that a two-way process would be beneficial: ‘We in industry 
[...] have a lot to learn too.’55 Ultimately, however, even he rejects as 
unsuitable the idea of infecting the university’s financial structure with the 
principles of industrial capitalism: ‘you’d be playing at capitalism.’56 The 
comic conclusion to the novel borrows excessively from the Victorian 
industrial novel on which Robyn lectures. Thus she receives, in the space of the 
final chapter, a job offer, a legacy from a forgotten uncle in Australia, and a 
marriage proposal, while her bumbling department head discovers that funding 
to re-employ her was available all along. Rich in her new wealth from the 
colonies, it is Robyn who funds Vic’s research, not the other way round. Thus, 
despite the gloomy signs for the future, Lodge employs comic licence to 
reverse the terms of the academic/industrial relationship as we came to 
understand them throughout the 1990s. This sleight o f hand would no longer be 
possible in the context o f Moo U.
54 Lodge, Nice Work, p. 219.
55 Ibid, p. 331.
56 Ibid, pp. 353-4.
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Robyn’s job offer in Nice Work comes from an American colleague who 
featured in Lodge’s previous books in this trilogy, Changing Places and Small 
World.51 Morris Zapp is deliberately represented in the trilogy as a confident 
and affluent academic, whose own working environment, Euphoria University, 
is in marked opposition to the dreary, poverty-stricken, redbrick Rummidge. 
However it is Rummidge, and not Euphoria, which bears the strongest 
resemblance to Moo U., where futures are so uncertain that ‘all the best faculty 
were known to be looking for other jobs and this was known to be a matter of 
indifference to the state board of govemers’(19). The crucial difference 
between Moo U. and Rummidge is in the presence of the corporation on the 
campus, as the funding crisis in higher education is no longer seen to be the 
responsibility o f the state. Thus, early in the novel, we learn that:
Associations o f mutual interest between the university and the 
corporations were natural, inevitable, and widely accepted. According 
to the state legislature, they were to be actively pursued. The 
legislature, in fact, was already counting the ‘resources’ that could be 
‘allocated’ elsewhere in state government when corporations began 
picking up more of the tab for higher education. (22)
The central ‘character’ in Moo is the university itself and the plot revolves 
around the pursuit of funding necessary for the university to continue its 
normal operations. Thus the world of the novel is not simply restricted to 
academic staff but is also peopled with senior management; the development 
division (a body entirely absent in Nice Work), who are charged with bringing
57 David Lodge, Changing Places (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978); Small World 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985).
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in private or corporate funding; students, who need to supplement their income 
with work or loans; and even university commons workers, whose jobs are 
threatened by McDonalds’ takeover of campus catering. As the novel narrates 
one full academic year in the life of the university, this money-plot is set in 
motion in the third chapter when the university’s provost, Ivar Harstad, 
contemplates the possible ‘reallocation’ of seven million dollars to be 
demanded by the state. The uncertainty initiated by the reallocation imbues the 
mood of the novel: ‘Cutbacks, on top of cutbacks already made, were in the air, 
though no one had yet used the word, which was a technical term and a 
magical charm [...] because it instantly transformed the past into a special, 
golden epoch, the grand place that all things had been cut back from’ (21).
The crisis in university funding depicted in Moo is thus represented as a 
moment o f wider change, wherein the role, function, and working of higher 
education become redefined, typically according to a new logic borrowed from 
the economic marketplace. This is evident, for example, in the pervasion of the 
metaphor of the market in the language of academia, where the ‘talk is of 
clients or consumers rather than students’ -  the second chapter of Moo is 
titled ‘More Than Seven Thousand New Customers Every August’(8). Both 
Jan Currie and Edward H. Berman report on the importation of language and 
practices borrowed from corporate management into the academic domain, 
such as the emphasis on ‘strategic planning’ or ‘quality assessment’.59 They
58 H. Miller, ‘States, Economics and The Changing Labour Process of Academics’, in 
Academic Work, ed. by J. Smyth (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995), pp. 40-59, cited 
in Jan Currie, Introduction to Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives, ed. by Jan 
Currie and Janice Newson (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), pp. 1-13 (p. 4).
59 Jan Currie, Introduction to Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives, ed. by J. 
Currie and J. Newson (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), pp. 1-13; Edward H. Berman, ‘The
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link this grassroots transformation of university life to greater corporate 
involvement in university funding, so that the university starts to become 
simply an outpost of business. This is a radical transformation from the 
university’s prior functions as the safeguard of liberal humanist values and the 
storehouse of national culture, as Bill Readings recorded in The University in 
Ruins.60 Once the corporation invades the campus, academia becomes subject 
to the vagaries o f the economics of the marketplace: Moo is, to this extent, a 
novel about the metaphor of the free market. The result of this convergence of 
business and university is that the narrative structure of Moo, unlike Lodge’s 
Nice Work, cannot represent the two domains as separate entities. Indeed it is 
difficult to conceive of the composition of the modem transnational 
corporation, with its complex web of business holdings, often operating 
apparently independently o f each other, as an ‘entity’. Academia and business 
thus form part of an ever-increasing network of interests in Moo, as Arlen 
Martin, a Texan billionaire and president of the TransNationalAmerica 
Corporation summarises for the provost:
‘Our interests continue to coincide, Dr. Harstad. I got hybrid seeds, you 
got plant genetics. I got steel roller mills, you got materials science and 
industrial engineering. I got airplane engine parts, you got aerospace 
engineering. I got chickens, beef, and llamas, you got animal science. I 
got a chemical company that specialises in pesticides, you got 
entomology. I got a big accounting and PR firm, you got a business 
school. Are you catching my meaning, Dr. Harstad? Why should I hire
Entrepreneurial University: Macro and Micro Perspectives From the United States’, in 
Universities and Globalization, pp. 213-33.
60 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
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R and D people just to read what your R and D people already know?’ 
(73)
Provost Harstad’s resistance to these advances is based on Martin’s prior 
involvement with the university, when he attempted to destroy the reputation of 
a scientist he had funded, because he sought to publish findings that were 
contrary to Martin’s business interests. The episode illustrates the concerns 
over academic freedom that accompany the pervasion of academia by market 
logic. However, as Lyotard reminds us in his own report on the transformation 
of higher education, The Postmodern Condition, questions of knowledge have 
always been a subset of questions of finance:
By the end of the Discourse on Method, Descartes is already asking for 
laboratory funds. A new problem appears: devices that optimize the 
performance of the human body for the purpose of producing proof 
require additional expenditures. No money, no proof -  and that means 
no verification of statements and no truth. The games of scientific 
language become the games of the rich, in which whoever is wealthiest 
has the best chance of being right. An equation between wealth, 
efficiency, and truth is thus established.61 
As Lyotard famously discussed in The Postmodern Condition, the particularity 
of the postmodern moment for higher education is not simply that the 
university has become subject to the capitalist marketplace, but also that there 
is a new ‘incredulity’ towards the ‘grand narratives’, such as Enlightenment 
humanism, which had previously legitimated the relationship between
61 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 44-5.
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knowledge and power. Liberal academic principles in the postmodern 
condition are undermined not just by corporate control, but also by the 
postmodern challenge to singular notions of reason and truth. Certainly, 
scientific knowledge could become just a ‘moment in the circulation of 
capital’62 but Lyotard is also interested in the new possibilities unleashed by 
the breakdown of the older discursive regime, as the legitimation of knowledge 
becomes ‘dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements’.63 It is this 
dispersal which is dramatised in Moo.
The multiple interconnecting storylines in Moo correspond to the breakdown 
and dispersal which Lyotard observed in The Postmodern Condition. This can 
be demonstrated through readings of both the novel’s content and its form. In 
terms of content, Moo stages the gradual slippage, for several of the key 
characters, o f the grand narratives upon which both their worldview and their 
subjectivity has been based. This crisis occurs against a backdrop of the 
amplification of the performativity criterion, which measures and legitimates 
production according to means designed to satisfy the needs of the economic 
marketplace -  an outcome which seems to suggest that capital has become the 
sole means for legitimating knowledge. However, I wish to demonstrate that 
some of the potential o f Lyotard’s analysis is also present in Moo U. The plot 
indicates that the result o f the postmodern crisis is the diffusion of multiple, 
competing voices who occasionally intersect to form contingent alliances -  
sometimes in order to confound free-market principles rather than uphold them 
-  but whose sum total does not produce the consensus required of a single
62 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 45.
63 Ibid, p. xxiv.
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universal worldview. This potential arena of competing narratives is also 
registered formally in the novel’s narrative structure, as the position of external 
omniscient narrator is both implied and withheld, suggesting that, in the 
postmodern condition, the totalising viewpoint of the classic realist narrator is 
ultimately unstable.
At the level of content then, Smiley’s Moo, while not an ordered whole, does 
contain the many voices that make up the social network of the university 
depicted. As Samuels and Samuels note, several social types are represented, 
and put into conflict. The two most obvious of these characters -  Chairman X 
and Lionel Gift -  correspond to two of the conflicting grand narrative 
epistemologies of the modem period: socialism and capitalism, or, as Lyotard, 
in his list of archetypal grand narratives, puts it: ‘the emancipation of the [...] 
working subject, or the creation of wealth’.64 X, whose given name is never 
revealed, is the Maoist chairman of the horticulture department, a vegan former 
social activist who exhorts his students to enact small-scale horticultural 
guerilla tactics against the forces of agronomy, which control the campus and 
are destroying the global environment. His oppositional philosophy thus 
operates as a grand narrative by offering his students a subjectivity in relation 
to the future revelation of a singular social truth. His narrative is also totalising; 
thus, we learn that X is afflicted by his ability to ‘so easily imagine the blue 
and sunlit globe of the world, its fragility and variety’ (118), although the 
failure of widespread social activism and the imminent collapse of 
Communism has left him rootless and depressed. Thus, he greets the fall of the
64 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiii.
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Berlin Wall, and the confirmation of the collapse of Communism in Europe -  a 
pivotal moment in the novel -  as renewed cause for self-doubt (195).
X’s gradual disillusionment is evident in other characters too. His great 
adversary Nils Harstad, Ivar’s brother, is a pompous conservative agronomist 
who spent the early part o f his career working in third world development, 
‘exporting not only our know-how and our technology, but also our national 
ideals’ (213), but who has buried the doubt he experienced when agronomy 
failed to fulfil its promise of an end to world-hunger in a new commitment to 
Creation Science. In his zealous pursuit of religion Nils finds a new 
subjectivity, which allows him to ignore the uncertainties generated by the 
collapse of his prior identity. Like X, Margaret Bell, a young black feminist 
literature professor, also depends upon an oppositional philosophy for her 
subjectivity, although she too finds that her ideals are slowly eroding as she 
accepts the bribe of an all-expenses-paid trip to Florida in order to speak at a 
conservative conference, prompting the ‘feeling that she had passed through a 
doorway that she had never realized was there’ (136).
The sense of erosion of prior ideals is accompanied in Moo by both the 
increasing involvement of the corporation on the campus, and the pervasion of 
market logic into all aspects of the character’s lives. For Lyotard this is 
exemplified by the increasing importance of the criterion of performativity, 
which refers to evaluation according to input/output ratios, and which requires 
measurement in terms of units in order that they can be fed into the 
input/output equation. The work/worth of higher education has undergone a
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kind of mathematisation as performativity increasingly measures performance. 
This is evidenced in Moo by the frequency with which characters use 
measurement by counting as a means of evaluation, with varying degrees of 
satisfaction. Thus, Margaret does ‘what she had vowed never to do’ and counts 
the number of questions asked after her paper, using the result ‘as some index 
of the interest she had aroused’ (134). Similarly, when X’s wife, (although they 
never did get round to marrying) Beth, reproaches him with the number of his 
affairs, he responds: ‘Now we are counting? Counting old betrayals? We 
always said we wouldn’t do that’ (276). Nevertheless, X measures the 
depletion of biodiversity in the ‘forty-eight species of toads’ or ‘123 species of 
butterflies!’ threatened with extinction (264). Mary, an African-American 
student whose grades slip after she is disturbed by a racist incident, is 
unsympathetically reminded by her sister that: ‘you got to have the numbers on 
your side. Affirmative Action and all that other stuff can go for you or against 
you, so you always want to have the numbers right in your comer’ (280). Dean 
Jellinek, a scientist who is the rumoured recipient of a large research grant, 
revels in the ‘heavy-sounding sums of money’ which accrue, not just to his 
reputation or stature, but also ‘to his experience of himself (95). Similarly, 
Timothy Monahan, a creative writing professor who spends much of the book 
awaiting the result o f his application for tenure, finds himself continually 
mulling over the numbers which will decide his future, as the tenure committee 
will rank his application on a scale from 1-10. He finds some comfort in the 
fact that he’s had the ‘numbers in his comer’ before:
The advertisement that had attracted his application eight years before 
had attracted 213 other, unsuccessful applications. Seventy-two from
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writers who had one book, as he had had, twelve from writers with two 
books. These were figures he was always cognizant of, never 
mentioned, but also never forgot. (15)
The application of mathematical measurement as a form of self-evaluation is 
particularly appropriate to Lionel Gift, the ironically named professor of 
economics, and highest paid member of the faculty. Gift, whose introductory 
chapter is titled ‘Homo Economicus’ (31), is a figure borrowed directly from 
the textbooks of neoclassical economic theory, where the dependence of much 
economic narrative on the character of ‘rational economic man’ has been 
criticised.65 Lionel Gift is both the subject and the object of his economic 
theories; thus, he organises his life according to deeply-held principles of self- 
interest and the pursuit of wealth, believing that in doing so, ‘all men copied 
the example of their Maker’, who was ‘perfect in the balance He incarnated of 
production and consumption’ (31). For this reason, Gift values his money, and 
consumer goods bought with it, above all his awards and distinctions, and 
makes the ‘principled stand that as long as this university paid him the most 
money (enabling the consumption of the most goods), here was where he 
would stay’ (32). Gift, too, is seen counting -  while dreaming -  the amount of 
times he could be personally bought and sold by Arlen Martin, billionaire. He 
is fascinated by the attachment of the number to the man, and the mystical 
power of money to represent not just goods but personal value (105). 
Measurement o f value according to performativity does not necessarily equate 
to measurement by money but it is particularly open to infection from capitalist
631 will address the construction of the gendered figure o f ‘Homo Economicus’ in more detail 
in chapter 3.
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modes of reckoning. Thus, Lyotard warns in ‘The sign of history’ that, ‘what 
presents itself as unity for the phrases of the postmodern Babel, [...] is the 
imposter-subject and blindly calculating rationality called Capital.’66 Lyotard 
uses the term ‘phrases’, here, to indicate competing language-regimes or 
knowledges -  the proliferating little narratives of the postmodern condition. 
Gift’s free-market capitalism is itself a grand narrative which claims to offer a 
totalising account o f social forces; thus, we must resist, Lyotard argues, ‘the 
pretension of Capital’s phrase to validate all phrases according to its criterion 
of performativity’.67
Unlike Chairman X or Margaret Bell, Lionel Gift is comfortable with 
evaluation by measurement of either mathematics or money. In contrast to their 
unease with both the apparent success of the capitalist model and their gradual 
accommodation to it, Gift exuberantly welcomes it as a confirmation of all that 
he deems rational. This is demonstrated in his keynote lecture on the 
liberalisation of Costa Rica’s economic policies (Gift also works as a 
consultant economic adviser to the Costa Rican government):
RATIONAL coordination of a nation’s local market mechanisms with 
world market mechanisms worked to the mutual satisfaction of 
everyone’s demands -which in theoretical terms were, of course, 
insatiable [...] the control of the international monetary community 
reenforced the RATIONALIZATION of an individual nation’s choices, 
working to bring it into the fold. (68)
66 Jean-Francois Lyotard, ‘The Sign o f History’, trans. by Geoff Bennington, in Post- 
Structuralism and the Question o f  History, ed. by Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington and 
Robert Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 162-180 (p. 180).
67 Lyotard, ‘The Sign of History’, p. 180.
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The ‘blindly-calculating rationality’ of free-market capitalism, as Lyotard puts 
it, refers to neoliberal economic policies which depend upon the neoclassical 
economic philosophy of rational choice. Rational choice theory offers an 
account of the decision-making behaviour of economic actors which finds that 
the best allocation of resources is guaranteed by rational individuals acting 
self-interestedly in order to maximise their own utility. I will discuss some of 
the criticisms of the dependence of neoclassical economics on rational choice 
further in chapter three.
Gift’s faith in the science of rational choice is rewarded every year when he 
asks his new intake of students to take an indifference test, which measures 
self-interest, during which 80% of the class invariably choose to invest tokens 
individually rather than collectively, despite a poorer return on their 
investment. The 20% who make the ‘wrong’ choice are invariably those 
students who have struggled in class and have consequently not learned the 
rules of the conversation. Ingrid Rima points out that the new field of 
‘experimental economics’ is troubled by such tautologies, displaying ‘serious 
limitations which derive, in part, from the typical reliance of such studies on 
university students who have been taught in economics classes to think along 
lines that are consistent with the predictions of neoclassical theory’.68 Gift 
alludes to his teaching as ‘the initiation of a whole new group of customers into 
the domain of truth’ (143), thereby illustrating why Judith Mehta refers to
68 Ingrid H. Rima, ‘From Political Arithmetic to Game Theory: An Introduction to 
Measurement and Quantification in Economics’, in Measurement, Quantification and 
Economic Analysis: Numeracy in Economics, ed. by Ingrid H. Rima (London: Routledge, 
1995), pp. 1-21 (p. 12).
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rational choice theory, itself, as a grand narrative.69 Gift’s confidence in his 
models, along with the imbrication of the corporation and the campus, seem to 
indicate the inevitable triumph of neoliberal economics to ‘present itself as a 
totalising narrative in Moo. This apparent inevitability is resisted, however, and 
I will now consider how both the plot and mode of narration work to 
problematise such a reading.
One of the major plotlines in Moo concerns the production of a secret report,
by Gift, for Arlen Martin, president of TransNationalAmerica Corporation,
approving of Martin’s project to exploit and mine a seam of gold which
happens to run under the world’s last remaining virgin cloud forest, which
happens to be in Costa Rica. TNA, whose motto is ‘we’re in all you do’ (63),
have, of course, managed to infiltrate the campus in a myriad of guises, despite
the unease of the provost, and the much stronger disapproval of his secretary.
Mrs. Walker is the true repository of all knowledge and power in the university
(Ivar is her third provost, and ‘she was glad to have chosen him’ (63)). While
painstakingly investigating Martin’s interests, Mrs Walker secretly manipulates
library budgets to gain access to required information, making her the only
individual in Moo's ‘marketplace of ideas’ to have the funding necessary for
perfect knowledge. Having eventually guessed at the existence of Gift’s report,
she bribes a secretary, with the offer of an immediate transfer to another office,
into finding a copy. This involves the kind of complex plotting and profusion
of minor characters which accounts for the comparison between Smiley and
Dickens. Once armed with her copy, Mrs. Walker embarks on a strategy of
69 Judith Mehta, ‘A Disorderly Household -  Voicing the Noise’, in Postmodernism, Economics 
and Knowledge, ed. by Stephen Cullenberg, Jack Amariglio and David F. Ruccio (London: 
Routledge, 2001), pp. 374-398 (p. 376).
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dissemination and the plot continues by following the trail of one of the freely 
distributed copies as it is exchanged between several of the major characters. 
The report is eventually passed, by writing professor Timothy Monahan, to the 
New York Times, from where it disseminates, causing a scandal which 
eventually brings down Martin’s mining company. This impels him to abandon 
the project, and threatens the collapse of the TNA corporation, which drops in 
value on the stock market. The repercussions of this action spread, in a 
‘butterfly effect’, across campus as TNA cuts back funds from the many 
projects in which it was involved.
Gift’s report comments: ‘Gold ... holds a hallowed place in the human psyche. 
It is both useful and beautiful’ (204). He is excited by the thought of the seam, 
a ‘hidden thread, [...] running through the lightless depths of ore’; yet, 
remaining unclaimed, it disturbs him because ‘it mocked consumer 
insatiability’ (173-4). Having written his report, and made the three secret 
copies, Gift nervously erases it from his computer: ‘It was scary, in a way, 
having only printed copies. It reminded him of ephemerality, human mortality, 
the transience of objects’ (175). Gift’s anxiety is reminiscent of the concern 
provoked by the invention of paper money, whose ephemerality seemed a poor 
substitute for the permanence of metal, for which it could ostensibly be 
exchanged. By this reading, the mystic properties Gift applies to gold here 
relate also to its function as the archetypal money-object, the general 
equivalent which makes exchange possible. This special signifying power of 
gold-money, identified by Marx, will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
five. In summary, gold-money functions not only as a measure of values or a
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means by which individuals exchange, for which token-money would suffice, 
but also as an object of value itself -  a means of hoarding. Concerns over 
paper-money relate not just to its ability to be destroyed, but also to its capacity 
to proliferate by reproducing itself illegally. Derived from paper’s abundance, 
as opposed to gold’s scarcity, this was a property exploited by governments 
and banks in the early experiments with paper money. In disseminating Gift’s 
report, Mrs. Walker effectively prints her own currency, which is no longer 
backed by the authority it represents, and sends it into the marketplace to freely 
circulate under conditions Gift would no doubt admire, were he not so busy 
distorting them.
The progress o f the report, a series of passings, which really amount to 
exchanges, both conforms to Gift’s principles and confounds them. The report 
is exchanged in an attempt to rebel against Gift’s bullying, or in an effort to 
rekindle a relationship, or as revenge against Gift -  this last by both Tim 
Monahan, who blames his low ranking from the tenure committee on Gift, and 
passes it to the New York Times, and by Chairman X, who organises a protest 
based on activist principles but is really motivated by his own desire to 
‘personally [...] wreck’ Gift (307). The paper report thus functions as currency 
in the marketplace and has the ability to satisfy desires. However, the 
marketplace traversed by the report is not the optimal resource allocator of 
economic theory, peopled by rational individuals possessed of perfect 
information, each indifferent to the other in the pursuit o f their own self- 
interest. Instead, the journey of Gift’s report illustrates the troubling range of 
human emotions which rational choice theory finds difficult to accommodate:
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the desire (for sex, or revenge, or simply to act irrationally) which Lyotard 
tried to account for in his own troublesome Libidinal Economy™
Rational choice is similarly evoked yet confounded by the humorous reference 
to William Bartle, a secretary Mrs Walker transfers into the VP for 
development’s office, who ‘is causing gridlock’ because of his ‘“preference” 
for not doing any work’. (397) Bartle is clearly borrowed from Melville’s 
Bartleby, the idiosyncratic character whose ‘I would prefer not to’ is a gesture 
of resistance which confounds a theory of preference based only on production 
and consumption. In acting strictly according to preference, Bartleby produces 
nothing, and neglects his own interests to the point of death. The foil to 
Bartle’s empty preference, in Moo, is the pure productive waste of Earl Butz, a 
secret research project of which even Mrs. Walker is unaware and which is 
taking place at the exact geographic centre of campus. The only true example 
o f ‘pure research’ on campus, Earl is a hog named after a former Secretary for 
Agriculture, who is being fattened simply to see how big he gets, with no 
research grant and no findings to report. Nevertheless, Earl perfectly 
maximises both his input and output ratios, thereby illustrating the emptiness of 
performativity as an evaluative system. I cite the above instances as, while 
comic, they illustrate the capacity for market systems to be inhabited by 
alternative voices, by language games which do not conform to narrowly 
defined conceptions of the ‘rational’. Gift’s report may circulate freely within 
the ‘marketplace of ideas’ but, in doing so, it is revealed as an arena of
70 Brian P. Cooper and Margueritte S. Murphy, ‘“Libidinal Economics”: Lyotard and 
Accounting for the Unaccountable’, in The New Economic Criticism: Studies at the 
Intersection o f  Literature and Economics, ed. by Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen 
(London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 229-241.
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dissonance, where actors make transient contingent alliances, often for 
opposing motivations, as with the unlikely coalition between Timothy 
Monahan and Chairman X. This arena of dissonance is also illustrated in the 
polyvocal narrative structure of the novel, as I would now like to demonstrate.
Eleanor Courtemanche’s argument about classic realism depends on the 
perspectival distance between the narrators and the characters of the 
nineteenth-century novels she examines. While Dickens’ ‘multi-focal plotlines’ 
may depict ‘the complexity o f modem society in which various parts of society 
are hidden from each other’, the omniscient narrator is also on hand to ‘make 
clear the relationships which link these remote classes and individuals 
together’.71 This clarity is achieved because the narrator emerges as a distinct 
voice within the text, separate from the characters and able to confidently 
comment on their actions, as well as their blindness to their own situation 
within the overall community. She cites the following passage from Dombey 
and Son to illustrate the point:
Oh for a good spirit who would take the house-tops off, with a more 
potent and benignant hand than the lame demon in the tale, and show a 
Christian people what dark shapes issue from their homes...! For only 
one night’s view of the pale phantoms rising from the scenes of our too- 
long neglect...! Bright and blest the morning that should rise on such a 
night: for men, delayed no more by stumbling-blocks of their own 
making, .. .would then apply themselves, like creatures of one common 
origin... to make the world a better place!72
71 Courtemanche, p. 76.
72 Charles Dickens, Dombey and Son, cited in Courtemanche, p. 75.
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While Courtemanche’s argument is persuasive, it is worth noting that the 
omniscient narrator’s organising presence is registered in the nineteenth 
century novel by more than just the occasional interventionist effusion. Indeed, 
as Catherine Belsey argues, such ‘intrusions [...] are much easier to resist, 
since they draw attention to themselves as propositions’. Instead, the narrator’s 
(often self-effacing) presence establishes itself through the presentation of a 
hierarchical relationship which emphasises the difference between the internal 
world of characters, often unaware of the motivations of their actions, and the 
world shared by the third-person narrator and the reader.
While Moo equally uses a ‘kaleidoscope’ of characters to represent the 
complex network of contemporary society, no organising viewpoint emerges 
with the clarity of focus Courtemanche finds in Dickens’ text. Instead the 
narrative structure consists of what I would like to call suppressed 
polyvocality, which gives space to the many consciousnesses represented, not 
directly, but through free indirect discourse, as the narrative constantly moves 
between characters, shifting from exterior third person narration to the interior 
thoughts and emotions of whichever individual is currently represented. In the 
following extract, Dr. Garcia, psychology professor, reflects on his colleagues 
at an interdepartmental committee meeting:
Dr. William Garcia, professor of psychology, could see them taking up 
their roles as soon as they walked into the meeting room. Father Lionel, 
humourless, even, you might say, witless, big with gravity though 
actually a rather small man. Mother Levy, full of a feminine power that
73 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 65-7.
80
was profound but essentially reactive [...]. Sister Bell, the youngest, 
perhaps the most brilliant [...] (and she hadn’t even opened her mouth, 
and Garcia had never actually met her before) [...] And finally himself, 
of course, a lifelong mediator -  he could already feel the tension and it 
already hurt him. He was better in groups of boys, as he had been great, 
in his youth, on the playground, [...] Most men, in fact, were competent 
in groups that mimicked the playground, incompetent in groups that 
mimicked the family; that was why all-male committees ran the most 
smoothly. (34)
If the external viewpoint of a narrator were assumed here, as the third person 
voice might seem to suggest, the final sentence could look like the kind of 
interventionist observation found in much nineteenth-century realism.
However, as the opening sentence turns on the action of ‘seeing’, it becomes 
clear that we are getting access to Garcia’s thoughts as he surveys his 
colleagues. This is also indicated from the means by which the narrative shades 
into psychological analysis, observing the other characters in terms of their 
adoption of familial roles. In the next sentence after this passage we learn that 
‘he’ had recently published a paper on the subject of all-male committees, so 
that any ambiguity over who is speaking seems resolved. Only a couple of 
paragraphs later, after an exchange of dialogue, the roving third person voice 
shifts again, introducing Dr. Bell, before shading into her observations also: 
‘Well, she had gotten used to the committee work, and often used the time to 
think through knotty logical points in papers she was writing’ (35). The process 
continues throughout the meeting and it exemplifies the way the narrative
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structure of the entire book accommodates the many personalities represented. 
In each case, the shift in narrative voice is recognisable more in the 
presentation of the character’s epistemological perspective than through any 
variation in tone of voice or idiom. This is the case with the extract above, as 
the shift to Garcia’s thoughts from any implied narrator’s is evident through the 
psychological perspective by which the others are being observed. The many 
competing narrative voices of Moo thus correspond, also, to the many 
conflicting epistemological outlooks which make up the university.
I do not draw attention to the use of free indirect discourse in an attempt to
claim that Smiley’s novel is a radically experimental text; free indirect
discourse has been used in literary narrative, with varying degrees of
perceptibility, since at least Jane Austen.74 A more self-conscious narrative
could attempt to textualise more formally the dispersal of narrative knowledges
Moo stages -  perhaps through the use of the direct discourse and syntax of
many competing voices. By contrast, it is precisely Moo’s treatment of classic
realist narrative that is of interest, as the text’s apparent mimesis sets it into
comparison with the economic narrative form McCloskey wishes to advocate.
In opposition to McCloskey, however, I wish to establish the potential for a
realist narrative like Moo to register not unity, but the complexity of dissenting
voices. In the passage just examined, the ever-shifting narrative spotlight which
is characteristic of the whole novel would seem to imply a certain level of
omniscience on the part of an implied narrator. Indeed, free indirect discourse
is used by many realist writers, including Dickens, to intensify the impression
74 See Brian Me Hale, ‘Free Indirect Discourse: A Survey o f Recent Accounts’, in Narrative 
Theory: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies, vol. 1, ed. by Mieke Bal (London: 
Routledge, 2004) pp. 187-222.
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of the narrator’s ability to see into people’s minds. In such instances, the 
distance between narrator and character which Courtemanche analyses would 
be particularly evident -  Brian McHale notes that Dickens, for example, would 
use a broad shift in idiom, to the point of parody, to indicate the change in
7Svoice. However, the stylistic use of free indirect discourse varies enormously: 
McHale contends that ‘FID is “free” [...] in the sense that its range of formal 
possibilities is extremely large’.76 A key factor in this diversity is the extent to 
which the text distinguishes the narrator’s voice from the characters’; thus, 
McHale finds that the varying perceptibility of FID can be used to generate a 
variety of textual effects, such as irony (where the distance between narrator 
and character is most evident), empathy, stream-of consciousness, polyvocality
7 7and ambiguity. As I have tried to show, the shifting narrative focus of Moo 
corresponds to what McHale might recognise as polyvocality, with variations 
in narrative voice often perceptible through changing epistemological outlook 
rather than idiom. Crucially, however, this polyvocality is not represented from 
the perspective of an omniscient narrator, as no such recognisably separate 
voice emerges. Rather, the implied external narrator, who is potentially 
inferred in even the most ambiguous act of free indirect narration,78 is never 
allowed to come into focus in Moo, so that the totalising perspective it appears 
to promise never comes into effect.
75 Brian Me Hale, p. 204.
76 Ibid, p. 190.
77 Ibid, p. 207.
78 McHale notes that some critics, notably Roy Pascal, argue that the narrator’s voice can 
always be distinguished in FID, although this is not always demonstrated in practice. Ibid, p. 
2 1 1 .
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The dissonance displayed in Moo, despite its classic realist credentials, should 
undermine the claims made by Deirdre McCloskey for a narratology, based on 
classic realism, to heal the rifts in economic theory. In her own ‘economist’s 
guide’ to postmodernism McCloskey, claims that her approach is a kind of 
iiberalist and economic postmodernism’,79 based on a critique of the high 
formalism which characterises modernist economics, while advocating a 
constructivist attention to the strategies of representation which characterise 
economic rhetoric. Her viewpoint draws upon the claim that deconstruction is 
itself a reinvention of classical rhetoric, arguing that ‘rhetoric, the first 
postmodernism, was bom with capitalism in the marketplaces of Greece’.80 
This understanding of deconstruction sees it, erroneously, as a wilful act of 
critical appraisal, characterised by McCloskey as the ability to both look ‘at’ 
words and ‘through’ them, which ‘allows one to see that one’s view is a view’. 
This reading manages to preserve the position of the master-rhetorician, skilled
o  1
in the ability to, as she puts it, ‘toggle’ between views. Jack Amariglio’s 
response to McCloskey notes that her account is ‘at a distance from some 
aspects of current postmodern theory, especially those that do not share [her] 
view that free talk is morally equivalent and perhaps inextricably intertwined 
with free exchange’.82 He draws a comparison between McCloskey and 
Foucault, who understands discourse as the locus of power (and resistance). 
McCloskey, by contrast, ‘stress[es] the “sweetness” of it all, including the 
community of free thinkers and believers, who potentially converse in ways
79 Deirdre McCloskey, ‘The Genealogy of Postmodernism: An Economist’s Guide’, in 
Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge (see Cullenberg, Amariglio and Ruccio, above),
pp. 102-128 (p. 121).
Ibid, p. 122.
81 Ibid, pp. 120-1.
82 Jack Amariglio, ‘Writing in Thirds’, in Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge (see 
Cullenberg, Amariglio and Ruccio, above), pp. 129-140 (p. 138).
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that recognize the right of the “other” to exist as a talker and listener too’.83 
McCloskey’s idea of conversation is equally removed from the Lyotardian 
account of ‘talk’ as agonistics. The conflicting epistemologies of the 
postmodern condition manifest themselves, Lyotard argues, in a diversity of 
language-regimes, where any utterance involves making a ‘move’ in a game in 
which your co-respondent’s rules may be radically different from your own. 
Nevertheless, such interactions must be encouraged, as they can result in ‘an 
unexpected “move” (a new statement)’.84 In Moo, ‘to speak is to fight’,85 as I 
have tried to show.
It is perhaps not surprising that McCloskey does not embrace the ultimately 
destabilising implications of Derridean post-structuralism or Lyotard’s account 
of postmodernism. She is concerned to preserve the discipline of economics, 
and the capitalist principle which views markets as sites of free exchange, 
while also borrowing a little literary theory in order to ‘reunify’ the discipline 
with ‘the conversation of mankind’. In contrast, it would be well to bear in 
mind the work o f Judith Mehta, an economist who equally views the discipline 
as a conversation, though not one characterised by unity, as McCloskey 
imagines. Mehta’s work on game theory and experimental economics involves 
the kind of activation of differends which Lyotard proposes. By focusing on 
the conversational process of bargaining models, as opposed to only their 
recorded outcome, she tries to imagine a forum in which ‘the noise o f many
83 Ibid, pp. 138-9.
84 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, pp. 9-16 (p. 16).
85 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 10. My emphasis.
86 McCloskey, ‘Storytelling in Economics’, p. 21.
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narratives can come to voice’.87 As I have tried to demonstrate through a 
reading of Moo, literary narrative, even in its classic realist form, is itself a site 
of dissonance, not consensus, and it may be in this respect that it is most ‘like’ 
economics after all.
87 Mehta, p. 376. Drawing on Bakhtin, Vivienne Brown also invokes an analogy between the 
site of the ‘economy’ and a polyphonic text, albeit one where some voices crowd out others, 
resulting in the production o f ‘official’ economic discourse, see Brown, above, pp. 377-81.
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Chapter Two
Is the Financial Economy Fictional?: Classic Realism and Virtual Economics 
in Wall Street
While the Rhetoric o f Economics movement, discussed in the previous chapter, 
is predicated on an analogy between economic discourse and storytelling, the 
rhetoric of cultural and social theory in the closing decades of the twentieth 
century regularly drew parallels between fiction and the financial economy. In 
The Condition o f  Postmodernity, David Harvey describes the transformation of 
New York’s economic culture in the 1980s as having ‘lost its traditional 
garment trade and turned to the production of debt and fictitious capital 
instead’.1 This ‘casino economy’ is the realm of financial speculation, or 
trading in financial instruments and investments, which is largely ‘unbacked by 
any growth in real production’. In a transcontinental leap from New York to 
Los Angeles, Harvey specifically likens the financial economy to the ‘image 
production machine’ of Hollywood, an economic structure based on 
storytelling.2 Jean Baudrillard similarly invokes a contemporary ‘rift between 
imaginary and real economies’, in which ‘the realm of mobile and speculative 
capital’ operates autonomously, having no effect on ‘real’ production and 
becoming, therefore, a ‘virtual economy’,3 which is also a ‘locus of special 
effects’.4 In these accounts the virtuality of finance is typically located in two
1 David Harvey, The Condition o f  Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins o f  Cultural 
Change (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), p. 331.
2 Harvey, p. 332.
3 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Transeconomics’, in The Transparency o f  Evil: Essays on Extreme 
Phenomena, trans. by James Benedict (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 26-35, (p. 27).
4 Baudrillard, p. 34.
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factors: the apparent indifference of speculation to the ‘real’ economy of 
production and the technological development of electronic forms of money, 
exchange and representation. Thus, Regenia Gagnier, writing on the economic 
culture of the 1980s asks, ‘What is labor when it amounts to electronic bleeps 
on a screen?’5
This mode of criticism typically displays a sense of the economy slipping out 
o f control, o f a financial economy grown to monstrous proportions, preying on 
the industrial sector. Thus, in his cultural history of Wall Street, Steve Fraser 
uses the imagery of parasites and employs the familial metaphor of ‘love-hate 
codependency’ when discussing the relationship between Wall Street and Main 
Street.6 Ironically, in depending on an opposition between the fictional and the 
real, accounts such as David Harvey’s seem to invoke a happier prior age when 
the financial economy was less avaricious -  typically the period of industrial 
capitalism, which was hardly seen as benevolent by its contemporary 
detractors, but at least had the benefits of producing real goods, from real 
labour, even though the results of such labour was often alienated from the 
workers who produced them. Thus, Gagnier prefaces her above comment with 
the observation that, at least, ‘in classical political economy the justification of 
capitalism was that it entitled one to the fruits of one’s labour’7 or Harvey 
contrasts Wall Street with the more tangible garment industry. Similarly, as I
5 Regenia Gagnier, The Insatiability o f  Human Wants: Economics and Aesthetics in Market 
Society (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2000), p. 195.
6 Steve Fraser, ‘Toward a Cultural History o f Wall Street’, Raritan, 22 (2003), 1-16. See also 
Fraser, Wall Street: A Cultural History (London: Faber & Faber, 2005). Dirk Verdicchio also 
explores the relationship between the representation of Wall Street brokers and the concept of 
the monstrous in ‘Fictional Money -  Real Monsters. The Financial Economy in Feature Films’, 
unpublished conference paper presented at Money and Culture conference, UCC, Ireland, 6th 
May 2005.
7 Gagnier, p. 195.
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have already indicated in the introduction, Jean-Joseph Goux allies the 
dominance of financial trading over more traditional economic structures in the 
late twentieth century with a postmodern aesthetic, which is also increasingly 
divorced from the real. In this chapter I wish to question what is as stake in the 
invocation of a binary opposition between the ‘real’ economy of production 
and the ‘purely fictional’ realm of the financial economy. To this end, I will 
provide a close reading of Oliver Stone’s 1987 film Wall Street, in which the 
fictional representation of the financial economy depends upon highly 
conventional modes of realistic narration. I wish to argue that this dependence 
on realism is a response to the speculative uncertainty of the financial 
economy, which, despite, the examples cited above, can never really be 
contained in a binary account of real versus fictional economies. Rather, in 
Derridean terms, the real and the fictional are mutually defining, each 
containing a trace of the other, and this unsettling necessity is central to both 
economic narrative and finance.
Despite the examples of late-twentieth century rhetoric outlined above, 
comparisons between financial speculation and fictionality have been drawn 
before. Indeed, as indicated in my introduction, the trope of credit as an 
unstable mark of the real recurs throughout literary and financial history. 
Writing on the history of speculation in the United States, and on the common 
discursive genealogy of finance, gambling, and speculation, Marieke de Goede 
cites Reverend George Hubbard, a nineteenth century opponent of futures 
trading who repeatedly criticised the threats posed by the development of
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‘fictitious’ over ‘real’ trading.8 de Goede argues that the status of financial 
trading, and its unstable conceptual difference from gambling, is a source of 
‘recurrent historical debate that has shaped the laws and institutions of modem 
finance’.9 Writing on the expansion in financial trading in early eighteenth- 
century Britain, Sandra Sherman finds equivalences between fiction and credit 
drawn in the texts of the period, which support her argument that the 
simultaneous development of a ‘market in ideas, in literature -  and the market 
constituted by commercial paper [...] generate a mutually inflecting discursive 
field around the notion of “fiction”’.10 For Sherman, this discursive field 
included the newly developing novel form, particularly the work of Defoe, but 
also the new paper credit instruments of financial trading and speculation, and 
contemporary writings on economics. John Vernon’s own Money and Fiction 
addresses the theme of money in the nineteenth century novel as the location of 
the problem of realism itself. Thus, the presence of (fictional) paper money in 
the nineteenth century novel, is a sign of ‘the failure of mimesis’, so that, ‘if 
the novel represents reality, it does so in ways which acknowledge this 
failure’.11
Financial speculation, as Sherman argues, contains its own narrative structure, 
in that it forces the mind to imagine the future, to speculate on future
8 See G. H. Hubbard, ‘The Economics of Speculation’ New Englander and Yale Review, 49 
(1888), 1-11 < http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/ncps:@field(DOCID+@lit(ABQ0722-0049-3)):: > [accessed 9th 
September 2006]. Cited in Marieke de Goede, Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A Genealogy o f  
Finance, Borderlines Series, 24 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 60.
9 de Goede, p. 48.
10 Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality in the Early Eighteenth Century: Accounting for  
Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2.
11 John Vernon, Money and Fiction: Literary Realism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 18-19.
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outcomes: ‘[Credit] initiates economic narrative.’12 Sherman draws attention to 
J. G. A. Pocock’s analogy between credit and fiction in which, she says, 
Pocock argues that ‘credit is always a potential cipher, a fiction with nothing 
behind it’.13 While I wish to argue for the narrative basis of stock market 
values which Sherman outlines, I disagree with the characterisation of credit, 
here, as a ‘fiction with nothing behind it’. Financial credit, like realist fiction 
and counterfeit money (as already outlined in my introduction) is based on a 
promise to adequately represent the real. Financial speculation both depends 
upon that promise (the possibility of future returns) and draws it into doubt. In 
the following discussion I refer to the financial sector as the virtual economy -  
as a discursive locale which claims a relationship to the real but continually 
threatens to supersede it. The virtual economy is not simply fictional, in a 
superficial sense; rather it generates fictions which have real effects, and these 
fictions are stable only as long as they are given shared credit by passing 
themselves off as real. Nevertheless, criticisms of the financial economy, as 
outlined above, and as represented in Stone’s Wall Street, continually invoke a 
binary opposition between real and fictional economies, which speculation 
endlessly subverts.
Financial trading, the arcane world of stocks, securities, indexes and 
derivatives, is potentially problematic for visual representation as it does not 
provide the ‘real’ conditions of production which were ready material for the 
nineteenth century novel. The obscure language of trading often seems too
12 Sherman, p. 37. See also, on this point, Gillian Beer, ‘Credit Limit: Fiction and the Surplus 
of Belief Comparative Criticism, 24 (2003), 3-14.
13 Sherman, p. 28; J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985).
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impenetrable to be grasped by the reader unversed in such texts. In Oliver 
Stone’s 1987 film Wall Street, set in 1985, a serious effort is made, however, to 
represent the world of stock market speculation in the cut-throat 1980s.14 The 
conspicuous consumption of the 1980s is, of course, in evidence but it is the 
world of the stock exchange which is central here. Thus, the action of the film 
is concentrated within the corporate offices of investment bankers, lawyers and 
risk arbitrageurs, cutting from trading rooms selling stock to public investors to 
the trading floors o f the New York Stock Exchange itself. On at least two 
occasions protracted sequences narrate the history of an individual equity’s 
journey through the market, capturing in cinematic form the kind of 
information typically represented by a single undulating line on a financial 
chart. To this end, Stone constructed elaborate facsimile sets of bank trading 
rooms, and employed numerous technical advisers, including investment 
banker, Kenneth Lipper, with whose help he gained access to the New York 
Stock Exchange and was permitted to film ‘during trading hours'.15
This effort to attain verisimilitude on the part of the film’s makers inevitably 
risks alienating the viewer. Thus, in order to illuminate the obscurities of 
market speculation, Wall Street relies on not just documentary realism, but also 
the conventions of classic realist narrative. The plot is constructed around a 
dominant central character with whom the viewer can identify and who acts as
14 Wall Street, dir., Oliver Stone, 1987.
,5Emphasis in the original. Stone’s quest for accuracy is described in detail in Martin S. 
Fridson, ‘Wall Street’, in Oliver Stone's USA: Film, History, and Controversy, ed. by Robert 
Brent Toplin (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp. 120-134, and by Oliver Stone 
in the same volume, in which Stone recalls, ‘The scripted scene from the movie was played by 
real brokers on the floor during trading hours' (Stone, ‘On Seven Films’, in Oliver Stone’s 
USA: Film, History, and Controversy (see Toplin, above), pp. 219-48, particularly section on 
Wall Street, pp. 231-36, (p. 235)).
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a tour guide through the unfamiliar world which the film portrays. Our guide is 
Bud Fox, whose oxymoronic name manages to suggest both naivety and guile, 
a combination essential for his role as market neophyte. As the film begins, we 
trail Bud on his lengthy commute to Wall Street; his transport changes and the 
escalating crowds increasing the sense in which Bud is journeying deep into 
the heart of things, to the centre of the financial world. On reaching his 
destination, the viewer’s identification with Bud is emphasised by a long 
tracking shot, following him through the confusing environment of his office at 
investment bank Jackson Steinem, where he works as an account executive, 
selling stock to public investors on the phone.
Accompanying Bud through the maze of desks and banks of computer screens, 
the viewer’s confusion is compounded as the dialogue is peppered with 
market-speak, without explication for the uninitiated. Thus, an older trader 
advises Bud to ‘stick to the fundamentals’ and complains about ‘cheap money 
sloshing around’, while a supervisor issues buy orders over an intercom. 
Writing on the critical reception of Wall Street, Martin Fridson notes that some 
reviewers complained that the ‘meticulous fidelity to details of securities 
industry practices and language’ made it ‘inaccessible to lay audiences’.16 
Certainly, the opening sequence would seem to confirm the view of one 
unsatisfied critic, who claimed that ‘it often threatens to leave viewers in a 
tangle of market jargon and ticker tape’.17 Close reading reveals, however, that 
the earnest verisimilitude of the film is carefully managed so as to not entirely 
risk alienating the viewer. Bud’s day at the office thus unfolds with a lengthy
16 Fridson, ‘Wall Street’, p. 120.
17 Hal Lipper, ‘ Wall Street: Paper-Thin,’ St. Petersburg Times, December 11, 1987, Weekend 
sec., p. 7, cited in Fridson, ‘Wall Street’, p. 124.
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montage sequence which alternately depicts the world of financial trading and 
inducts the viewer into that world.
As the market opens, the film briefly accelerates before the hand-held camera 
leaves Bud and enters into the frenzy of Jackson Steinem’s salesroom, the 
rising babble of unexplained terminology and flashing LED screens apparently 
offering the unmediated access of reportage. The documentary effect is 
extended as the film cuts between Jackson Steinem and the trading floor at the 
New York Stock Exchange. However, the establishing high-angle ‘god’ shot 
used in the NYSE provides a point of view above the pandemonium of the 
frenzied action. For the plot to unfold the viewer must be made familiar with 
some of the tools of market analysis; thus, we return to Bud, and watch him 
check on the price of a stock for a client. An extreme close-up of Bud’s 
computer keyboard notes the three letter ‘ticker’ by which any stock is 
identified before subsequently cutting to the ‘quotron’, or scrolling LED screen 
on which tickers and prices are displayed. The viewer can thus make the 
connection between the stock named by the client and the market convention of 
abbreviation. This point, once established, is reinforced throughout the film as 
the camera cuts continually back to the scrolling LED screen as each of the 
plot’s main trades are played out. The visual narrative is thus carefully 
constructed to both expose the viewer to the confusion of this unfamiliar world, 
and to manage that confusion through the intervention of conventional 
cinematic techniques.
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Such careful management o f unfamiliar information is crucial to the film’s 
capacity to retain the audience’s attention; however, it also illustrates the 
customary response to the uncertainties generated by stock-market speculation, 
an issue which I wish to discuss further here. Significantly, the conventionality 
of the film is not limited to its cinematic style, as the narrative structure also 
employs traditional means to engage the interest of its viewers. Wall Street is a 
morality tale where forces of good and evil do battle for the soul of Everyman, 
and its generic antecedents stretch back to classical and religious mythology. 
Further, an entire series of binary oppositions structure the narrative and 
operate in parallel to the good/evil dichotomy informing the film’s moral code. 
The most obvious of these is the distinction between rich and poor as the plot is 
also one of reversed fortunes. Our Everyman, Bud Fox, is not part of the Wall 
Street elite but is the son of an airline maintenance worker, who grew up in 
Queens and borrowed money to go to NYU. Despite the ‘account executive’ 
title, he is, as his father says, ‘a salesman’ who spends his day cold-calling 
customers in order to sell them stock. This is entry-level stock-broking, despite 
Bud’s ambitions to be a major ‘player’ in the financial world -  like Gordon 
Gekko, the billionaire financial mastermind whom Bud admires. Gekko is an 
aggressive market investor, risk arbitrageur and corporate raider, of the kind 
who were both vilified and praised in the 1980s for embodying the spirit o f 
neoliberal free-market economic philosophy.18 The character of Gekko is at 
least partly modelled on Ivan Boesky, an infamous corporate raider who was 
convicted for dealing in insider information in 1986 and served a term in
18 See Gagnier, ‘On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in the 1980s’, Chapter Six of The 
Insatiability o f  Human Wants, pp. 176-207.
prison.19 On an obvious level, then, Bud’s paternalistic role models -  his actual 
father and his idol, Gekko -  embody the dichotomies of poor/rich, 
honest/dishonest upon which the film is structured. As a lifelong union 
representative, Bud’s father also represents the voice of the workers or labour, 
as opposed to that o f owners or capital, represented by Gekko. This, more 
interesting, dichotomy can further be read as an opposition between what 
Harvey and Baudrillard refer to as the ‘real’ economy of production and the 
‘fictional’ economy characterised by the inflated financial sector. Main Street 
versus Wall Street.
The old/new or real/fictional binary is signalled in the opening sequence of 
Wall Street by the character of Lou Mannheim, the gentlemanly older trader 
(and third candidate for Bud’s father-figure), who exhorts the younger 
salesmen not to forget the ‘fundamentals’ of financial trading: ‘The money you 
make for people creates science and research jobs. Don't sell that out’. 
Mannheim’s approach appears as quaint as he does, however, and is evidently 
out of step with market conditions based on, as he complains, ‘too much cheap 
money sloshing around the world.’ He refers, here, to the abandonment by 
Nixon of the gold-standard, which had fixed the price of dollars in relation to 
gold, and thus in relation to all international currencies, since the end of the 
Second World War. The removal of the dollar from the gold-standard in 1971 
led to a devaluation of the dollar in world markets, which was intended to re­
balance an international goods market which had no longer been operating in 
America’s favour. A system of fixed values, anchored by the convertibility to
19 Commentators note that Gekko is most likely a composite of Boesky and other infamous 
characters from the 1980s such as Michael Milken and Carl Ikahn.
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gold, was thus replaced by one of fluctuating values, and the deregulated 
financial sector was equipped to capitalise on such fluctuations.
In fact, then, Lou misrepresents the relationship between the financial sector 
and industry; while the trading of stocks was originally intended to guarantee a 
flow of funds from business to industry, this is only the case when a new or 
previously private company is floated on the stock exchange. This Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) gives the public the opportunity to purchase shares in the 
company’s stock, with all revenues flowing directly to the company to expand 
its workforce or develop new products. Beyond the IPO however, the route 
between cash earned in the stock market and industrial development is not 
guaranteed, as shares continue to change hands many times, making profit only 
for the seller and his broker. Their value is now dependent not so much on the 
underlying stability o f the company who issued them, but on the market’s 
assessment of their perceived worth as a commodity to be bought and sold. The 
original raison d’etre of the financial sector has long been superseded by its 
ability to manufacture money independently of the worth of the goods initially 
traded.20 Beyond the IPO, stock market values are based on narratives -  
speculations on expected outcomes -  and these fictions have value only as long 
as they are given shared credit.
20 Tom Kemp outlines how, in the late 1970s, increased market activity occurred alongside 
deindustrialization so that high interest rates designed to attract overseas investors to the 
American financial markets had the effect of ‘pushing up paper gains and favouring a 
proliferation of financial transactions which had little or no relationship to production’ (The 
Climax o f  Capitalism: The U.S. Economy in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1990), 
p. 187).
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The narrative trajectory of the film, then, reproduces a conventional rags-to- 
riches plotline as we follow Bud’s path from one side of the binary structure to 
the other. This path is not initially paved with gold, however, and we observe 
that, while Bud deals in large sums every day, he is nevertheless broke, 
representing, in the film, the apparent inconvertibility of speculative money 
into real wealth. The shifting value regime of Bud’s new world is 
incomprehensible to his father, Carl, who earns less than Bud, yet is still 
lending him money to get by: ‘ I don't get it kid, you borrow money to go to 
NYU, the first year out you make thirty-five grand, you made fifty grand last 
year and you still can’t pay off your loans, where the hell does it all go?’ As 
Bud compares Carl’s economic model -  ‘5% mortgage and you rent the top 
room’ -  with his own, the clash of economic systems becomes clear:
‘I got 40% in taxes, fifteen grand for rent, I got school loans, car loans, 
food, park my car that’s 3 bills a month, I need good suits, 400 bucks a 
pop, shoes [...]. I gotta live in Manhattan to be a player. There is no 
nobility in poverty anymore, Dad.’
In Bud’s world debt outweighs earnings in order to service future (potential) 
income. His survival depends less upon his actual salary than upon his ability 
to project an image of success in order to gain more credit (and credibility) in 
the market. Carl’s incomprehension -  ‘Fifty thousand dollars, Jesus Christ, the 
whole world is off its rocker’-  indicates the extent to which this alternative 
economic model belongs to a new world picture in which he cannot orient 
himself. Despite their apparent separation, these two worlds are connected; 
thus Carl’s act of loaning Bud three hundred dollars o f ‘real’ notes symbolizes
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the parasitical dependence of the financial economy upon the real economic 
structures it was designed to support.
To finally cross over into the world of market sophistication Bud needs 
something more than a college education, some new clothes, and an ability to 
start saying ‘pasta’ instead o f ‘spaghetti.’ He attempts, therefore, to combine 
his old-economy talents of hard work and persistence in order to meet his new- 
economy idol, Gordon Gekko: calling Gekko’s office for fifty-nine consecutive 
days in the hope of gaining him as a client. When he finally secures access to 
Gekko, however, his hard work does not bear fruit, as Gekko is not interested 
in Bud’s market predictions, borne of long nights analysing financial charts. In 
desperation, and seeing his chance slipping away, Bud uneasily pitches 
Bluestar Airlines, the company for whom his father works, predicting a rising 
share value based on confidential information about a favourable court ruling 
which he heard of earlier from his father, the union representative. In passing 
on the information he has learned in conversation from Carl, information 
which, as the film makes clear, is not in the public domain -  ‘even the 
plaintiffs don’t know about it’ -  Bud is (potentially) committing the crime of 
insider dealing, an unfair and illegal market practice. The episode illustrates the 
rigidity of the moral code which the film appears to uphold. In order to fully 
transfer to the rich/capitalist/fictional economy side of the film’s binary 
structure, Bud must also cross the honest/dishonest line, becoming an 
accomplice of the evil Gordon Gekko. Neither hard work nor education can 
guarantee him success, and he must betray his own real-economy roots in the 
process.
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The fact that Bud does not become rich until he becomes dishonest undermines 
any effort made in the film to depict the possibility of legitimate market 
success. While a character like honest Lou Mannheim may seem to offer an 
alternative, he does not appear to be financially successful at doing so. 
Meanwhile, apparently innocuous characters like Bud’s sidekick Marv are not 
averse to seeking tips from disreputable sources, asking Bud, after his first 
meeting with Gekko, ‘Did you get something from him?’ No middle ground is 
offered; dishonesty is pervasive and equates with financial success. This 
message is ramified in Bud’s further dealings with Gekko, whose interest in 
Bud relates not to his acumen as a tipper but rather in his hunger for success 
and his proven capacity to bend the rules in order to achieve it. The 
correspondence between Gekko’s own illegal market activity and his 
remarkable success in the financial markets is thus important for the moral 
code which the film attempts to outline.
For his part, Bud seems unaware, at the outset, of Gekko’s illicit market 
behaviour, admiring instead his ruthless pursuit o f profits through, for example, 
the restructuring of unprofitable companies. Like Ivan Boesky, Gekko and his 
rival Larry Wildman are corporate raiders, engaging in hostile takeovers by 
acquiring controlling shareholdings in companies which they do not intend to 
keep, either liquidating them or falsely inflating their share price through the 
use of media tippers, before selling them on to an unsuspecting public. The 
prevalence of corporate mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s, whether through 
hostile takeover or not, was the outcome of an overburdened industrial sector,
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which had long been struggling to compete in world markets. While some 
commentators praised the part corporate raiding played in aggressively 
‘rationalising’ the American industrial sector, the rise in such activity 
inevitably opened up new possibilities for those willing to profit from advance 
information on the many deals taking place.21 Thus, while corrupt practices, 
such as those depicted in Wall Street, were by no means new, opportunities for 
engaging in them were widespread in the 1980s and stricter sanctions 
eventually led to a greater awareness of such scandals, culminating in a series 
of landmark trials such as that of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, of 
investment bank Drexel Burnham.
Bud’s apparent success in completing his narrative trajectory thus symbolizes 
the increasing ascendancy of financial sector activity over the ‘real’ economy 
in the 1980s, when the ‘growth of “paper entrepreneurship”, [or] pushing 
around paper titles to wealth [...] greatly surpassed the solving of technical 
problems of production and marketing as the object of business skills’.22 His 
transfer to the dishonest/virtual economy is complete when he eventually 
agrees to engage in corporate espionage for Gekko, after which wealth quickly 
follows. This narrative triumph of the virtual economy in Wall Street is 
accompanied by Bud’s initiation into the kind of ‘discursive field’ described by 
Sandra Sherman of the eighteenth century, although, in this case share values 
resonate with those of art and design, where the fictional is again prized above 
the real.
21 According to Robert Sobel, the ‘merger mania’ of the 1980s resulted in mergers and 
takeovers for more than one third of the Fortune 500 companies and an estimated gain for 
stockholders of 650 billion dollars (‘Hubris humbled: Merger mania, retribution, reform, it’s all 
happened before’, Barron's, 78 (Apr 13,1998), p. 24).
22 Kemp, The Climax o f  Capitalism, p. 213.
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The congruence of the fields of finance and art is evident in the early episode 
where Bud makes his daily call to Gekko’s office. While Gekko’s secretary is 
heard in voiceover, the scene cuts from Bud’s desk in Jackson Steinem to a 
close-up of a large modem painting. The artwork focused on is itself concerned 
with the representation of money: the painting depicts a hand, grossly inflated 
in the style of a renaissance fresco, thrusting a burning bank note towards the 
viewer. The camera lingers on this image, then tracks across to reveal the 
interior of Gekko’s outer office, expensively decorated and lined with more 
contemporary artwork, before focusing on the secretary, on the phone, still 
speaking to Bud. Eventually a door opens and the camera travels again to 
reveal a brief view of Gekko’s inner office, where the viewer’s attention is 
drawn to another large painting, in this case an abstract colour-field Miro, 
located exactly in the centre of the shot, upstaging Gekko, who is barely visible 
below, and slightly to the right. Consequently, our first glimpse of Gekko’s 
world is a conflation of his art collector and financier personas; thus the 
prevalence of expensive contemporary art in this establishing sequence 
signifies Gekko’s wealth and success. The importance of the contemporary art 
world to the narrative is greater than this however, as it helps to establish the 
logic of the entire ‘discursive field’ into which Bud will be initiated.
Guiding him through this world is Darien Taylor, Bud’s girlfriend and Gekko’s
former lover, an interior designer and ‘great spender,’ as she informs Bud, ‘of
other people’s money’. While her first conversation with Bud, on the topic of
231 am relying, here, on Rita Hatton and John A. Walker, who identify the painting in question 
as a Mird in their Super collector: A Critique o f  Charles Saatchi (London: Ellipsis, 2000), p.
155.
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Gekko’s art collection, seems to suggest an interest in aesthetic value, their 
conversation quickly shifts to the commercial, as she inducts Bud in the 
potential profits to be made in the art market. Gordon’s art investments, like his 
financial speculations, depend on high returns in the short term; contemporary 
artworks, if successful, appreciate rapidly. Also, like stocks in a market led by 
mergers -  whose values rise on the basis of rumour rather than fundamental 
change -  the art values in which Gordon speculates derive from a culture of 
fashionable interest which motivates demand, driving up price. While the 
market for traditional fine art can be said to operate on a similar basis, enduring 
popularity means that its commercial value remains high, appreciating 
incrementally over a long period of time, in a manner similar to the blue chip 
stocks Lou Mannheim prefers: IBM or Hilton. Arguably, the enduring values 
of traditional fine art could also be linked to their dependence on traditional 
aesthetic values, such as realism in landscape painting. In this case, enduring 
commercial value accrues to the ability to accurately represent the real, just as 
dependable financial instruments are those which claim ready convertibility to 
‘real’ money.
Bud’s inability to guess the value of Gekko’s artwork should be unsurprising, 
then, as he is not privy to the rumours and inside information which guarantee 
their speculative value. The fact that he guesses so low, predicting ‘a few 
thousand dollars down the tubes’ for a painting which turns out to have been 
bought for four hundred thousand, indicates the insufficiency of traditional 
forms of art appraisal, based on realist aesthetics, in the face of contemporary, 
anti-realist art forms. In the discursive field of Wall Street, then, art values and
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share values are both based on a binary opposition between the fictional and 
the real. As fictions, they depend on narrative speculations about future 
outcomes, and their worth is based not on their relation to the real but on their 
ability to remain in circulation. As with Sandra Sherman’s analysis of fictional 
credit and credible fictions, both apparently ‘produce signs without referents, 
ciphers with no payoff in the world of phenomena’.24 As Bud’s involvement 
with Gordon deepens, his payoff seems to be realised, however, in the form of 
his expanding credit and apparent wealth. Consequently, for his wealth to be 
signified, it must be converted into real goods; thus, he buys a million-dollar 
apartment on the fashionable upper east side and hires Darien to decorate it. 
However, while bricks and mortar appear to signify real phenomena, real-estate 
values are themselves subject to short-term speculation, as Gekko’s earlier 
conversation with Bud, on the subject of real estate speculation, proves:
‘see that building? I bought that building ten years ago. My first real 
estate deal. I sold it two years later -  made an $800,000 profit. It was 
better than sex.’
Thus, in terms o f the film’s binary narrative structure, Bud’s apartment 
purchase represents his further conversion to the world of speculative 
fictional values rather than a return to the real.
This discursive field equally extends to the world of interiors, where the 
contamination of the real by the fake is exemplified by Darien’s earlier 
confession to Bud that her ambition is to ‘do for furniture what Laura Ashley 
did for interior fabrics: produce a line of high-quality antiques at a low price.’
24 Sherman, p. 16.
104
1
Since antiques cannot be ‘produced,’ only reproduced, making them new 
rather than antique, her ambitions are clearly located in the same regime of 
values as Bud’s. This reading is corroborated by the lengthy montage 
sequence in which Darien oversees the apartment’s decoration. Darien’s taste 
is postmodern in the Jencksian sense -  she favours eclectic combinations of 
modem and parodied classical styles, which reference history as ‘distressed’ 
antique. As the scene plays out, attention is repeatedly focused on the 
fictionality o f Darien’s design: fake plaster mouldings are swiftly screwed into 
place and then partially gilded with sheets of gold leaf, paint effects conjure up 
marble and fresco, floors are painted to look like mosaic tiles, and plaster walls 
are covered in brick-effect wallpaper which is then partially plastered over to 
imitate exposed brick. The finished effect simulates wealth rather than 
embodying it, but this does not prevent it from earning further credit for 
Darien, who invites an interiors magazine to come in and photograph it. In this 
simulated world fake values supersede real ones: thus Bud jokingly sings along 
to a recording of Rigoletto but doesn’t really know the words; and food is 
prepared on expensive consumer gadgets such as the pasta machine or 
automatic sushi maker, rather than by traditional methods. The scene 
culminates in a telling moment when, as they sit in their fake Renaissance 
palazzo, about to eat dinner, Darien comments on the perfection of her vision 
and Bud responds: ‘It’s too perfect, let’s not even eat....let’s just watch it.’ At 
this moment, as the camera slightly elevates to catch their diminishing 
reflection in the window behind, Bud and Darien are caught in the frame of 
their own perspectival painting. Their reality is achieved through an elaborate
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construction which cannot actually be consumed: like the grapes painted by 
Zeuxis,25 it is too perfect to eat.
Dependent, as Wall Street is, on a narrative structure based on binary 
oppositions, the sequence discussed above appears to celebrate the final 
triumph of the fictional over the real in the life of the central character. This 
portrayal is itself dependent on an artificial separation of the real and the 
fictional, where the virtual economy is viewed as undermining one in favour of 
the other. This process is familiar to economic criticism and is evident, for 
example, in the work of Jean-Joseph Goux who suggests that ‘the logic 
implied in the mobility of share prices, the stock exchange model of values, 
has invaded, or is in the process of invading entirely, our notion of value.’26 
The implied criticism in this notion of ‘invasion’, which is also present in those 
critics I cited at the outset, is bom out in Wall Street, and accounts for the 
film’s adherence to a classic realist narrative which seeks to impose a binary 
moral code in its analysis of the characters and society depicted.
In line with these generic requirements, then, Bud’s triumph should be 
followed by his downfall, and a reversal o f his trajectory as discussed thus far. 
Bud’s work for Gekko causes him to violate a number of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s sanctions governing fair market practice. Most
25 Pliny the Elder tells the story o f a contest in illusionism between Greek painters Parrhasius 
and Zeuxis in 5* century BC, in which Zeuxis painted trompe l’oeil grapes which seemed so 
real that birds came and pecked at them. ‘Parrhasius’ The Oxford Dictionary o f  Art, ed. by Ian 
Chilvers, Oxford University Press, 2004. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University 
Press.CardifF University.
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entrv=t2.e2640> 
[accessed 23/03/05].
Jean-Joseph Goux, ‘Values and Speculations: The Stock Exchange Paradigm’, Cultural 
Values, 1 (1997), 159-177 (p. 160).
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evident for the viewer (but probably not for the authorities prosecuting him), 
he is shown illegally acquiring market information by copying confidential 
files while masquerading as cleaning personnel in a legal office. He shares this 
information among a network of investors, including his ex-college friend, 
Roger, using their accounts to conceal the fact that Gordon is acquiring large 
shareholdings in single companies, ready to cash in when the information Bud 
has discovered is released to the public. Along with his friends on the trading 
floor, this network of investors is also used to rig market conditions, artificially 
creating demand and inflating the price of a stock, Anacott Steel, which 
Gordon is aware his rival, Larry Wildman, wishes to buy. To this effect, he 
also places coded tips to the Wall Street Journal for Gordon, which also drives 
up the price of Anacott. When Bud is eventually arrested and charged with 
violating SEC sanctions, the cinematic technique emphasises his downfall: as 
in the film’s opening sequence, a lengthy tracking shot is used, this time 
preceding Bud as he retraces his steps out of the office. Bud leaves handcuffed 
and with a police escort, the long, real-time take lingering on his tears and 
humiliation.
While the tension of this shot emphasises the depth of Bud’s corruption, the 
reasons for his downfall are not, in fact, located in his crimes, but elsewhere in 
the narrative. Bud’s ultimate mistake is not that he acquires and deals in insider 
information, but that he attempts to redress the balance between the fictional 
and the real. Buoyed by his success with Gordon, Bud persuades him to buy 
Bluestar Airlines, in order to restructure it and run it as a profitable airline, 
with union-agreed paycuts and shareholder dividends. While Gekko humours
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him, such old-economy thinking has no place in the fictional-equals-evil logic 
of the film’s narrative structure. In fact, Bud’s proposition is typical of the kind 
of ‘healthy restructuring’ which many claim was the result of the corporate 
raiding activities o f the period. In the film an earlier example of this kind of 
‘friendly takeover’ can be seen in Larry Wildman’s bid to buy Anacott Steel in 
the interests, as he claims, of its real-economy factors: ‘It’s not a liquidation, 
I'm going to turn it around. [...] We're talking about lives and jobs; three and 
four generations o f steel workers.’ Bud’s reasoning even informs the text of 
Gekko’s most famous (yet insincere) monologue from the film, containing the 
infamous quote, ‘Greed, for want of a better word, is good’.27 The speech is a 
paean to the refining and clarifying properties of shareholder greed which will 
rescue the ailing U.S. industrial economy from the grip of unwieldy corporate 
management structures and uncompetitive union expectations. In proposing the 
Bluestar deal, and attempting to reinvest the speculative financial economy in 
the service of real production, Bud falls for Gekko’s insincere justification for 
his actions and complicates the real/fictional binary opposition which the 
narrative struggles to impose. When Gekko jettisons Bud’s plans, opting 
instead for liquidation of Bluestar, which enables him to raid the employee 
pension fund, making some 60-70 million dollars of profit, the binary structure 
is re-imposed. Bud, dumbfounded, challenges Gordon on his motivations, 
repeatedly asking him: ‘How much is enough?’
27 Gekko’s infamous speech is a paraphrase of a commencement address given by Ivan 
Boesky, to the Business School of the University o f California, in which Boesky said: ‘Greed 
is all right. Greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself.’ (Gagnier, p. 
183).
108
In fact, in a departure from the film’s classic realist traits, Gekko’s 
psychological motivation is one of the more elusive qualities in his 
characterisation. Unlike Larry Wildman, Gordon is no ‘white knight’,28 nor, 
despite his oft-quoted catchphrase, is he simply acquisitive. It is not a matter, 
as Bud puts it, o f ‘how much’, because Gekko has wealth far beyond what he 
can use. A closer explanation for his behaviour could be that of competition or 
warfare, and his pleasure in exacting revenge on Wildman, and frequent 
quotations from Sun Tzu’s Art o f  War seem to support this case. This would 
not account for his treatment o f Bluestar, however, and his own justification to 
Bud, delivered in their confrontation over the airline’s liquidation, has little to 
do with such basic psychology:
‘It's not a question of enough, pal. It's a zero sum game. Somebody 
wins, somebody loses. Money itself isn't lost or made; it's simply 
transferred from one perception to another. Like magic. This painting 
here, I bought it ten years ago for $60,000.1 could sell it today for 
$600,000. The illusion has become real. And the more real it becomes, 
the more desperately they want it. Capitalism at its finest.’
While this explanation appears to suggest the kind of blind self-interest
which neoliberal economics lauds as the guarantor of a fully maximising
marketplace, Gekko seems more interested in the illusionist act of
speculation rather than the money which is its outcome. Crucially, the
painting he points to when making this speech is the anti-realist Mir6 with
which his character was introduced. The ‘illusion becoming] real’, is not a
28 In the language o f corporate raiding, a white knight is a friendly investor who comes to a 
company’s aid in the midst of a hostile takeover, buying the firm with the aim of restructuring 
rather than liquidating.
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return to real phenomena for Gekko, who claims he ‘creates nothing,’ but 
to a virtual reality based on perception, which gains him a paper profit to 
reinvest in further speculation. ‘Gekko the Great’ is a magician pulling, as 
he says ‘that rabbit out o f the hat while everybody sits out there wondering 
how the hell we did it.’ While he claims this act to be the epitome of free 
market capitalism, the allusions to magic do not fit with the rationality on 
which that system is allegedly constructed.
However, Gekko’s self-characterisation as the illusionist-behind-the-curtain 
does fit with the good-and-evil moralising of which the film stands accused. 
While Stone denies this reading, several key moments in the film support such 
analysis. Crucially, the first such instance occurs when Gekko makes his initial 
suggestion that Bud set about the business of acquiring insider information. 
Throughout this sequence, which moves from Gekko’s health club to his 
limousine, the mise-en-scene accentuates the illegality of Gekko’s offer. 
Turning to Bud in the underground dressing room of his club, Gekko, angered 
by Bud’s efforts to impress him using conventional market analysis, asserts: 
‘You want another chance? Then you stop sending me information and you 
start getting me some.’ This moment is marked by an excessive lighting change 
which emphasises the line Bud is about to cross. On Gekko’s proposal: ‘Get 
dressed, I’ll show you my charts’, the scene, previously lit by a rooflight to the 
left, abruptly darkens, so that Bud’s head in the left foreground is suddenly 
obscured and only Gekko’s face is visible, bathed in a mysterious golden light 
whose source is uncertain. Although a storm can be heard breaking outside, 
this does not adequately account for such abrupt and absolute darkness, nor
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does it explain the mysterious glow lighting Gekko. An alternative explanation 
must be found.
As the location cuts to the limousine, Bud and Gordon discuss his proposal. 
Bud, apparently still naively ignorant of Gekko’s methods, questions his 
suggestion that Bud spy on his rival Wildman’s organisation in order to 
discover his plans: ‘Mr. Gekko, it’s not exactly what I do, I could lose my 
licence, and if  the SEC found out I could go to jail. That’s inside information, 
isn’t it?’ Gekko swiftly reminds him of his prior offence, in informing Gekko 
of the favourable ruling on Bluestar Airlines. The sequence closes with Bud, 
having initially rejected Gekko’s offer, leaning on the window frame of the 
limousine to declare, ‘OK, Mr. Gekko. You’ve got me.’ Once again, the 
lighting emphasises the fact that Bud is selling his soul: as he leans over the 
window his face is elongated by shadow, while on the reverse shot the 
limousine interior (previously well-lit) is mysteriously dark, contrasting once 
again with a golden light bathing Gekko’s face. Neither shot corresponds to the 
grey washed-out light of the final street scene long-shot as the limousine pulls 
away.
Further analysis shows that exaggerated lighting cues, when combined with the 
references to magic, introduce an element of the uncanny which undermines 
the classic realist aspirations of the plot. This is most evident in a later scene 
when Gekko, Bud, and Gekko’s lawyer discuss Bud’s agreement to engage in 
industrial espionage, seated around a patio table next to Gordon’s pool. Here 
Bud metaphorically signs away his soul to Gekko, agreeing to take the blame
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should their illegal activities be detected, in exchange for incalculable wealth. 
On concluding business, Gekko rises from the table on the line, ‘the stakes are 
going up, no mistakes’, and the reverse shot is thus from a high angle looking 
down at Bud who remains seated. As he looks in the direction of Gordon, the 
camera mysteriously floats towards Bud but remains elevated and hovering, so 
that Bud appears to be talking to a space in the air, immediately above and to 
the front of him. Inexplicably, the frame then fills with white light, emanating 
from the direction in which Bud is looking and enveloping him. While 
ordinarily this could be read as a stylised non-diegetic element, perhaps 
smoothing the transfer as we cut to the next exterior shot, that interpretation is 
here impossible as Bud puts on his sunglasses as he speaks, acknowledging the 
presence of the blinding light.
Why, then, these elaborate lighting cues surrounding the episodes where Bud 
effectively loses his naivety and our sympathy and becomes initiated into 
Gordon’s world? Is it simply a narrative gesture, underlining the extent of 
Gekko’s corruption, presenting him metaphorically as Beelzebub, a kind of 
devil-angel who can control natural light and has Bud entranced? The presence 
of these uncanny lighting changes in a text which otherwise strives earnestly 
for verisimilitude do not permit such a casual reading. Along with the 
real/virtual, old/new, labour/capital, cash/stocks dichotomies established 
earlier, this opposition of light and dark is further evidence of the film’s 
exaggerated dependence on a conventional narrative structure based on binary 
opposition. Yet it is also the point at which that opposition becomes untenable. 
For if Gekko is truly evil (as opposed to simply ruthless) why the need to
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underline it so emphatically? The answer lies in the intervening conversation in 
the limousine, where Gekko explores differing interpretations of insider 
dealing. As Bud naively queries whether he is being asked to deal in inside 
information, Gekko responds:
‘You mean like when a father tells a son about a court ruling on an 
airline? Or someone overhears that I'm buying Teldar Paper and 
decides he’s going to buy some for himself? Or the chairman of the 
board o f XYZ decides it's time to blow out XYZ. Is that what you 
mean?’
Insider dealing exists, here, on a spectrum between intentional destruction of a 
company by its managers to casual observations between friends. These cases 
are not clear-cut and partially coexist with factors which are the condition of 
possibility o f markets: stories, tips, narrative exchanges. Securities and 
Exchange Commission enforcement officers Newkirk and Robertson state: 
‘“Insider trading” is a term subject to many definitions and connotations and it 
encompasses both legal and prohibited activity.’ As they go on to explain, 
insider trading does not have a statutory definition as a crime, its prosecution 
resting instead on a series of interpretations, making such prosecutions 
notoriously difficult. During the period in which Wall Street is set, for 
example, convictions for securities fraud were regularly obtained, only to then 
be reversed by higher courts. A significant, and timely, example was the 
instance of Dirks v SEC, which took place ini 984, just one year before the film
29 Thomas C. Newkirk and Melissa A. Robertson, S.E.C staff members, ‘Insider Trading -  A 
U.S. Perspective’, Speech given at the 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime, 
Jesus College, Cambridge, September 19, 1998
<http://www.sec.gov/news/sDeeches/soch221 .htm> [accessed 26/02/05].
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is set. In reversing the SEC’s decision to reprimand an individual ‘tippee’ who 
had profited from information he had received from a ‘tipper’ who was a 
company insider, the Supreme Court ruling in this case registered (and 
attempted to clarify) the persistent uncertainty over who, in fact, could be 
called an insider at all.30
Legislation regarding the management of information which is not yet in the 
public domain is designed to safeguard the public perception that markets 
operate fairly, without which, Newkirk and Robertson claim, the public would 
not invest at all, and the market would be denied the stream of capital which is 
its lifeblood.31 Yet, as Wall Street shows, the reverse is also true. The 
perception of being ‘on the inside,’ of having received information in advance 
of the public at large is the narrative motivating much of the trading portrayed 
in the film, both within the dishonest plot itself and outside it, in the general 
representation of market business. In attempting to sell stock on the phone, Bud 
and his colleagues regularly employ this narrative to make their pitch: thus 
stocks are referred to as an ‘emerging opportunity,’ a ‘comer,’ or a ‘hot lead.’
The potency of the ‘insider’ narrative is most ably displayed in the sequence 
depicting the public trade of Anacott Steel. In a chain of narrative exchanges 
which result in the rising share price, we first see Bud spread the tip as a ‘sure 
thing’ around the office to his colleagues, then place a call to the Wall Street 
Journal to ensure the stock is tipped to the public. In an effort to represent the
30 Ibid. While the tippee in this case was allowed to profit, a footnote to the ruling on Dirks v 
SEC established the legal concept of ‘constructive insiders’ -  individuals such as outside 
lawyers or consultants who have access to confidential corporate information but are deemed 
to be under the same confidentiality obligations as ‘true insiders’ within the corporation.
31 Ibid.
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ensuing rapid dissemination of the information, the diegesis splits to several 
screens, each depicting a conversation in which an individual takes the decision 
to purchase Anacott. In each case the decision is based on the insider narrative, 
speculating that the stock is ‘ready to fly’, or advising to ‘bet the ranch’ on its 
future. In none o f these vignettes are the underlying causes for the rising share 
price discussed -  either the rumour of a takeover by Wildman or, even less 
likely, the fundamental financial position of the company issuing the stock 
which would supposedly motivate all rational market purchases. The split 
screen format usefully demonstrates the ‘fallacy of composition’ said to be at 
the heart of any speculative stock market bubble -  that many individual 
rational decisions nevertheless produce an excessive irrational outcome.32 
However, the split-screen format also highlights Wall Street's own fallacy of 
composition -  the insufficiency of realist film narrative to represent the 
excesses of market trading results in a technique which can only draw attention 
to the film’s own fictional construction.
At the very least then, the split-screen sequence shows that markets not only 
tolerate the gossiping behaviour of which Gekko claims Bud is guilty, but need 
it to survive. As markets depend on the ability of fictions to accumulate credit, 
then exchanging fictions is part of their necessary structure. Bud and Gekko, in 
utilising existing market structures for their own gain, operate not beyond but 
on the limits of licit market behaviour. The condition of possibility for their 
crimes is the operational structure of the financial economy itself. While 
former SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, may claim that those who deal illegally
32 Sandra Sherman discusses this paradox of market behaviour in relation to the ‘South Sea 
Bubble’ o f 1720 {Finance and Fictionality in the Early Eighteenth Century, p. 22).
in inside information ‘wilfully stride across the bright line of the law’,33 the 
distinction is not as well lit as the narrative of Wall Street depicts, or he would 
like to contend.
The exaggerated lighting changes work, then, to re-invoke a sense of right and 
wrong at the point when Gekko has called attention to the market’s tendency to 
draw that distinction into doubt. This doubt, which will be discussed further in 
later chapters, may well be a necessary condition of both market speculation 
and economic theory itself. For Wall Street, such uncertainty threatens not just 
the honest/dishonest borderline but the entire binary structure -  good/evil, 
labour/capital, real/virtual -  on which the narrative depends. It thus creates a 
narrative exigency for the binary structure to be reinvoked, and so Gekko’s 
depiction as unmotivated evil is shored up here by the use of lighting. This 
support is, in fact, a prosthetic device, in the manner invoked by Derrida in the 
‘Parergon’ section of The Truth in Painting,34 The lighting changes impose a 
moral frame around the financial activity represented, which only serves to 
show that speculative value is, in fact, unbounded, making the border -  
between good and evil, licit and illicit behaviour, or real and fictional 
economies -  perpetually subject to collapse. This ‘internal infirmity in the 
thesis’ therefore ‘demands to be supplemented by a prosthesis’ in the manner I 
have discussed.35 Although intended to underline the moral code revealed by 
the film, the exaggerated lighting changes have the opposite effect, revealing 
and destabilising the binary code on which the narrative is structured.
33 Levitt, quoted in Newkirk and Robertson, ‘Insider Trading -  A U.S. Perspective’.
34 Jacques Derrida, ‘Parergon’, The Truth in Painting, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Ian 
McLeod (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 15-147 (pp. 78-9).
35 Ibid, p. 78.
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Consequently, Gekko’s uncanny presence as a kind of devil-angel also troubles 
the veracity o f the classic realist text.
The imperative to impose a binary moral code on the narrative is, I wish to 
argue, an outcome o f the uncertainties generated by financial speculation. For 
the classic realist narrative of Wall Street this necessity translates to a need for 
closure, and a final reversion from the fictional to the real. As the film draws to 
a close, this seems to take place. Bud, having crossed Gordon over Bluestar 
Airlines, is then arrested by SEC enforcement officers, the rapidity with which 
this occurs seeming to suggest that Gekko has tipped them off as an act of 
revenge. While the arrest will presumably result in Bud losing his job, it is in 
fact prior to this that he is shown attempting to sell his apartment. His pastiche 
castle-in-the-air was sustained, not by his regular income, but by the credibility 
he received while part o f Gekko’s world. Darien, too, departs at this stage, and 
Bud’s downfall is signified by crude symbols of his working class roots: take­
out pizza and beer drunk from the can. In an earlier draft of the screenplay for 
Wall Street, written by Stone and Stanley Weiser, Darien rejoins Bud in the 
final frame, indicating hope for their reunion in a future not determined by the 
fictional values of the financial economy. The fact that this scene was cut 
indicates the narrative imperative to impose a moral code on the film. Only 
justice, not love, is permitted to redeem the financial subject; hence, invasions 
from the genre o f romance have been resisted.36 In the final sequence of the 
film, being driven to court by his father, Bud becomes a child again, dependent 
on his parents for support.
36 ‘ Wall Street, Original Screenplay’ by Stanley Weiser & Oliver Stone, 
<http://www.imsdb.com/scriptsAVall-Street.htnil> [accessed 09/09/05].
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The narrative resolution of Wall Street, then, seeks to reaffirm the values of the 
real economy which had been under threat from an avaricious and speculative 
financial sector. On the way to court, Carl repeats his earlier advice to Bud, 
exhorting him to produce something with his life, ‘create, instead of living off 
the buying and selling of others.’ This statement, made in direct opposition to 
Gekko’s arrogant claim that he ‘create[s] nothing’, underlines once again the 
film’s artificial separation of the two worlds. It also ignores the final 
speculative sequence in the film, in which Bud attempts to rescue Bluestar 
Airlines from liquidation, and exact revenge on Gekko, by employing the same 
means used in Gordon’s earlier raid on Anacott Steel. This sequence builds 
upon the information learned by the viewer in the earlier depictions of trading; 
thus, it cuts more rapidly between brokers pitching Bluestar in Jackson 
Steinem’s salesroom, to a frenzied NYSE, where traders attempt to execute 
their buy orders. The narrative tension mounts as Bud and his colleagues 
succeed in raising the price of Bluestar just as Gekko is building up his 
shareholding in the company, thereby forcing him to buy at a higher price than 
expected. Bud’s network then sell all of their clients’ shares, thereby lowering 
the price, before the unions inform Gordon that they are withdrawing their 
support, leading him to sell. The value of his large shareholding plummets, 
losing him millions. Bud succeeds in saving Bluestar, and seems to have 
earned his father’s respect, but, crucially, he can only do so by exploiting the 
same market conditions which Gekko uses: the management of speculative 
rumour through the exchange of tips.
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The tension which exists throughout Wall Street derives from the oscillation 
between the fictional and the real, each defining the other in their opposition, 
but never really as far apart as the narrative seeks to maintain. The speculative 
trading of Bluestar, in which Gekko is ‘hung out to dry,’ should therefore mark 
the film’s denouement as the slave overcomes the master at his own game. The 
binary moral code of the film does not permit this, however, and so Bud’s 
speculative success, in which ‘fictitious’ capital is seen to have ‘real’ effects, is 
sidelined in favour of an unconvincing Central Park fistfight between the two 
central characters, shot with all of the characteristics of a gunfight in a 
Western. In this scene Bud, wearing a wire for the SEC, entraps Gordon into 
admitting his part in the fraud. The intervention of the SEC thus re-imposes the 
borderline between good and evil in the film, making Bud’s prosecution (and 
Gordon’s possible future one) seem to be the primary narrative outcome. This 
is stressed in the closing moments of Wall Street where Bud walks alone up the 
steps of the New York City Courthouse, ready to plead guilty and ask for 
justice. Here the long shot establishes Bud as he begins to climb the steps, then 
cuts to an extravagant high-level shot which pulls out to a position high above 
him, emphasising the imposing edifice of the neoclassical justice building. The 
majesty of this shot, which then pans across the city to gaze at the towers of 
Wall Street, underlines the centrality of the justice system in the working of the 
financial sector. Wall Street may trouble the binaries slightly, but they are 
ultimately re-imposed.
The necessary imposition of a binary code on the representation of the financial 
economy is in itself troubling, however, and suppresses an underlying
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uncertainty regarding market speculation which gained new ground in the 
decade following the film’s production. This uncertainty, which also relates to 
the unstable border between the fictional and the real, returns to trouble both 
the representation of market speculation, and representation itself, and will be 
the subject of subsequent chapters. Prior to this discussion, however, I will first 
examine the representation of gendered subjectivity in the conventions of 
financial narrative.
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Chapter Three
Rational Economic Detectives: Trading Reality and Gendered Subjectivity in 
Economic Narrative
In Jane Smiley’s Moo, undergraduate Keri Donaldson is alienated by Lionel 
Gift’s introductory economics classes because she doesn’t recognise herself in 
the world he describes or the stories he tells:
The thing that Keri had noticed over the last seven weeks in Dr. Lionel 
Gift’s beginning economics lecture class was how happy he seemed. He 
bounced around the podium, full of high spirits; [...] He made lots of 
jokes, most of them not that funny but he was in such a good mood that 
the students laughed along with him anyway. The students were mostly 
boys, and they seemed to enjoy classes very much. Keri felt more at a 
remove. She felt, in fact, as if Dr. Gift were telling rollicking tales 
about an entirely alien planet, the Bizarro Planet, home of Bizarro 
Superman.1
Gift’s description of a perfectly competitive marketplace, in which self- 
interested individuals act to ensure the optimal allocation of resources for all, is 
at odds with her own experience. Keri’s alternative reality is one in which the 
word ‘“market” was synonymous with “impending doom’” , as she grew up on 
her father’s farm during the 1980’s farm crises with land and crop prices 
‘rocketing and plummeting’. The insatiable self-interest Gift propounds has led 
to her father and grandfather working more land than ever before in order to 
service bank debts, and, far from providing overall good, her previously
1 Jane Smiley, Moo (London: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 141
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integrated family has been bitterly divided into rich and poor, as her 
unsuccessful uncle had his land bought out by his avaricious brother.2
Keri’s consequent inability to comprehend or articulate the principles of Gift’s 
neoclassical theories (she is one of the 20% of the class who fail his 
indifference test) corresponds to Diana Strassmann’s account of ‘the selection 
and socialization process for becoming an economist’ which ‘ensures that those 
to whom this structure might be less obvious learn how to do proper economics 
or be screened out’. Strassmann’s is one of many feminist voices from within 
and outside the discipline of economics which have begun, relatively recently, 
to subject economic philosophy and practice to feminist critique.4 The above­
quoted essay appears, for example, in one of the first edited collections on 
feminist economic theory, Beyond Economic Man, published in 1993,5 while 
Strassmann herself is editor of Feminist Economics, the scholarly journal of the 
International Association for Feminist Economics (IAFFE), whose first issue 
was published as recently as 1995. Marianne A. Ferber and Julie A. Nelson 
introduce their collection with three broad observations arising from prior 
studies of the gendered construction of economic theory: that the economics
2 Moo, pp. 144-5.
3 Diana Strassmann, ‘Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of Disciplinary Authority in 
Economics’, in Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics, ed. by Marianne A. 
Ferber and Julie A. Nelson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 54-68 (p. 55).
4 While there has been a lengthy history of both feminist and non-feminist research on women 
in economics, which has gained pace since the 1970s, ‘the use of “feminist economics” as a 
label for a recognized field of research within economics is a very recent phenomenon. [...] As 
a formal field o f intellectual endeavour [it] has yet to be rigorously delineated’ (Gillian J. 
Hewitson, Feminist Economics: Interrogating the Masculinity o f Rational Economic Man 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999), p. 5).
5 Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics (see Ferber and Nelson, above). A 
second collection, Feminist Economics Today: Beyond Economic Man ed. by Marianne A. 
Ferber and Julie A. Nelson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) was published to 
mark the tenth anniversary of the 1993 book. Another important early volume, the result of a 
1993 European-based conference on feminism in economics is Out o f  the Margin: Feminist 
Perspectives in Economics, ed. by Edith Kuiper and Jolande Sap (London: Routledge, 1995).
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profession is a community of mostly male scholars; that, consequently, women, 
and traditional women’s roles such as home and family, have been largely 
absent from mainstream economic study; and, finally, that when women are 
represented in economic theory their experiences have often been distorted to 
fit into (masculinist) neoclassical models which are of little explanatory 
relevance. Supporting this last perspective, they cite, for example, the work of 
Amartya Sen who ‘has investigated the applicability of the usual conception of 
“utility” when women may be socialized to expect little and has pointed out the 
limitations on the usefulness of bargaining models to examine intrahousehold 
conflict’.6
The propensity for neoclassical economic theory to view the agents it analyses 
as individuals who seek to maximise their own utility, indifferent to the needs 
of others, is one of the concerns of this chapter. In contrast to this account, Keri 
Donaldson’s ‘practical economics’ experience of the repercussions of inter­
family conflict is typical of the kind of behaviour ignored by mainstream 
economic analysis, which has historically treated family units also as 
individual self-interested agents. Indeed, many of the criticisms levelled by 
feminist economists at neoclassical economic theory are present in this 
representation of Keri’s meditative response to Gift. Thus, feminist analyses of 
the uncounted role of women in the economy are present in Keri’s alternative 
consideration of family relations as economic outcomes, as well as in her 
awareness of the deterioration of her family’s domestic life because her mother
6 Marianne A. Ferber and Julie A. Nelson, ‘Introduction: The Social Construction of 
Economics and the Social Construction of Gender’, in Beyond Economic Man: Feminist 
Theory and Economics (see Ferber and Nelson, above), pp. 1-22 (p.7).
7 Strassmann, p. 58.
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and grandmother are forced, through debt, to go out to work to pay for food. Of 
course, such efforts to account for previously unrecorded ‘women’s work’ 
within the home or family inevitably risk invoking traditional categories and 
definitions for men and women. In economics, as elsewhere, feminist 
scholarship has struggled with internal debate over whether it is necessary to 
re-inscribe women’s experience within dominant disciplinary paradigms or 
break away from them altogether. The founding moment of IAFFE was a 1990 
conference panel entitled, ‘Can Feminism Find a Home in Economics?’. 8 The 
question is particularly pertinent for a discipline whose knowledge-paradigm 
and discursive regime is, some argue, constructed along particularly masculine 
lines.
Ferber and Nelson, for example, employ the conventional distinction between 
sex and gender in order to focus attention not on men per se, but on how 
‘culturally “masculine” topics, such as men and market behaviour, and 
culturally “masculine” characteristics, such as autonomy, abstraction, and 
logic, have come to define the field’.9 They express a desire to free economics 
from ‘the straitjacket of masculine mythology’10 by placing emphasis on the 
social construction of both gender and economics. Bracketing the question of 
naturally given gender categories, Ferber and Nelson thus differentiate their 
work from earlier attempts, often by male scholars, to measure the economic 
value of women’s domestic labour within the established (mathematical) 
analytical framework of mainstream neoclassical theory. They characterise this 
approach, practised by the ‘new home economics’ scholars prevalent in the
8 Ferber and Nelson, Feminist Economics Today, p. 7.
9 Ferber and Nelson, Feminist Economics Today, p. 1.
10 Ferber and Nelson, Beyond Economic Man, p. 13.
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1970s, as ‘add women and stir’.11 However, while they focus attention on 
excluded ‘feminine-identified’ approaches, Nelson and Ferber do not embrace 
a politics of difference through the establishment of an alternative ‘female 
science’. This would potentially overthrow ‘values of objectivity, reason and 
analytical inquiry [...] in favour of their feminine-identified opposites: 
subjectivity, emotion and a holistic approach,’ but could result in simply re-
1 7essentialising old categories. Instead, Ferber and Nelson remain within 
dominant epistemological paradigms by advocating a scientific approach which 
would remedy masculinist bias in economics, maintaining that ‘objectivity, the 
search for knowledge that does not reflect particularistic biases, is still a 
goal’.13
Julie Nelson, in particular, pursues this approach in the name of a ‘broader, 
richer’ ‘human science’ which would move beyond gendered definitions of 
knowledge.14 This has prompted criticisms from others: Rhonda Williams, for 
example, contends that, ‘Nelson’s discussion speaks from unified and stable 
conceptualizations of masculinity, femininity, and humanity,’15 while Gillian 
Hewitson criticises the ‘innocent’ view of language betrayed by Nelson’s call
11 Ferber and Nelson, Beyond Economic Man, p. 6. They cite the work of Becker, Gronau and 
Schultz as examples of the ‘new home economics’: Gary Becker, ‘A Theory of the Allocation 
of Time’, Economic Journal, 75 (1965), 493-517; Becker, ‘A Theory of Marriage: Part I’, 
Journal o f  Political Economy, 81 (1973), 813-46; Becker, ‘A Theory of Marriage: Part II’, 
Journal o f  Political Economy, 82 (1974), 1063-93; Reuben Gronau, ‘Leisure, Home 
Production and Work: The Theory of the Allocation of Time Revisited’, Journal o f  Political 
Economy, 85 (1977), 1099-1123; Theodore W. Schultz, ed., Economics o f  the Family: 
Marriage, Children and Human Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press and NBER, 
1974).
12 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
13 Ibid, p. 11.
14 Julie A. Nelson, ‘The Study of Choice or the Study of Provisioning?’, in Beyond Economic 
Man (Ferber and Nelson, above), pp.23-36; see also Nelson, ‘Feminist Economics: Objective, 
Activist, and Postmodern?’, in Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge, ed. by Stephen 
Cullenberg, Jack Amariglio and David F. Ruccio (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 286-304.
15 Rhonda M. Williams, ‘Race, Deconstruction, and the Emergent Agenda of Feminist 
Economic Theory’, in Beyond Economic Man (Ferber and Nelson, above), pp. 144-153.
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for feminists and others to simply ‘break out’ of dualistic modes of thought.16 
While awareness o f the gender binaries at the core of mainstream economic 
thought has been a unifying feature in feminist criticism of economic theory, 
then, the practice of feminist economics has, perhaps inevitably, proceeded on 
several fronts. Rhonda Williams, in the essay quoted above, proposed that 
critics of gender bias in economics must also pay attention to its constructions 
of racialized others, a project furthered and complicated by writers such as S. 
Charusheela and Eiman Zein-Elabdin, who examine the assumptions of both 
mainstream and feminist economics from postcolonial and working-class
1 7perspectives. Strassmann focuses on gender categories as discursively rather 
than socially produced, and the implications of this approach are further 
explored by Gillian Hewitson, who brings a poststructuralist perspective to the
1 ftstudy of binary thinking in economic knowledge.
The account I have outlined, while far from comprehensive, sketches the 
familiar narrative whereby feminist critique fragments due to the inability of 
gender to present a stable, universal subject-position or voice. This instability 
is nevertheless productive, as it undermines not just mainstream feminism, but 
also the masculinist privilege which was its focus. In the introduction to New 
Economic Criticism, Mark Osteen and Martha Woodmansee suggest that future 
economic criticism needs to pay attention to the ‘role of gender and ethnicity in
16 Hewitson, p. 93.
17 S. Charusheela and Eiman Zein-Elabdin, ‘Feminism, Postcolonial Thought, and Economics’, 
in Feminist Economics Today (Ferber and Nelson, above), pp. 175-192; S. Charusheela, 
‘Empowering Work?: Bargaining Models Re-considered’, in Toward a Feminist Philosophy o f 
Economics, ed. by Drucilla K. Barker and Edith Kuiper (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 287- 
303; Eiman Zein-Elabdin, ‘The Difficulty of a Feminist Economics’, in the same volume, pp. 
321-338.
18 Strassmann, ‘Not a Free Market’; Diana Strassmann and Livia Polanyi,‘The Economist as 
Storyteller: What the Texts Reveal’, in Out o f  the Margin (see Kuiper and Sap, above), pp. 
129-150; Hewitson, Feminist Economics.
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both economics and literary economics’, addressing ‘how, for example, does 
gender impinge upon economic stories and stories of economics?’19 For the 
remainder of this chapter I wish to focus on the representation of the gendered 
economic subject in fictional economic narrative, examining the extent to 
which fictional narrative both deploys the traditionally gendered character 
types of economic theory, and destabilises those types by means of their 
narration. As has been the case with feminist economics, my discussion will 
particularly focus on the masculine character-type of rational economic man, 
an unstable figure who, I wish to argue, seeks determination through perpetual 
self-narration. I will illustrate this with a reading of Michael Ridpath’s 1996 
financial crime thriller Trading Reality, while also making reference to the 
financial crime genre in general, as well as some of the other cultural texts 
discussed in this thesis.
The ‘rollicking tales’ of economic theory have long been dominated by a single
character, homo economicus, the individual whose behaviour is the subject of
neoclassical modelling. Since neoclassical theory views the world it describes
in terms of markets, the behaviour of rational economic man is the assumed
optimal behaviour of any agent operating under market conditions. For Gillian
Hewitson, ‘neoclassical economics can be characterized as a “science of the
individual’” in which isolated figures, motivated by self-interest, participate in
market and non-market exchange in order to maximize their own ‘utility’,
which Hewitson equates with the economic agent’s ‘happiness’. The process of
maximization, she explains, involves marginal cost/benefit calculations which
19 Mark Osteen and Martha Woodmansee, ‘Taking Account of the New Economic Criticism:
An Historical Introduction’, in The New Economic Criticism (see Woodmansee and Osteen, 
above), pp. 3-50 (p. 40).
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are carried out in accordance with the individual’s preferences. ‘The core of the 
neoclassical individual, their “self-interest”, is a set of preferences, the 
characteristics of which conform to certain assumptions.’ For example, 
economic theory assumes that the person’s behaviour will always be 
‘instrumentally rational; meaning that they will always choose the least cost 
means of achieving given ends (defined by their preference bundle) -  if they 
did not they would not be utility maximizing and would not fit the model.’ 
According to Hewitson, this model is used to describe ‘an amazing array of 
interactions’; she refers, for example, to the work of proto-neoclassical theorist 
Gary Becker, who describes formalist economics as ‘a valuable unified 
framework for understanding all human behaviour’.20 As Hewitson points out, 
this is not simply a matter of abstract modelling, as positivist neoclassical 
economic theory also assumes that “‘rational economic man” is a referent who 
pre-exists the discourse about him.’
The dependence of neoclassical economic theory on the presumption of an 
atomised, self-maximising, rational individual thus cannot be overstated. Aijo 
Klamer, following Deirdre McCloskey, names this utility-maximising 
economic agent ‘Max U’ and refers to him as ‘the main character in the new 
classical story’ and ‘the metaphor around which the neoclassical narrative
20 Hewitson, p. 159. Mark Blaug also defines the ‘rationality postulate’ in economics as 
referring to ‘choosing in accordance with a preference ordering that is complete and transitive, 
subject to perfect and costlessly acquired information; where there is uncertainty about future 
outcomes, rationality means maximising expected utility, that is, the utility of an outcome 
multiplied by the probability of its occurrence’ {The Methodology o f  Economics Or How 
Economists Explain, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 229-233 (p. 
229)). Blaug usefully discusses the centrality of rationality to neoclassical economics and 
reviews criticisms o f its dubious applicability, although feminist criticisms do not feature in his 
discussion.
21 Hewitson, p. 4.
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oorevolves’. Similarly, Susan Feiner claims that ‘certainly for a hundred years, 
and on some readings since the days of Adam Smith, the dramatis personae of 
mainstream economics have been self-interested and egoistic actors’, which 
she identifies as ‘Homo economicus {a.k.a. Rational Economic Man)’.23 
Economic stories, she points out, thus ‘also carry forward the humanist project 
in which Man (the conscious, knowing, unified, and rational subject) is the 
master of his fate.’24 Hence, the humanist subject and the (masculine) 
economic actor coincide most obviously in the figure of Defoe’s Robinson 
Crusoe, who makes frequent appearances as the paradigmatic homo 
economicus in economics textbooks. Rational economic man is the hero 
without whom the narrative could not be told, but who is, I wish to argue, 
constituted in its telling. The prevalence of his character in introductory 
economics textbooks further illustrates this point, as both students and 
economists find themselves identifying with the character they study.26 That 
such texts consequently ‘limit the range of available subject positions’ is one of
onthe feminist criticisms of mainstream economics. Thus, for Keri Donaldson, 
in Lionel Gift’s Economics 101, the rational economic subject remains 
‘Bizarro Superman’, a comic-book hero from another planet.
22 Arjo Klamer, ‘Late Modernism and the Loss of Character in Economics’, in Postmodernism, 
Economics and Knowledge (see Cullenberg, Amariglio, and Ruccio, above), pp. 77-101 (pp. 
93-4).
23 Susan F. Feiner, ‘A Portrait of Homo Economicus as a Young Man’, in The New Economic 
Criticism: Studies at the Intersection o f Literature and Economics, ed. by Martha Woodmansee 
and Mark Osteen (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 193-209 (p. 193).
24 Feiner, p. 194.
25 For critical readings of Robinson Crusoe and his importance to neoclassical theory see 
Hewitson, pp. 145-167, and Ulla Grapard, ‘Robinson Crusoe: The Quintessential Economic 
Man?’, Feminist Economics, 1 (1995), 33-52. Crusoe also appears as a character in the writings 
of classical political economy such as the work of David Ricardo. Karl Marx notes that 
‘political economists are fond of Robinson Crusoe stories’ (Capital, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1976) p. 169).
26 Feiner, pp. 194-5.
27 Feiner, p. 195. See also Feiner and Roberts, ‘Hidden by the Invisible Hand: Neoclassical 
Economic Theory and the Textbook Treatment of Race and Gender’, Gender and Society, 4 
(1990), 159-181.
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As I have indicated, feminist economics is not only concerned with the lack of 
female scholars in the economics profession, or the consequent absence of 
women as the object of economic analysis, but also with the dominance, in the 
profession, of the ‘masculinist’ epistemological paradigm of neoclassical 
theory, which privileges such values as reason and detachment. The character 
of rational economic man has thus been the prime object of feminist critique, as 
it both embodies the epistemological paradigm descried, and signals women’s 
absence from economic study. This critique has engaged in a ‘regendering’ of 
the economic agent, pointing out that rational economic man, does not 
resemble a universal ‘human’ subject but a particular, white, western male.28 
As a result of this critique, Feiner claims, it is now widely recognised that ‘the 
traits of economic actors map (too perfectly to be coincidental) onto traditional 
notions of masculinity’.
As is evident from Stone’s Wall Street, popular narratives of the financial 
marketplace are also dominated by characters reminiscent of the rational 
economic agent: young, self-interested, male brokers, who also embody 
stereotypical notions of the ‘masculine’. Ben Younger’s 2000 film Boiler 
Room, which is the focus of my next chapter, is no different in this regard, 
featuring a brokerage house almost entirely populated by apparently 
heterosexual, testosterone-heavy, young men, where the few women present,
28 See David F. Ruccio and Jack Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 137-170 for a discussion of the feminist 
‘regendering’ of economic subjectivity.
29 Feiner, p. 194.
130
including the protagonist’s girlfriend, are receptionists or secretaries.30 The 
same setting is evident in the mass-market paperbacks of the financial fiction 
genre, exemplified by writers such as Po Bronson, Alexander Davidson and 
Michael Ridpath. Ridpath’s thrillers all feature protagonists who are rising 
stars in the male-dominated world of investment banking. His second novel, 
Trading Reality, is no exception.31 This depiction is no doubt ‘true to life’; 
Ridpath and the other writers listed have all also worked in the financial 
industry, and financial trading is still a profession practised overwhelmingly by 
young men. However, the verisimilitude of these tales also depends upon a 
realist construct, which represents the economy from the perspective of a 
detached narrative hero, and depicts gender difference as a binary opposition 
between masculine and feminine ideals. An evident parallel thus exists 
between the narrative hero of popular financial fiction and the rational 
individual agent of neoclassical economic theory. As is the case with Robinson 
Crusoe, their similarity also marks an instance where the borderline between 
economics and literature is particularly unstable, and where the narrative 
representation of economic theory disrupts its positivist pretensions.
Mark Fairfax, the protagonist of Trading Reality, is an established bond trader 
who works in an exclusive investment bank in the City of London. Despite 
the different locations, the similarities between Trading Reality and Wall Street 
extend to the novel’s opening -  where, as in an early scene in Stone’s film, the
30 Boiler Room, dir. Ben Younger, New Line Cinema, 2000.1 will discuss Younger’s film and 
the implications of the obvious similarities between it and Wall Street further in chapter four.
31 For details of Ridpath’s highly successful and growing series of financial thrillers see 
www.michaelridpath.com.
32 Bonds are effectively loans issued by investors to government or industry: they usually have 
a fixed rate of interest and a preset maturity date.
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reader is pitched into the noisy clamour of Harrison Brothers’ trading floor. 
Also like Wall Street, Ridpath’s earnest depiction of the intricacies of market 
trading is offered through the organising perspective of Mark’s first-person 
narrative. This is often so obvious that it is clumsy: when his colleague, Greg, 
decides to buy ‘the eights of Novie twenty-one!’, Mark, as narrator, comments, 
to no-one in particular, ‘He meant the US Treasury eight percents of November 
2021 ,’33 Illuminating the cause of the panic (and the inverse relationship 
between bonds and interest rates) for the reader, Mark’s monologue takes on 
the tones of the financial trading manual:
For the past two years interest rates had fallen month after month. Bond 
prices had risen month after month. It had been easy to make money; 
the more bonds you owned, the more money you made. [...] But now 
that the US Federal Reserve had announced that it would be raising 
interest rates, there would be carnage. Bond prices would fall, and then 
fall some more as people sold to protect their profits, to hedge their 
positions, or just through a mixture of fear and panic. (2)
As in the case of all investment manuals, however, the clarity of Mark’s 
understanding of market forces has not guaranteed him financial success. In an 
early indication of the inaction which troubles him as an economic agent, he 
had predicted the interest rate drop in advance but failed to act upon it, and has 
lost two point four million dollars for the bank as a result.
Mark’s profession as a bond trader is significant to my reading of his character 
as a fictionalised rational economic man. In contrast to Wall Street's Bud Fox,
33 Michael Ridpath, Trading Reality (London: Arrow, 1996), p. 10. All further references are to 
this edition and will be given parenthetically in the text.
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who buys and sells shares for clients, attempting to make money on the back of 
their portfolios, Mark trades the bank’s own ‘proprietary book’ in bonds; thus, 
he is ‘responsible for placing Harrison Brothers’ own bets in the bond market’ 
(3).34 Whereas a salesman is effectively a middleman between the bank and its 
clients, a trader represents and personifies the bank itself, trading in stocks or 
bonds for the bank’s accounts. Mark thus operates as Max U -  a detached, 
apparently autonomous agent in the marketplace, his trading decisions 
motivated by precise cost/benefit calculations. Since his career and generous 
bonuses are dependent on his success, he is also guided by self-interest: the 
maximisation of the bank’s utility coincides perfectly with his own. Hence, 
Mark feels the loss of the two point four million diminishes his identity as a 
trader, which is based upon his ability to make successful calculations: ‘I had 
my reputation to think of, my track record. For a trader, the annual profit and 
loss is all’ (15). Thus while the market, and his own trading floor, is gripped by 
panic because of the change in interest rates, he strives to remain calm by 
separating reason from emotion: ‘Almost two months’ profit gone in ten 
minutes. I allowed myself thirty seconds to curse my own stupidity, [...] I 
needed to get it out of my system. To clear my head. To figure out what to do 
next’ (3). Later, he refers to his work as ‘making sense’ of the market (5), and 
as using ‘rational thought’, which he presents in opposition to the infamous 
trader’s ‘gut-feel’ (12). Mark’s clear-headedness is praised by his boss, a 
former trader, as the appropriate response, and contrasts with that of his French 
colleague, Etienne, who is (predictably) ‘givento [...] hysteria’ (4). This
34 This description echoes that of Michael Lewis, a former bond salesman who recalls, in his 
1989 Wall Street memoir: ‘A trader placed bets in the markets on behalf of Salomon Brothers. 
A salesman was the trader’s mouthpiece to most of the outside world.’ Lewis also notes, ‘men 
traded. Women sold’ (Liar’s Poker (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), pp. 78-9).
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triumph of reason over emotion is also crucial to the trader’s identity as Homo 
economicus.
The process of ‘making sense’ of the financial market through the application 
of rational thought nevertheless sounds suspiciously like the kind of financial 
charting denigrated by Gordon Gekko in Wall Street. Statistical analysis is not 
depicted quite so unfavourably in Trading Reality -  Mark occasionally consults 
a colleague who is an expert in ‘deciphering’ charts, although the analogy with 
astrology is evident: ‘Steve didn’t believe absolutely in what his charts told 
him, but he always wanted to know what they said nonetheless’ (368). Mark’s 
alternative to the uncertain, faith-based knowledge of charting is ‘Bondscape’, 
an experimental virtual reality computer system invented by his brother, 
Richard, which Mark is trialing for Richard’s company, Fairsystems, a hi-tech 
startup based in Scotland. Equipped with a special headset which relays the 
virtual world directly to his retina, and a ‘wand’ which picks up his gestures, 
Bondscape allows Mark to ‘enter’ the market itself. Bondscape utilises, in 
Richard’s terms, a ‘landscape metaphor’ (25), so that, while using the 
programme, Mark experiences the market as a ‘world’ composed of ‘rolling 
green hills’ and grey mountains, ‘dotted with clusters of buildings of different 
sizes and colours, and with national flags’ (5). The topography of this world 
represents the global bond market, with low yielding bond regions represented 
by plains, the more active hillsides shifting endlessly up and down, and the 
individual buildings growing or shrinking continually to show changes in the 
yields of the bonds they represent. Using Bondscape, Mark can have the 
sensation of being ‘in’ the market, apparently feeling the ground erupt beneath
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his feet as he rewinds the programme in order to experience the earlier frenzy 
resulting from the change in interest rates. He can also employ a search 
function, represented by an eagle, which gives him the perspective necessary to 
take decisions, as it flies above the landscape, scanning data on market 
behaviour and feeding him results (5-8).
While Mark refers to Bondscape at first as a ‘representation’ of the market (6), 
his euphoric review repeatedly collapses the virtual representation into the 
thing itself, referred to here as ‘it’: ‘I had been able to visualise the whole bond 
market, to get right inside it, to see and feel it moving’ (15). ‘The market’ is, of 
course, itself a metaphor, a model for visualising the complex activity of the 
financial industry, and for some neoclassical theorists, all social behaviour can
o  c
be conceived thus. Hence, the ‘it’ Mark experiences is itself a discursive 
construction; the other ‘world’ he ‘felt as though [he] were living and moving 
inside’ is, he later qualifies, ‘an abstract world of bonds, yields and currencies’ 
(15). Both interiority and abstraction, then, Bondscape provides Mark with a 
power of prediction unrivalled by statistical charts. The representation of the 
world as an abstract economic model has often been compared, as by Samuels 
and Samuels in chapter one, to a map. Aijo Klamer, for example, claims 
formalist modelling is useless because ‘like a cartographic map’ it cannot tell 
us how to live.36 Since the market represented in Bondscape is itself 
discursively constituted, however, the distinction between reality (world) and 
representation (map) becomes harder to maintain. Mark seems to be in 
possession of the apotheosis of economic models: a fantasy-reality that
35 When market becomes marketplace, as in the widely familiar ‘marketplace of ideas’, it too 
becomes a ‘landscape metaphor’.
36 Klamer, p. 94.
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removes the distinction between map and world, giving him access to the real- 
abstraction.
The fantasy of Bondscape is thus also the fantasy of perfect knowledge. The 
rational economic subject represented by Mark is Max U, the individual 
possessed of perfect knowledge, cognisant of all of the factors necessary to 
make the correct calculations. Thus, the economic subject is also the ‘knowing’ 
subject and is defined in relation to the object -  market knowledge -  which he 
masters. Since perfect knowledge is also a humanist ideal, the rational 
economic subject is also the liberal humanist subject, possessed of reason and 
self-knowledge, the ‘conscious, knowing, unified and rational subject’ referred 
to by Feiner. Bondscape thus also corresponds to the Renaissance 
adventurer’s globe -  a similar virtual-representation which enabled the 
Elizabethan explorer to go out into the world and make conquests -  just as 
Mark makes ‘a killing’ in the markets. The economist’s invocation of rational 
economic man is also, therefore, a gesture of self-identification, as the 
economic scientist, too, aspires to perfect knowledge in the development of 
economic theory. Indeed, Aijo Klamer argues that Max U has had such 
longevity in neoclassical theory precisely because he has provided a subj e x ­
position for the Enlightenment ‘metanarrative of the scientist who, through the 
applications of stylized reconstructions of reality, knows how to intervene in 
and improve on that reality’. As economic science has progressed, this figure 
has increasingly become a kind of technocrat or computer analyst, ‘intrigued
37 See Feiner, above, p. 194. See also Catherine Belsey, The Subject o f Tragedy: Identity and 
Difference in Renaissance Drama (London: Routledge, 1993) for a discussion of subjectivity, 
and the construction of the modem gendered ‘knowing subject’, in Renaissance humanism.
38 Klamer, p. 94.
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by the intricacies of fully articulated systems’, such as Bondscape, and 
‘speaking a purely technical language’. This development has, Klamer notes, 
increasingly enabled economists to ‘take on the attributes of their favourite 
character, the problem-solving, soulless Max U.’39 The caricature-economist in 
Moo, Dr. Lionel Gift, is also homo economicus, a ‘knowing subject’ 
constituted in and by the theory he teaches. A pre-millennial adventurer in the 
age of globalisation, Gift also profits from his exploits in the ‘virgin’ cloud- 
forests of Costa Rica.40
Ridpath’s narrative hero, then, is both rational and all-knowing; he employs 
‘stylized reconstructions of reality’, and embodies the ideals of both humanist 
philosophy and economic science in his relationship to the financial economy. 
Trading Reality is not just a novel about the workings of financial markets, 
however. It also belongs to a genre of mass-market crime writing which uses 
the protagonist’s profession as the background setting for the mystery to be 
solved, as with the legal profession in the work of the American John Grisham. 
Ridpath’s first novel, Free to Trade, was subject to a record-breaking bidding 
war between British publishers eager to imitate Random House’s success with 
Grisham, and was specifically publicised by his agent as ‘the financial world’s 
answer to John Grisham’. Reviewers also make frequent references to 
Ridpath’s similarity to Dick Francis, who he admits to imitating.41 The
39 Klamer, pp. 98-9.
40 This depiction of conquest is also obviously gendered. See Suzanne Bergeron ‘Political 
Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics’ Signs, 26 (2001), 983-1006 for a 
review of feminist critiques of the gendered rhetoric of globalisation.
41For Ridpath’s agent see Richard Pendlebury, Daily Mail, 24 January 1994, p. 3. Also, Hugh 
Sebag-Montefiore, Evening Standard, 7 February 1994, p. 32; and Jim White, Independent, 26 
January 1995, Arts section, p. 26; all via < http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive> [accessed 
30/07/06].
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representation of the financial economy as a crime scene is not new; Wall 
Street, as I have already shown, narrates the central character’s descent into 
white collar crime, and Boiler Room, discussed in the next chapter, repeats this 
plot to excess. In Ridpath’s financial thrillers, however, the protagonists are not 
criminals but reluctant, ‘one-off, amateur detectives, typically striving to solve 
the murder of a friend or colleague, which turns out to have been the by­
product of a financial fraud in which they are also unwittingly entangled.42 
Trading Reality is a relatively conventional whodunit in which Mark Fairfax 
struggles both to solve his brother’s murder and to save Richard’s ailing 
technology company, whose share-price seems to be subject to suspect market 
manipulation. Mark’s rational economic man is, thus, also reminiscent of the 
logical Holmesian ‘rational superman’, who, Stephen Knight notes, has been 
associated with scientific detective fiction 43 There is also a family resemblance 
to other financial detectives, such as the banker protagonist of the American 
John Putnam Thatcher mysteries by ‘Emma Lathen’ -  the joint pseudonym of 
an economist and a lawyer -  as well as to similar ‘one-off thrillers about 
market corruption and intrigue by former British traders, such as Linda Davies 
or Alexander Davidson.44
42 Martin Priestman, describing the decline of the amateur detective series in British crime 
fiction notes, nevertheless, the presence, exemplified by Dick Francis, of the ‘non-series hero 
whose demanding day-job plunges him into a particular one-off case’ (‘Post-war British crime 
fiction’, in The Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction, ed. by Martin Priestman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 173-189 (p. 186)). Ridpath refers to these protagonists 
as ‘innocents’. Recently, in On the Edge (2005) and See no Evil (2006), Ridpath has embarked 
on a series, whose central character, Alex Calder, displays more of the characteristics of the 
hard-bitten amateur detective (‘On the Edge by Michael Ridpath’, 
<http://www.michaelridpath.com/onthedge.html> [accessed 30/07/06]).
43 Stephen Knight, Crime Fiction 1800-2000: Detection, Death, Diversity (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 68.
44 Mary Jane Latsis and Martha Henissart are the real authors of the Thatcher mysteries.
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In the introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction, Martin 
Priestman comments that the strict separation between crime and detective 
fiction has lately come under question.45 My conflation of the thriller (crime) 
and detective genres is therefore deliberate. While the novel exhibits many 
similarities to classic detective fiction, Mark’s rationality is also troubled by 
the ‘discomposure’ with which David Glover characterises the thriller.46 
Glover notes that thrillers are conventionally understood to depict heroes 
‘overcoming obstacles and dangers and accomplishing some important and 
moral mission’.47 However, he argues that the genre is just as, and sometimes 
more, ‘concerned with creating obstacles, proliferating setbacks, traps, 
inconveniences, dead-ends and discomposure’.48 In a similar effort to read the 
conventionality of Trading Reality against itself, I wish to examine whether 
Mark’s increasing ‘discomposure’ as both a detective and a trader is significant 
for his depiction as rational economic man.
The figure of the rational economist-as-detective is probably best depicted in 
the character of Henry Spearman, an amateur detective modelled on Milton 
Friedman, in a series written by two economists, William Breit and Kenneth G. 
Elzinga. This features three books: Murder at the Margin (1978), The Fatal 
Equilibrium (1985), and A Deadly Indifference (1998), published under the 
joint pseudonym Marshall Jevons. Alfred Marshall and William Stanley Jevons 
were both prominent British nineteenth-century economists associated with the
45 Priestman, above, pp. 1-6.
46 David Glover, ‘The Thriller’, in The Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction (see 
Priestman, above), p. 138.
47 John G. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and Popular 
Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 39, cited in Glover, p. 138.
48 Glover, p. 138.
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marginalist revolution which ushered in the neoclassical era. Spearman solves 
mysteries by applying the laws of neoclassical theory to understand the hidden 
costs or benefits behind apparently irrational behaviour, thus displaying the 
kind of scientific approach which Martin A. Kayman found to be in vogue in 
the period immediately post-Holmes.49 Breit and Elzinga explore the link with 
Holmes via the presumption of rationality upon which both Holmes’ deduction 
and neoclassical theory rests: ‘Like Sherlock Holmes and other gifted 
detectives of fiction, economists assume that people act rationally.’50 The 
economist is also frequently conflated with homo economicus in their account, 
so that, later, the comparison reads: ‘the main actor in each was a coldly 
logical, rational calculating creature: the mastermind sleuth in one, the 
economic man in the other.’51 This depiction of economic science as abstract 
puzzle solving is evidently popular: according to Breit and Elzinga, the 
Spearman mystery series is often used, alongside standard textbooks, to 
explicate microeconomic principles in introductory economics courses.52
Spearman’s character illustrates, Breit and Elzinga claim, not just the similarity
between detective fiction and economics but also the opposite -
that,
almost all good economic analysis is structured like classical detective 
fiction. [...] The economist’s epistemology, presented in the form of 
scientific narratives, runs parallel to the puzzle-solving processes of the
49 Martin A. Kayman, ‘The Short Story from Poe to Chesterton’ (see Priestman, above), pp. 41- 
58 (pp. 47-8).
50 William Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga, ‘Economics as Detective Fiction’, Journal O f 
Economic Education, 33 (2002), 367-376 (p. 368).
51 Breit and Elzinga, p. 373.
52 Breit and Elzinga, p. 375.
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mastermind sleuth presented in the form of fictional narratives. [...]
The irrational to the economist is the counterpart of the supernatural to 
the mastermind sleuth. Once this similarity is recognized, economics 
and murder mysteries no longer seem like an odd literary pairing.53 
Along with rationality, this parallel between the two narrative genres derives 
from their shared predilection for a universe which tends towards equilibrium. 
Thus, they argue, economic articles tend to follow a familiar narrative structure 
whereby a state of ‘mental equilibrium’ is disturbed by the observation of 
anomalous behaviour, which precipitates disorder as it challenges established 
theoretical principles. The economist-sleuth then interprets the evidence, 
eventually revealing that ‘the seemingly irrational practice is actually 
consistent with sound economic principles. As in detective fiction, the end is an 
illumination. Order is restored. Equilibrium is regained.’54
The conventional plot structure of detective fiction, which Breit and Elzinga 
identify in economic narrative, is, for Catherine Belsey, merely the exemplar 
for all classic realist narrative. Thus, all realist narratives depict ordered plots 
which turn ‘on the creation of enigma through the precipitation of disorder’ 
before leading to narrative ‘closure which is also disclosure’.55 In her own 
discussion of Holmes, Belsey finds that, depicted in classic realist form, the 
scientific positivism deployed by Holmes is ‘compelled to display its own 
limitations’. This is due to realism’s inevitable displacement of unattainable 
‘facts’ by a simulated real, and positivism’s tendency to ‘push to the margins of
53 Breit and Elzinga, p. 368.
54 Ibid, p. 370.
55 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 64-5.
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experience whatever it cannot explain’.56 As with Deirdre McCloskey in my 
chapter one, Breit and Elzinga’s celebration of the parallels between economic 
science and classic realist detective fiction neglects to discuss these 
implications. Instead, they emphasise the revelatory power of economic 
detection, which exposes ‘the hidden logic and deeper significance that 
underlie the seemingly commonplace and humdrum activities of humankind’.57 
Despite these authors’ shared blind-spot however, the representation of 
economics as narrative (detective) fiction displays both its limitations and its 
inevitable abstractions. In Trading Reality, the narrative presentation of the 
‘knowing’, rational, economic (detective) subject, opens up the possibility for 
‘his’ interrogation, as I will now go on to suggest.
Critics of the representation of the rational economic subject usually present 
two conflicting arguments. Either the representation is too abstract, a poor 
reduction of the human he is designed to represent, or he is not abstract at all 
but gendered -  a fully recognisable masculine character. In the first case, Aijo 
Klamer, for example, laments the minimalism of formalist economics, which 
has reduced the economic agent, once a human guided by moral principles, to a 
unit of utility maximisation: ‘While physicists are still looking for the most 
elementary particle and the unified force, economists appear to have found
c o
their fundamental axiom in the notion of the maximising individual unit.’
Max U, an individual devoid of character, history or moral sentiment, says 
Klamer, cannot even be thought of as making ‘choices’, as his decisions are
56 Belsey, pp. 107-8.
57 Breit and Elzinga, p. 375.
58 Klamer, p. 87.
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entirely ‘mechanic’.59 Roback Morse makes the same criticism: ‘There is only 
calculation, no real choice.’60 This abstraction is dangerous, for Klamer, 
because it renders economic knowledge meaningless: the economic theory 
based on it risks having no applicability. Curiously, what both of these critics 
find missing from the neoclassical economic subject is uncertainty, the 
‘insecurities that plague anyone who has to make choices’.61 It should be noted, 
however, that they are both keen to re-invoke a more fully ‘human’ subject 
who will ultimately overcome this uncertainty, whether guided by morals 
(Klamer), or by ‘reflecting’ on their decisions (Roback Morse).
David Ruccio and Jack Amariglio, who discuss this alleged ‘(dis)appearance’ 
or abstraction of the sensate human body as subject in modem economic 
theory,62 agree that one of the founding narratives of neoclassical economics is 
‘the sophisticated story in which desire and reason (and their interactions) are 
brought into play as the foundation of a theory of economic relations and 
institutions.’63 They reject, however, the nostalgia inspired by accounts, such as 
Klamer’s, in which economic history is told as a narrative of the Fall from ‘the 
true humanist beginnings of modem economics’.64 Adopting a Foucauldian 
approach, Ruccio and Amariglio claim that the ‘thinking and feeling’ body has 
not disappeared from modem economic theory; rather it has been dispersed 
into a myriad of representations designed to control it. These include economic 
theories such as ‘revealed preference’ theory, whose purpose is to overcome
59 Klamer, pp. 93-5.
60 Jennifer Roback Morse, ‘Who is Rational Economic Man?’, Social Policy and Philosophy, 
14(1997), 179-206 (p. 181).
61 Klamer, p.93
62 Ruccio and Amariglio, pp. 92-136.
63 Ruccio and Amariglio, p. 142.
64 Ruccio and Amariglio, p. 109.
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the effects of the troubling presence(s) of the body. Further, as Ruccio and 
Amariglio point out, the subjectivity invoked by neoclassical theory itself relies 
upon a ‘humanist optimism’, whereby
the subject, as it succeeds in overcoming the multiplicity and wildness 
of bodily desires and emotions (often rendered, historically, as 
‘femaleness’) through the application of reason and the use of 
knowledge in guiding behaviour, will achieve beneficial ends, both 
individual and social. [...]; Study neoclassical theory, it is repeatedly 
announced, and you too can discover the salubrious results that are 
occasioned by the bridling of passion by reason, of insatiable desire by 
rational calculation.65 
I will discuss the apparent abstraction of the economic subject, and the conflict 
between reason and emotion in Trading Reality before returning, finally, to the 
presence o f ‘femaleness’ in the gendered construction of rational economic 
man.
On the face of it, Mark Fairfax seems to correspond to the abstract calculating 
subject which Klamer has criticised. As mentioned above, he repeatedly refers 
to financial trading, on which his identity is founded, as pure calculation: ‘the 
thing about finance is that everything can be quantified. The famous bottom 
line’ (228). When Mark’s brother is mysteriously murdered, and he and his 
estranged father become the majority shareholders in Richard’s almost- 
insolvent company, Mark is forced to take a decision which he finds himself 
approaching ‘like the trading problems I came up against every day’ (120).
65 Ruccio and Amariglio, p. 143.
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Should FairSystems remain independent, and very possibly go bankrupt, or be 
sold to a rival, which will betray his brother’s wishes, but potentially save 
some of the employees jobs, while netting Mark a substantial personal profit?
I knew how to solve problems like this. Divide the problem into a series 
of factors that would affect the ultimate outcome. Assign the 
appropriate level of significance to each factor. Consider what the 
downside was and how likely it was to occur. Quantify the upside and 
the likelihood of that occurring. Weigh the two against each other, 
being very careful to identify and then ignore any emotional 
considerations that might sway the analysis. Take a decision. And then 
act on it.
This approach had served me well in the past and I fell 
naturally into it now. (120-121)
Mark’s analysis reduces decision-making, as Roback Morse points out, to a 
process of calculation in which only one option is present. ‘Leaving aside 
emotional considerations, the correct decision wasn’t really that hard to see. 
“We sell’” (122). Despite such certainty, the plot of Trading Reality is driven 
less by Mark’s action than by his inaction. Consequently, his ‘natural’ adoption 
of rational calculation can be seen to depend on the repression of emotion, 
which returns, as the plot progresses, to undermine his subjectivity as homo 
economicus.
Having been outvoted by his father at their first board meeting, Mark agrees to 
run the company for three months, and thus transfers temporarily from the
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abstract financial economy from which he gets his identity, to the apparently 
‘real’ economy of FairSystems. This opposition is problematised, however, 
both by the ‘product’ FairSystems has developed, and by speculative 
uncertainty over its value, making it an ‘unreal world [...] of virtual reality 
machines, of murder, of a company that could either be worth hundreds of 
millions or nothing’ (302). No longer a rational actor in the marketplace, Mark 
becomes increasingly unsure of his decisions, emotionally affected by his wish 
to fulfil his dead brother’s legacy, and his gradual attraction to Rachel, 
FairSystems chief of technology. While Wall Street is apparently structured by 
a binary opposition between virtual and real economies, therefore, Trading 
Reality supplements this with a further opposition between reason and emotion.
In Michael Ridpath’s first novel, Free to Trade, the narrator, Paul (a bond 
trader new to the job), struggles unsuccessfully to master his emotions: ‘This 
wouldn’t do. I had to banish all the what-ifs from my mind. I had to transform 
my brain from an emotional jumble of wild conjectures to a totally reliable 
calculating machine.’66 Both Free to Trade and Trading Reality depict such 
moments of ‘discomposure’, where the narrator is forced to face the conflict 
upon which his subjectivity is founded. Mark’s consultation with his, 
increasingly distant, girlfriend Karen, who sells stock for Harrison Brothers, 
and is herself a shareholder in FairSystems, is one such instance. As 
appropriate to David Glover’s reading of the thriller genre, Mark has suffered a 
series of setbacks, including the treachery of his chief of finance, assault and 
sabotage by a crazed ex-employee, and the loss of his most valuable customer,
66 Ridpath, Free to Trade (London: Heinemann, 1995), p. 8.
146
all three of whom are potential suspects for Richard’s murder. He thus 
becomes imbued with self-doubt: about his loss of judgement, his inefficacy at 
solving Richard’s murder and his inability to save the business (256). This 
uncertainty, which recurs throughout the book, is frequently referred to as a 
loss of ‘perspective’. As both a detective and a trader, Mark struggles to 
maintain a subject-position from which he can make rational decisions. When 
Karen informs him that he has lost his trader’s ‘detachment’ and must ‘take 
your losses’, his worry dissipates, finding that ‘once I had taken the decision to 
sell, my mind cleared’ (258).
Having reiterated his determination to sell four times in the course of the 
narrative, however, Mark suddenly revokes that decision, resolving to keep the 
company afloat somehow. His ‘we have no choice but to sell’ (265), is 
followed, just over ten pages later, by ‘we don’t sell’ (276). Mark’s change of 
mind comes about because Rachel supplies him with previously secret 
information about the technological advances the company is due to make. 
Poised to become the Microsoft of VR, FairSystems value could potentially 
rise from some ten million dollars to hundreds of millions, if they can stay 
afloat for just a few more months. His new decision does not apparently 
conflict with his rational methodology, therefore, as it is based on a new 
cost/benefit calculation, in which the benefits have radically increased. 
However, the future profits are no more realisable than before he received the 
new information: the firm is still likely to go under before it can achieve them. 
Mark is aware of this, so he characterises his decision as ‘a classic trader’s 
mistake. Betting everything on a trade that was going wrong’. Despite this he is
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unperturbed, finding that ‘this had long ago ceased to be simply a large-scale 
trade. I was emotionally, psychologically and financially wedded to 
FairSystems’ (357-58). Mark has transferred to the real/emotional axis of the 
novel’s binary structure, and consequently he has discarded the uncertainty 
which previously troubled him.
The conflict between reason and emotion in Trading Reality, represented by 
Mark’s indecision over ‘to sell or not to sell’, appears to support those critics, 
such as Klamer and Roback Morse, who find the rational economic subject to 
be an impossibly abstract model. Just as such criticisms depend upon the 
invocation of an alternative ‘fully human’ economic actor, Trading Reality 
depicts an economic agent who eventually becomes a more ‘rounded’ character 
by virtue of his crisis of identity. Uncertainty and discomposure may dog the 
rational economic subject, but they are ultimately overcome in the name of a 
new, stable subjectivity. This is not an effect of the novel’s greater adequacy to 
the ‘human condition’, however. Rather, it is an effect of the novel’s classic 
realist/detective structure. ‘Classic realism cannot’, Catherine Belsey writes, 
‘foreground contradiction’.67 While the narrative may feature disorder, such as 
a murder, which provides a test of identity, the impulse toward closure 
suppresses contradiction by presenting the subject overcoming their crisis. 
‘Decisive choices are made, identity is established, the murderer is exposed, or 
marriage generates a new set of subject-positions.’ All four occur in Trading 
Reality, as, having saved the company by making the right decision, Mark and 
Rachel discover the truth behind who is manipulating their share price -  a
67 Belsey, Critical Practice, p. 75.
68 Ibid, p. 69.
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board director with whom Mark’s girlfriend, Karen, is having an affair. In the 
closing chapters, Karen is revealed to have murdered Richard to protect her 
lover, while Mark starts a new relationship with Rachel, and finally returns to 
the world of trading -  and to his identity as a trader, although retaining an 
interest in FairSystems. Therefore, while it is possible to read Trading Reality 
for its narration of the insufficiency of an economic subjectivity based on homo 
economicus, the narrative works to supplement these insufficiencies through 
his encounter with the real economy, which precipitates his own emotional 
self-discovery. This reading is reinforced by both the narrative closure and the 
mode of narration. Delivered in the past tense, Mark’s narrative relates a tale 
which, for him, is now over. Despite his many setbacks, including an attempt 
on his own life, the narrator speaks from a new subject-position constructed 
outside the narrative, in which, we can presume, he has learned to temper 
reason with emotion, and can reflect on past decisions.69
The very conventionality of Trading Reality’s narrative may prove, however, 
to be its undoing. In one of the key moments of uncertainty in Mark’s 
narration, he struggles to regain stability by reminding himself who he is. 
Having just spent an evening with Rachel, Mark describes his sense of being 
drawn towards her and away from Karen, and his life in London, as ‘slipping 
towards something’. He continues,
I was in danger of losing my sense of perspective.
69 See Belsey, p. 71 on the significance of past tense narration for classic realist narrative.
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I struggled to get a grip, to remember who I was. A successful 
young trader at Harrison Brothers with excellent prospects. I had a 
beautiful girlfriend. (302)
The moment entails, I wish to infer, a kind of soliloquy which seems to permit 
the reader access to Mark’s ‘real’ identity.70 The preceding passage, which 
invokes the ‘unreal world’ of virtual reality in which he has been living, is 
evidently designed to contrast with this description of who he ‘really’ is. In this 
moment of self-narration, however, Mark Fairfax invokes, as his authentic 
identity, a subject-position which reads like the character description from the 
back cover of a mass-market novel. It is a stereotypical presentation endlessly 
repeated in narratives of the financial economy, whether film, fiction, or, as 
some feminist critics point out, economic textbook. The scene thus provides a 
glimpse of the inevitably discursive constitution of the rational economic 
subject, a figure who, as I will show in the next chapter, is always in a process 
of self-narration, and endlessly relies upon prior texts to forge an identity. 
Mark’s narrative is thus, in a moment of apparent authenticity, instead 
‘compelled to display its own limitations’:71 ‘real’ identity is endlessly deferred 
in favour of a simulated real, a stereotype without an original.
In addition, the realist subject-position invoked as ‘real’ identity in this passage 
relies upon a gendered opposition between the ‘successful young trader’ and 
his ‘beautiful girlfriend’. It is an opposition familiar to both the readers of 
financial narrative, and feminist critics of representations of rational economic
701 am referring here to the discussion of the soliloquy as revelatory of an apparent, though 
actually absent, interiority of the humanist subject, in Catherine Belsey, The Subject o f  
Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 33- 
54.
71 Belsey, Critical Practice, p. 107.
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man. Returning to Jane Smiley’s Moo for example, and my opening passage, 
Keri Donaldson may feel at ‘a remove’ from Lionel Gift’s lectures because 
they don’t represent her experiences -  but she also feels it in relation to the 
boys, ‘who seemed to enjoy classes’. Further, unlike Keri, the male students 
recognise that the neoclassical theory they are learning does ascribe her a 
place, one which exists outside their community of scholars. She is the reward 
for their labours, the ‘mysterious blond beauty’, ‘self-contained and remote’, 
who represents the prize for which they are eternally competing.72 In both Wall 
Street and Boiler Room, female characters inhabit this position. Darien is 
‘given’ to Bud by Gekko, as a signifier of his success; consequently, when he 
betrays Gordon, she departs also (the suggestion of their reunion in an 
undetermined future, found in an earlier draft of the screenplay, was cut).
Abby, the receptionist positioned, literally, outside the competitive marketplace 
of J.T. Marlin’s trading floor in Boiler Room, is also viewed as a prize by the 
young traders. Thus, she is the source of conflict between the protagonist, Seth, 
and his trainer, Greg, when she transfers her affections from one to the other. 
She also occupies two of the traditional roles offered to young women of her 
socioeconomic group, working as both a receptionist and as carer for her ailing 
mother.
Boiler Room also figures the feminine as irrational by way of Greg’s 
instruction to not ‘pitch the bitch’ when selling stock on the phone. ‘We don’t 
sell stock to women’, he informs Seth. ‘They’re gonna call you every fucking 
day wanting to know why the stock is dropping. And God forbid the stock
72 Jane Smiley, pp. 141-46.
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should go up, you’re gonna hear from them every fucking fifteen minutes.’73 
This exclusion of women from the role of controlled, rational agent in the 
marketplace would appear to be contradicted, in Trading Reality, by the 
depiction of Karen, Mark’s ‘beautiful girlfriend’, who is an equities dealer at 
Harrison Brothers. However, while we learn that Karen is hard-working, 
athletic, competitive, and extremely successful, this representation, narrated 
through Mark’s gaze, also emphasises her as a feminine ideal: another blonde 
beauty. Exuding uber-feminine poise, her character is introduced
sitting on her desk, a phone jammed between her cheek and her 
shoulder, her long legs resting on her chair. Despite the day’s 
excitement, her yellow skirt and white silk blouse had not a wrinkle in 
them, and she looked as cool as she had at seven thirty that morning. 
(13)
This depiction is in marked contrast to Karen’s less successful colleague, Sally, 
who has ‘short dark hair in a bob, and glasses’ and is, presumably as a 
consequence, intimidated by her male colleagues (27). Karen succeeds in the 
marketplace by exploiting her, supposedly innate, feminine ‘charms’ as part of 
her sales technique. In opposition to Mark, she sells stock over the phone, 
typically engaging her clients, who are usually men, in gossip and flirtation. 
While he observes that she is a meticulous researcher of the stocks she tips, she 
regularly conceals this fact, preferring to intimate instead that she is passing on 
a rumour. As with Darien and Abby, Karen is the prize which signifies Mark’s 
success: in an early moment of self-congratulation he considers, ‘I took a swig 
of my beer. Things were going well. The house. The job. Karen’ (20).
73 Boiler Room, dir. Ben Younger, 2000.
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However, we soon learn, through Mark, that Karen’s poise is as artfully 
constructed as the fake Armani suits she buys from a tailor in Hong Kong. 
While she is initially depicted as simply vulnerable, her act conceals an 
emotional instability which relates to her father’s desertion when she was a 
teenager, and a more recent affair with an older man. The details are unclear at 
the outset: although Mark is aware that she received psychiatric counselling 
when she was younger, he perceives her as merely vulnerable, or highly strung. 
The final revelation, near the novel’s end, that she killed Richard, with an axe, 
out of loyalty to her much older lover, is compounded by the final disclosure, 
in which Mark learns that the teenage Karen had had a nervous breakdown and 
committed arson, attempting to kill her father’s mistress. Karen is depicted as 
not merely unstable, then, but as an hysteric; she murders out of an excess of 
unconstrained emotion, a crudely inferred Oedipal desire for the father whose 
attention she lost as a child. Whereas Mark begins the novel displaying too 
little emotion, Karen displays too much. Desire thus figures in the novel, not as 
emotion per se, but as emotion untempered by rationality. Her lengthy 
deception of both Mark and the reader illustrates, nonetheless, the dependency 
of the subject-position of rational economic man on what is perceived to be its 
opposite - the emotionally vulnerable feminine ideal.
The novel’s disclosure should, therefore, destabilise Mark’s own subjectivity, 
by revealing the dependence of both his own and Karen’s identities on an 
idealised opposition between the masculine and the feminine. However, this 
troubling suggestion is deferred in the text by the introduction of Rachel, a
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brilliant computer programmer, who subsists on red wine and cigarettes and 
reads Mark poetry. Initially Karen’s opposite, Rachel is gradually feminised 
under Mark’s gaze, displaying feminine wiles of her own, in her efforts to 
finally attract his attention. As Karen changes from ideal object to hysteric, 
Rachel is transformed from eccentric to vulnerable feminine, although her 
‘deep brown eyes that could express emotion, understanding and intelligence 
all at the same time’ evidently hold these qualities in a finer balance (302). 
Despite this outcome the representation of rational economic man as classic 
realist detective does, as in Belsey’s discussion of Holmes, offer a glimpse of 
what positivist economics ‘pushes to the margins of experience’.74 Karen’s 
irrational desire -  depicted as an excess of emotion, which is not reason’s 
opposite but its undoing -  is marginalised by the text and construed as 
madness.
As I have indicated, while some feminist approaches have sought to redress the 
balance of masculinist subjectivity in economics -  sometimes through the 
invocation of a more integrated ‘human’ subject -  others have sought to 
destabilise it altogether. Adopting the latter approach, Gillian Hewitson 
analyses the binary oppositions upon which the Robinson Crusoe myth is 
structured, in order to reveal how representations of self-present rational 
economic man depend upon the production and exclusion of a feminine 
subject-position which is its absent other.75 Thus, she contends, ‘the male body 
and masculinity sire constructed discursively in opposition to, and valued at the 
expense of, the feminine, which is understood as irrational, dependent, passive,
74 Belsey, Critical Practice, p. 108.
75 Hewitson, pp. 145-167.
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vulnerable, and self-sacrificing.’76 In the fictional economic narratives I have 
discussed, all of these female subject-positions are present. Since neoclassical 
theory is, in Hewitson’s reading, founded upon this concept of femininity, it 
cannot be simply re-gendered. Her approach does not, therefore, invoke a ‘true’ 
excluded feminine, which could be simply integrated within existing theories, 
rather, she attempts to show that ‘femininity’ is already a subject-position 
within neoclassical theory, one which the theory both produces and excludes. 
The implication of her analysis is that both masculine and feminine subject- 
positions, and male and female bodies, are discursively produced within 
culture. Hewitson’s deconstructive approach is praised by Ruccio and 
Amariglio, who argue that
postmodern notions of subjectivity may destabilize neoclassical 
theorizing to such a degree that their introduction may compromise the 
dominance of neoclassicism in the discipline of economics. This 
possibility, to our mind, distinguishes the critical effects of postmodern 
feminism from the critiques that aim simply at regendering knowing 
and acting subjects and that, as a result, remain within the bounds of 
economic modernism.77
The figure of rational economic man, who, in Trading Reality, is also the 
narrative hero, and the rational detective, depends upon the exclusion of a non- 
rational emotional other, an incompletion staged by the novel form. However, 
in accordance with criticisms of the abstraction of economic man, the novel 
also tries to supplement his incompletion -  by showing him learning to
76 Hewitson, p. 163.
77 Ruccio and Amariglio, p. 166.
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overcome the conflict within and thereby become more fully 'human'. This is 
an effect of the text's adherence to classic realist narrative, and of the critics’ 
adherence to humanist ideals. Alternatively, a poststructuralist approach, such 
as Gillian Hewitson's reading of the Robinson Crusoe myth, or the reading of 
Ridpath’s novel I have attempted above, aims to demonstrate that the rational 
economic subject depends upon the exclusion of its emotional other, without 
seeking to resolve this through the inclusion of the excluded feminine. Instead, 
a deconstructive reading demonstrates that both masculinity and femininity are 
positions produced in culture, which nevertheless have effects on male and 
female subjects. For Ruccio and Amariglio, this approach, which fragments the 
economic subject instead of making it more complete, will ultimately have a 
more troubling effect on the truth claims of neoclassical economic science.
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Chapter Four
‘Trust me. I’m selling you stories’: Citation, Iteration and Narration in Boiler 
Room
Seth Davis, the rookie stock-seller and narrator of Ben Younger’s 2000 film 
Boiler Room, lives in a world saturated with economic narratives about 
shortcuts to financial success. His voiceover, as the film opens, emphasizes the 
ersatz quality of these get-rich-quick tales, drawn from popular culture and 
urban myth:
I read this article a while back that said that Microsoft employs more 
millionaire secretaries than any other company in the world. They took 
stock options over Christmas bonuses. It was a good move.
[...] And then you turn on the TV and there’s just more of it. The 
eighty-seven-million-dollar lottery winner, that kid actor that just 
made twenty million on his last movie, that internet stock that shot 
through the roof -  you could have made millions on it if you just got 
in early.1
In each of these stories financial success is largely a matter of good timing in a 
world where millions appear as if by magic. For Seth, the effect of these 
endlessly repeated fictions is that they reinforce each other, insisting upon their 
own realisation: ‘I remember there was this photograph of one of the 
[Microsoft] groundskeepers next to his Ferrari -  blew my mind. You see shit 
like that and it just plants seeds, makes you think it’s possible, even easy.’ By
1 Boiler Room, dir. Ben Younger, New Line Cinema, 2000.
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mutual reinforcement the stories accumulate credit and enter the bounds of 
possibility -  the fictional invades the real.
The period to the end of the 1990s, during which Boiler Room is set, was that 
of the longest bull market in American economic history. Despite the high- 
profile criminal cases of the mid-eighties and the 1987 ‘Black Monday’ crash, 
both of which generated market mistrust, the bull market of the 1990s saw a 
return to economic investment conditions based on mergers, flotation of new 
internet based companies and reinstated public optimism in the ability of 
markets to generate easy money. This boom in market speculation, partly 
derived from the new possibilities of internet trading, saw an unprecedented 
rise in the number of individual Americans investing in stock,2 and created a 
culture of credulity in financial storytelling such as Seth describes in the 
opening voiceover. The discursive field of Boiler Room is thus similar to Wall 
Street, as in both cases the rising bull market encourages a proliferation of 
economic storytelling which exacerbates the tension between the fictional and 
the real at the heart of the virtual economy. In Wall Street this tension gives 
rise to a narrative which is dependent on a binary opposition between the 
supposedly fictional world of the financial economy and the real world of 
production, a binary which the narrative increasingly struggles to impose. In 
Boiler Room the threatening fictionality of the financial economy appears to
2 ‘An unprecedented boom in the stock market, combined with the ease of investing in stocks, led 
to a sharp increase in public participation in securities markets during the 1990s. The annual 
trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange, or “Big Board”, soared from 11,400 million 
shares in 1980 to 169,000 million shares in 1998. Between 1989 and 1995, the portion of all U.S. 
households owning stocks, directly or through intermediaries like pension funds, rose from 31 
percent to 41 percent.’ (Christopher Conte and Albert R. Karr, ‘Stocks, Commodities and Markets’, 
chapter five of Conte and Karr, Outline o f  The U. S. Economy (United States Information Agency 
Publication, 2001) <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/oecon/chap5.htm> [accessed 20/01/05] 
(section: ‘A Nation of Investors’)).
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have come into effect as, here, all market trading is shown to be dependent on 
storytelling practice. However, treated together, the similarity between these 
two tales exposes their conventionality. Through both its explicit and 
unacknowledged references to Wall Street, along with other financial fictions, 
Boiler Room poses as a counterfeit -  a tale which troubles the real/fictional 
distinction upon which both plots depend. In so doing, it also investigates the 
relationship between financial selling and storytelling and explores the 
credibility of all narrative, economic or otherwise.
As we have seen, then, fiction about financial trading is marked by twin 
impulses towards both uncertainty and closure. In the cases discussed so far the 
risks and uncertainties generated by market speculation provide the impetus for 
the narrative action, yet the ultimate threat such uncertainty presents triggers 
the second, containing, impulse towards narrative closure. Despite a 
momentary confusion where rules are in abeyance, villains are sorted from 
victims {Wall Street) and rational judgement prevails {Trading Reality). In the 
following two chapters, I wish to examine cases where the uncertainties 
generated by the market are less easily contained, as both Boiler Room and 
Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis provide a reworking of the lexicon established in 
texts like Stone’s Wall Street, which questions the certainties that text imposes.
The similarities between Wall Street and Boiler Room are striking and are 
marked by more than just their economic backgrounds, as Younger’s film 
depends upon the same storytelling conventions examined in Wall Street. 
Hence the viewer is oriented, once again, through the use of a central character,
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Seth, who is inducted into the gendered world of financial selling, where he is 
tempted to engage in illegal activity in return for untold wealth. These 
similarities extend, for example, to the subplot concerning Seth’s relationship 
with his father, and even to the use of specific shots and framing devices. Our 
first introduction to the sales floor where Seth works thus mirrors Bud’s entry 
to the trading floor at Jackson Steinem, with the hand-held camera first 
following Seth, then travelling away from him in order to enter into a scene of 
heightened chaotic action, punctuated with bursts of incomprehensible sales 
pitch. Hence, it is possible to argue, as I wish to do here, that Boiler Room 
amounts to a remake of Wall Street. Writing on the tendency for Hollywood to 
recycle tales from French cinema, Lucy Mazdon notes that remakes are often 
critically dismissed as evidence of the triumph of commercialism over 
creativity. This response, she argues, fails to engage with the pertinent issue of 
why certain kinds of stories get remade, nor does it pay attention to the 
significant issues raised by remakes concerning the relationship between an 
‘original’ and its ‘copy’. Boiler Room rewards critical interest on both of these 
points. Bearing in mind David Wills’ broad definition of the remake as ‘the 
possibility that exists for a film to be repeated in a different form’,4 Boiler 
Room's repetition of Wall Street can also be accounted for in the decisive 
differences between the texts as much as in their similarities.
The most striking (and significant) difference between the two films is the 
change in location. Just as the opening sequence to Wall Street emphasises
3 Lucy Mazdon , ‘Introduction’, in Film Remakes, ed. by Lucy Mazdon (= Journal o f Romance 
Studies, 4(2004)), 1-11 (p. 1).
4 David Wills, ‘The French Remark: Breathless and Cinematic Citationality’, in Play It Again, 
Sam: Retakes on Remakes, ed. by Andrew Horton and Stuart Y. McDougal (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), pp. 147-61 (p. 148).
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Bud’s journey into the centre of the financial universe, an early sequence in 
Boiler Room depicts Seth’s opposing drive outwards. His destination is J. T. 
Marlin, a financial brokerage which operates out of a call centre or ‘boiler 
room’, located, as his voiceover relates, ‘way out’ on Long Island ‘a good hour 
away from Wall Street’. The opposition is highlighted by the use of repeated 
cross-cuts between Seth’s face framed in his rear-view mirror and an exterior 
shot of the diminishing skyline of Manhattan, representing his point of view. 
The negative comparison is further emphasised through Seth’s voiceover, 
which continues: ‘Somebody forgot to tell the guys who worked there though -  
they looked and acted like they took the six train to Fulton Street every 
morning.’ This narrative voiceover employs a conventional tone of ironic 
detachment which further encourages the viewer to mark Seth’s difference 
from and superiority to the world he describes.
Seth’s observation about his future colleagues is significant, as it highlights the 
self-conscious comparison drawn between Boiler Room and the fictional world 
of Stone’s Wall Street, where Bud Fox catches the train every morning, as 
much as with the real world upon which both texts rely. Whereas Bud is 
depicted as a social climber who has escaped his blue collar destiny by gaining 
a scholarship to NYU, Seth is the son of a judge, who has dropped out of 
college, and is tempted by the boiler room’s promise of immediate wealth. This 
inversion is further emphasised by the brokers with whom Seth works: coarse, 
grasping Wall Street hopefuls who lack the education and social skills which 
Bud Fox had acquired and who, despite their apparent wealth, are still riven by 
the ethnic and racial insecurities which do not hamper their WASP
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counterparts. The significance of Seth’s journey away from New York’s 
financial centre is thus made manifest in Boiler Room’s outward and 
downward dispersal of the social structure which comprises Wall Street. 
Completing this movement, J. T. Marlin’s clients are drawn from the flood of 
new individual investors who were attracted to the financial market as it 
reached its peak at the end of the 1990s.
Despite this context, Boiler Room’s depiction of the workings of the financial
market is quite old-fashioned. The stocks traded, while bearing high-tech titles
such as MedPatent or Farrowtech, apparently relate to tangible ‘real world’
products, such as drugs or syringes, rather than the 1990s virtual economy
‘dotcoms’ -  companies whose potential profit depended on the unproven
business models of internet selling. Similarly, all of the selling and trading
depicted in the film is done, not via the internet, but over the phone, with less
computing hardware present than in Wall Street. Stock market prices are rarely
referred to and Wall Street’s omnipresent scrolling ticker screen is conspicuous
by its absence. One cause, of course, is the standard business model of the
boiler room, an inexpensive start up which, because it is pushing cheap stocks,
has no need for costly market data feeds. Financial-scamming boiler rooms are
illegal operations which typically increase in number during a booming market,
employing high pressure cold-calling to sell unappealing stocks to the newly
susceptible public.5 The strategy places emphasis on making sales with little
regard for the performance of the stock once purchased; hence the
predominance of sales performance boards over live market feeds in the office
5 The UK Financial Services Authority has lately reported an increasing presence of offshore 
boiler rooms operating in the UK financial market. (Rupert Jones, ‘Boiler Room Fraudsters 
Increasingly Active in UK’, Guardian, 7 June 2006, p. 24).
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environment depicted. The act of selling thus moves to the centre of the 
narrative action, and so, as we shall see, the film also pays self-conscious 
homage to the 1992 film Glengarry GlenRoss (the screen version of David 
Mamet’s 1983 play) in its detailed depiction of the persuasive techniques of the 
cold-caller.6
By portraying the financial marketplace through the lens of J. T. Marlin, then, 
Boiler Room reverses the moral economy of Stone’s film. While Fox and 
Gekko are depicted as transgressive criminals, exploiting the rules of an 
imperfect but ostensibly honest marketplace, in Boiler Room all rules are in 
abeyance as Seth’s colleagues work within normal market processes in order to 
sell fraudulent stocks, about the origins of which only Seth seems to be even 
curious. Whereas Bud’s narrative trajectory sees him move away from his 
colleagues into his criminal partnership with Gekko in order to get rich, Seth 
becomes more integrated into his office environment as the narrative 
progresses, entering a world where everyone is a workaday Gekko, and no one 
seems interested in the illegality of their actions. The con, Seth eventually 
discovers, involves selling shares in fake or ‘shell’ companies. The boiler room 
operates as a closed unit which registers the companies in the financial 
markets, issuing the shares in the name of a small group of individuals, who are 
all associates of J. T. Marlin’s creator Michael Brandtley, and then promoting 
them to its unlucky customers. While the shares’ value initially may appear to 
rise, this is only due to J. T. Marlin’s own sales hype, as Seth realises: ‘there’s 
no other firm selling this shit; it’s all artificial demand’. Once Brandtley’s
6 Glengarry GlenRoss, dir. James Foley, 1992, with screenplay by David Mamet.
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shares have been sold at a vastly inflated profit, the salesmen stop pushing and 
the share price falls. Thus, the discursive field of the expanding bull market 
lends credibility to the fraud. By appearing credible, the shares gain credit and 
are able to circulate as though they were real. The fraud also depends upon a 
structure of repetition which allows the stocks to pass as real; thus, the 
brokerage’s name -  J. T. Marlin -  plays upon its similarity to the real 
celebrated financial house of J. P. Morgan in order to gain credibility when 
cold-calling clients. This structure of (counterfeit) repetition also encapsulates 
the relationship between Boiler Room and its precursor text, Wall Street, and 
has implications for both the narrative representation of finance, and the 
economic narratives upon which financial speculation depends, as I will shortly 
go on to show.
Boiler Room also plays upon a discursive ambiguity between gambling and 
financial speculation in its subversion of the moral framework of Stone’s film. 
Such comparisons are often drawn; David Harvey, as noted at the beginning of 
chapter two, referred to the growth in financial speculation in New York in the 
1980s as a ‘casino economy’.7 The disapprobation evident in this remark 
operates on the presumption of a possible distinction between the two realms, 
which Harvey subverts in order to criticise. However, according Marieke de 
Goede, it is only since the early twentieth century that gambling and finance 
have been thought of as belonging to separate moral and legal spheres whereby 
‘gambling [is] condemned as immoral, idle, and blasphemous’, while financial 
practices ‘such as insurance and speculation, [are] praised for inculcating
7 David Harvey, The Condition o f Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins o f Cultural 
Change (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), p. 332.
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oprudence and foresight.’ Tracing the history of the ‘moral problematization of 
gambling’9 de Goede finds that the conceptual separation between gambling 
and finance ‘became thinkable only through a prolonged political, cultural, and 
legal struggle surrounding the meanings and boundaries of “the financial 
sphere” and the character and behaviour of “financial man’” .10 This struggle 
was particularly active in the United States, in nineteenth-century debates over 
speculation and over the legitimacy of so-called ‘bucketshops’, which dealt in 
bets made on stock market movements without actually purchasing stock, and 
resulted, de Goede argues, in a definition of ‘normal’ or legitimate market 
behaviour which depends upon the repudiation of gambling to the category of 
the abnormal, immoral or illicit.11
The depiction of financial trading in Boiler Room continually works upon and 
reverses this distinction between gambling and finance. From the outset, 
gambling is seen to be part of the ‘normal’ character and behaviour of 
‘financial man’, as represented by the brokers who work at J. T. Marlin. Crap- 
shoots and poker games take place in bars after work, in the aisles of the bus on 
which the brokers travel to a casino for a class trip, or on the margins of the 
trading floor itself. Brokers swap tips on horses, while their bookies send their 
winnings to the office by federal express. While this could be interpreted as 
connoting, by association, the illicit nature of J. T. Marlin’s own financial 
ventures, the subversion of the gambling/finance binary is more complex than 
this. The accent in all of these transactions is on paper money; the framing of
8 Marieke de Goede, Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A Genealogy o f Finance, Borderlines Series, 
24 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 53.
9 de Goede, p. 53.
10 de Goede, p. 48.
11 de Goede, pp. 54-85.
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shots regularly emphasises wads of dollar bills being brandished, exchanged, or 
tumbling out of fed-ex envelopes, highlighting by contrast the absence of even 
token money in the financial trading which is their normal business. The result 
is that paper money takes on the material integrity normally reserved for the 
gold-money form: in contrast to the inflated values and endlessly deferred 
credit of speculation it offers immediate settlement of debts in the form of real, 
present value. Consequently, the bookmaker who posts wads of ‘real’ money in 
settlement seems, ultimately, more honest than his client -  the broker who 
trades in fictional shares. This reversal of the moral distinction between 
gambling and financial trading is most evident in the character of Seth, who, 
before being approached to work at J. T. Marlin, had been running an illegal 
casino in his apartment. Confronted by his parents, Seth defends the casino as 
an ‘honest living’, later reflecting, in his past-tense voiceover, that ‘the illegal 
business I was running was the most legitimate thing I had going. I looked my 
customers in the eye and provided a service they wanted. Now I don’t even 
look at my customers and I push them something they never asked for.’
In the discursive field of Boiler Room, then, fake stocks are traded like the
early credit instruments of the eighteenth century, discussed by Sandra
Sherman, which perpetually defer the question of their authenticity in order to
10remain in circulation. Whereas, in Wall Street, the real economy of 
production was invoked as a viable alternative to the speculative working of 
the financial sector, in Boiler Room such an alternative is no longer possible. 
Rather, the film appears to offer the resolution that the financial economy is
12 Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality in the Early Eighteenth Century: Accounting for 
Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 14-40.
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ultimately the illicit domain of ‘pure’ fiction. While the companies traded 
claim to make tangible products they are, in fact, as Seth eventually discovers, 
‘cardboard -  there’s nothing, there’s no employees, there’s no research and 
development, there’s nothing’. Emphasising the fictionality of the financial 
economy, the trainees learn that financial selling looks a lot like storytelling. 
The most important thing, Seth’s supervisor tells him, is that ‘you can be 
whoever you want to be on the phone. [...] Do what you gotta do. Change your 
last name. Say you're the fucking vice-president, you know, who cares?’ 
Several scenes depict brokers inventing personae to suit the interests and hold 
the attention of their clients. When Seth questions this breach of securities 
trading rules, Greg assures him that it is common practice: ‘I mean, even on 
Wall Street’. As the plot progresses, Seth is seen to develop his own 
storytelling skills, and his success increases as he hones a fake personal history 
designed to encourage identification with his clients. Thus, he performs the 
identity of a young married parent who, like his clients, needs to invest in order 
to save for his children’s college fund.
Such role-playing is further encouraged through the firm’s emphasis on 
appearance, promulgated through the chief trainer Jim Young, played by Ben 
Affleck. Young directs the trainees that their clothes must meet the firm’s 
‘minimum level of aesthetic professionalism’, despite the fact that all of their 
work is done over the phone. The rationale for this is located in the firm’s 
mantra ‘Act as if,’ which requires them to continually act as if they are more 
successful, important, or dynamic than they are, as though the virtual 
performance of financial success guaranteed its realisation, which seems to be
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the case, at least for Brandtley and Young. The trainees are thus encouraged to 
embody the same structure of repetition as the fake stocks and the firm’s name: 
the accuracy of their performance confirms their credibility in the marketplace 
and assures the firm’s credit. This emphasis on acting ‘as i f  also recalls the 
analogical reasoning of positivist economics, outlined by Milton Friedman.13 
As discussed in chapter one, Klamer and Leonard, citing Friedman, identified 
“ as i f  reasoning’ as the ‘characteristic mode of economic discourse’.14 
According to Klamer and Leonard, Friedman noted that economists should not 
lose sight of analogy’s ‘essential if useful fiction’;15 however, he also argued 
that the dependence of economic discourse on analogy is acceptable because 
economic theory is not in the business of realistic representation.16 This would 
appear to be equally true for the whole field of financial representation 
depicted in Boiler Room. Nevertheless, both economic theory and financial 
selling depend upon a belief in a future real, in which either predictive models 
or stock forecasts will be realised. That this reality effect is itself the result of 
discursive practice (whereby the models produce what they purport to describe) 
is one of the concerns of this chapter.
The apparent ascendancy of the fictional over the real in Boiler Room is 
accentuated by the film’s own dependence on intertextual references to other 
financial fictions, such as David Mamet’s Glengarry Glen Ross and, most 
notably, Stone’s Wall Street. The relationship between these intertexts bears
13 Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, in Essays in Positive 
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 3-43.
14 Arjo Klamer and Thomas C. Leonard, ‘So What’s an Economic Metaphor?’, in Natural 
Images in Economic Thought “Markets Read in Tooth and Claw”, ed. by Philip Mirowski 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 20-51 (p. 36).
15 Klamer and Leonard, p. 36.
16 Friedman, p. 41.
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close examination, however, as it both establishes the shared lexicon of 
financial economic narrative and problematises the border between such texts 
and the ‘real’ world represented in them. In the examples previously cited, I 
have drawn attention to the similar narrative trajectories of Bud Fox and Seth 
Davis as they struggle with the problematic borderline between licit and illicit 
market behaviour. As both films are set in New York and deal with similar 
periods in American economic history, the mise-en-scene of Boiler Room most 
closely resembles Stone’s film. Nevertheless, the emphasis on cold-calling and 
on the figure of the salesman demonstrates the film’s genealogical connection 
to prior representations of this American capitalist anti-hero, such as Willy 
Loman in Arthur Miller’s Death o f a Salesman. More specifically, in the case 
of Glengarry GlenRoss, the film version of David Mamet’s play exists as both 
a contextual reference for the characters within Boiler Room and an intertextual 
reference for Boiler Room’s viewers.
This multi-registered referencing is most evident as Seth gains his training as a 
financial salesman. Contextually, then, Seth’s supervisor, Greg, refers to 
Glengarry GlenRoss as a training manual from which Seth can learn:
GREG
Even though you're not actually selling stock yet, I want you to 
remember the coda we have here, ok. Did you see Glengarry GlenRoss? 
SETH 
Yeah.
GREG
Okay, do you remember ABC?
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SETH
Yeah, always be closing.
GREG
That’s right. Always — Be — Closing. Telling's not selling. That's the
attitude you wanna have.
In Mamet’s film, a group of out-of-luck real estate salesmen strive to break 
through in a falling market, struggling to discover adequate language or 
characterisation with which to sell their financial fictions. They are visited by a 
representative from head office, Blake, who informs them that their corporation 
is instituting a ruthless new sales competition in which the losers will be fired 
and the winners will gain access to the coveted golden ‘leads’ -  potential new 
customers who will be interested in their sales pitch. Blake’s motivational 
monologue is made up of market-speak acronyms such as the above-quoted A- 
B-C. For the trainees in J. T. Marlin’s boiler room, Mamet’s film forms a 
shared reference with which they can further perfect their performance as 
salesmen.
This point is then underlined by the intertextual borrowing of an entire 
character from Glengarry GlenRoss. Jim Young (played by Ben Affleck), who 
exhorts the trainees in Boiler Room to ‘act as i f , is a recognisable carbon copy 
of Mamet’s Blake, played by Alec Baldwin. Both characters are arrogant 
dynamic salesmen who deliver high-powered monologues designed to instil 
fear and ambition in the failing sales teams by chastising their poor ability as 
closers and bragging about their own success. Young reiterates Blake’s 
instruction from Glengarry GlenRoss that the trainees should always be
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closing, although, unlike Greg, he does not namecheck the film nor does he 
appear to be quoting. The physical similarity between Affleck and Baldwin is 
emphasised through their costuming: both wear dark, obviously expensive, 
suits which set them apart from their poorly-dressed colleagues. Both seek to 
intimidate their inferior, seated, colleagues by standing and walking around 
while delivering their pitch. Like Blake, Young also catalogues his possessions 
as signifiers of his success, and in order to emphasise his superiority over the 
trainees. The similarity between the two characters thus further indicates the 
dependence of both the trainers and the salesmen in Boiler Room upon the 
generic codes of financial storytelling as source material for their own 
characters.
Boiler Room's excessive citations from the lexicon of financial storytelling also 
gives evidence to the capacity for intertextuality to problematise the distinction 
between the fictional and the real as well as to renounce the safe assumption of 
authentic origin. Thus, Roland Barthes, announcing the death of the author as 
the location of ‘a single “theological” meaning’ in any text, contends that, since 
‘the text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of 
culture’, ‘the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never 
original’.17 Despite the playful use of the term ‘quotation’, Barthes is not only 
referring here to an author’s direct allusions to prior texts but to the function of 
language whereby meaning is infinitely deferred because, like ‘a ready-formed 
dictionary’, words are ‘only explainable through other words, and so on
17 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, in Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader, ed. 
by David Lodge (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 167-72 (p. 170).
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1 sindefinitely’, so that any signifying act already depends upon other texts, 
themselves ‘made of multiple writings’.19 This is also the case with Boiler 
Room, where quotations from previous texts do not simply serve to make 
allusion to their status as prior. Rather, the intertextual interdependence of 
these texts signifies the dependence of financial selling on an entire discursive 
field to which Boiler Room also belongs. Thus, as Horton and Douglas argue, 
‘remakes, in fact, problematize the very notion of originality. More so than 
many other kinds of films, the remake and, as we shall see, the makeover [...] 
invite and at times demand that the viewer participate in both looking at and
onreading between multiple texts.’ Reading between the texts, the explicit and
unacknowledged presence of these fictions in Boiler Room emphasises the
entire discursive field, or what Barthes might call ‘the innumerable centres of
culture’,21 from which they are all drawn. Moreover, as ‘the remake both pays
00tribute to a preexisting text and, on another level, calls it into question’, the 
specific reiteration of Wall Street in Boiler Room exposes the fictionality of the 
prior, classic realist text and problematises the real-fictional oppositions on 
which it is structured.
Boiler Room's extensive citation of Wall Street becomes most evident in an 
arresting sequence which I would now like to examine. As Seth becomes more 
committed to his job at the boiler room, several scenes depict his integration 
with his new colleagues. On the first such occasion Seth arrives at his team
18 Barthes, p. 170.
19 Ibid, p. 171.
20 Andrew Horton and Stuart Y. McDougal, ‘Introduction’, in Play It Again, Sam: Retakes on 
Remakes (see Horton and McDougal, above), pp. 1-13 (p. 4).
21 Barthes, p. 170.
22 Horton and McDougal, p. 4.
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leader’s house, where a number of J. T. Marlin employees are already gathered, 
watching a movie and eating pizza. The soundscape of the sequence is 
complicated as Seth’s voiceover is first overlaid with the intermittent strains of 
hip hop which make up much of Boiler Room’s soundtrack. As Seth enters the 
house, the voiceover ends, while the soundtrack continues to play against the 
new sound of film dialogue emanating from a television within the house. The 
camera travels through empty rooms, representing Seth’s point of view as he 
searches for the source of the off-screen TV noise. The source, it turns out, is 
Oliver Stone’s Wall Street, which is playing on the widescreen television 
around which Seth eventually finds his colleagues seated. The roving camera is 
finally arrested as he pauses to take in the scene of his colleagues, all seated 
with their backs turned to him -  a reverential audience absorbed in the object 
of their gaze. Shot from Seth’s point-of-view at the back of the room, the 
gathering gives the impression of a congregation, one which Seth, as yet only 
an observer, will shortly join. At this moment, as the hip hop theme fades 
away, a crescendo from Wall Street swells, so that the soundtrack of the earlier 
film appears to comment upon the later one.
This merging of the two soundtracks foreshadows the action to follow, in 
which Seth’s senior colleagues, for whom the viewing of Wall Street is 
evidently a ritual, begin to recite Gordon Gekko’s dialogue in turn, reproducing 
not just the script but also the delivery, tone of voice and character of Gekko. 
As the momentum builds, Chris Varick, Seth’s mentor, rises and crosses the 
floor to stand next to the television, taking up the position of gazed object and 
addressing the younger traders (seated on the floor) as though they were Bud
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Fox, to whom Gekko is speaking. The move may simply serve to emphasize 
the extent to which the young men have internalised Gekko’s character; Chris, 
drawing on a cigarette in the exact manner of Gekko, is able to mimic Michael 
Douglas without missing a beat, even though he is not looking at the screen. 
However, like the merging of the soundtracks, Chris’ move also denotes a 
potential transgression, or invasion, from one film to the other, as Chris 
figuratively crosses the fourth wall and enters the filmic reality of Wall Street, 
embodying the character of Gekko, and becoming the object of his audience’s 
attention. In doing so, he also takes up the subject position offered to him by 
the world of the boiler room, in its representation of the financial realm: that of 
a broker by repetition, who maintains his position in the market by 
ritualistically embodying the traits which the ‘real’ broker Gekko represents. 
This subject position is consequently offered to the younger brokers to whom 
he speaks, just as Gordon Gekko does to Bud Fox. Their collective response: 
‘How do you do, Mr. Gekko. Bud Fox’, is delivered in a chorus which 
references both twentieth century rap and classical Greek drama, indicating 
their communal adoption of the role offered.
On one level, the brokers’ repetition of Gekko’s words ‘in character’ 
demonstrates the extent to which Wall Street's morality tale aspirations have 
backfired. Despite his portrayal as the devilish embodiment of market 
corruption, Gekko is resurrected here as a role model for the following 
generation of aspiring stockbrokers. The extent to which this has, indeed, 
occurred can be measured in the fact that Gekko’s mantras such as ‘lunch is for 
wimps’ or ‘greed is good’ have become slogans for the whole decade of the
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1980s. The fact that Gekko’s character is the most enduring element of the film 
seems to indicate that the film can have real effects, albeit not the ones that 
Stone intended. The brokers’ citation of Wall Street in Boiler Room, then, can 
be read as an ongoing narrative act of inscription (which is also conscription) 
such as described by Jean-Francois Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition. 
Lyotard’s analysis of the pragmatics of popular folk narratives is recalled by 
the ritual performance in Boiler Room as the scene described assigns roles to 
the brokers as addressor, addressee, or as the referent: Gekko, the hero-object 
of the story being told. Thus, the experienced trainers, for the period of their 
performance, become Gekko, while the trainees ‘ [gain] potential access to the 
same authority simply by listening’.23 Crucially, for Lyotard, the knowledge 
transmitted in the narrative performance is the whole ‘set of pragmatic rules 
that constitutes the social bond’, which he describes as ‘the community’s 
relationship to itself and its environment’. Thus, ritualistic narrative 
performance, simply by being narrated, ‘determines in a single stroke what one 
must say in order to be heard, what one must listen to in order to speak, and 
what role one must play (on the scene of diegetic reality) to be the object of a 
narrative’.24
This function of financial narrative, whereby it legitimates and prescribes the 
appropriate discourse, subjectivity, and knowledge for future brokers is 
confirmed by Ben Younger, who describes the scenes of brokers quoting prior 
fictions in Boiler Room as ‘life imitating art imitating life’. Having based the
23 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 19-23 
(p. 20).
Lyotard, p. 21.
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film upon his own experience as a trainee for a boiler room, he attests to the 
realism of this account. Indeed, he and Jennifer Todd, the film’s producer, 
repeatedly stress the accuracy of their ‘realistic portrayal’ of the ‘real life’ of a 
boiler room. Reviews of the film appear to support this claim, even extending 
its claims of accurate representation to include ‘legitimate’ Wall Street 
brokerages. Younger maintains that the brokers he knew regularly quoted 
from Wall Street and Glengarry GlenRoss, so that ‘those two movies are 
actually a big part o f their world’, albeit one which he also refers to as an 
‘alternate reality’. Thus, successful films such as Glengarry GlenRoss and, to 
an even greater extent, Wall Street, have become touchstones for newer 
generations of real brokers. This capacity for storytelling to conscript and 
delimit subjects of knowledge is also found in the discipline of economics. As 
noted in my previous chapter, Breit and Elzinga, the economist-authors of the 
Spearman murder mysteries, have found their books to be popular reading on 
introductory microeconomics courses, which are charged with producing 
rational economic subjects who will identify with both Henry Spearman and 
the real economist Milton Friedman, on whom he is based. The British author 
Andrew Davidson traverses the same borderlines: a former share dealer turned 
financial journalist, whose expose of corrupt City practices led to debates in the
25 Ben Younger and Jennifer Todd, Boiler Room DVD Commentary, New Line Cinema, 2000. 
In an interview after the film’s release Younger also comments: ‘I wasn't trying to make a 
documentary, but I spent two years talking to guys who work in boiler rooms so I could get the 
best story possible.’ (Ben Younger, interviewed in Beth Piskora, ‘“Boiler” A Hot Topic; Wall 
Streeters Say Film Is On Target’, New York Post, 17 February 2000, p. 65).
26 Securities trading lawyer, John Lawrence Allen claims it is ‘one of the most realistic films 
about Wall Street ever made’, depicting scenes reminiscent ‘not only of boiler-room 
brokerages but even of things that have happened at major wirehouses.’ Younger notes, ‘I 
thought I was just depicting the boiler rooms, not all of Wall Street. But now I know that 
there's 50,000 people out there who think this movie is all about them, and the reason is all 
these firms are completely the same’ (Beth Piskora, ‘“Boiler” A Hot Topic; Wall Streeters Say 
Film Is On Target’, p. 65).
27 Ben Younger, Boiler Room DVD Commentary, New Line Cinema, 2000.
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House of Commons, Davidson also writes ‘factual’ investment manuals, 
among which can be included his ‘fictional’ novel, Stock Market
9 o
Rollercoaster.
On another level, therefore, the brokers’ excessive quotation of Gekko also 
serves to emphasise the artificiality of the character -  his status as a type which 
can be endlessly repeated. This, alternative, reading of the sequence draws 
upon Jacques Derrida’s critique of the speech act theory on which Lyotard’s 
narrative analysis is based. In his seminal essay ‘Signature Event Context’, 
Derrida argues that citation can be a radical, subversive force. This subversion 
derives from the iterability of the signifying mark which enables it to be 
repeated in the absence of its original referent. Such iterability both constitutes 
the mark as a unified entity and subverts that unity through the fact that it can 
be repeated. Through their careful re-enactment of Gekko’s character, Chris 
and the other brokers exemplify Derrida’s initial assertion that ‘a certain self- 
identity’ is recognizable within any signifying form, consisting, in the case of 
spoken language for example, of ‘empirical variations of tone, voice, etc., 
possibly of a certain accent’ which ‘permit its recognition and repetition’. 29 As 
they compete with each other to more accurately capture Michael Douglas’ 
tone and speech pattern, Seth’s colleagues conversely illustrate Derrida’s 
subsequent assertion that the self-identity of the mark is also ‘paradoxically the
28 Alexander Davidson, Stock Market Rollercoaster (Chichester: John Wiley, 2001). 
Davidson’s account of market corruption is The City Share Pushers: A Dossier o f Coercion, 
Insider Dealing, Sex, Drugs and Malpractice in and Around the City (Scope International, 
1989).
29 Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’ repr. in Limited Inc (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988), pp. 1-23 (p. 10).
177
division or dissociation of itself.30 In his response to John Searle’s critique of 
‘Signature Event Context’, reproduced under the title Limited Inc, Derrida re- 
clarifies the paradox which the condition of iterability imposes on all texts:
For the structure of iteration [...] implies both identity and difference. 
Iteration [...] contains in itself the discrepancy of a difference that 
constitutes it as iteration.31
The self-identity of any ‘mark’ or text is, Derrida tells us, an inevitable illusion. 
In order to be communicable, hence repeatable, any text must draw upon 
conventional structures which make possible its re-iteration. As Chris mimics 
Gekko he communicates to himself and others not only that they can all, to 
some extent, be Gekko, but also that Gekko can never uniquely be himself.
This effect is achieved, not because they succeed in their efforts to embody 
Gekko’s character but because they embody his character differently from what 
Stone or Douglas apparently intended -  making him the embodiment of 
optimum market behaviour rather than its avaricious exception. This 
‘discrepancy of a difference’ is, Derrida tells us, constituted in the primary text 
itself, so that the possibility for a mark to be reiterated in a manner which 
preserves its identity while activating its difference ‘constitutes it as iteration.’
Boiler Room's excessive dependence on Wall Street exposes, not simply the 
extent to which the characters in Boiler Room are inauthentic copies, but also 
the iterability which marks Wall Street itself -  its ability to be repeated, hence 
its own conventionality which problematises its status as origin for Boiler
30 Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, p. 10.
31 Derrida, ‘Limited Inc a b c ... ’ repr. in Limited Inc (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988), pp. 29-110 (p. 53).
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Room's copy. This iterability is, Derrida suggests, a condition of all narrative. 
As I have already discussed in relation to Boggs, Derrida’s later work Given 
Time 1: Counterfeit Money reworks the trope of iterability more specifically in 
relation to the monetary form. He draws attention, here, to the way in which 
counterfeit money -  an almost perfect copy of an apparent original -  is only 
able to circulate as money by not drawing attention to its status as a copy. Like 
the circulation of fake stocks in Boiler Room, the circulation of counterfeit 
money exposes, Derrida says, the conventionality of the entire money system -  
a system which can only consist in passing itself off as real. In emphasising 
and exploiting the dependence of financial selling on narrative exchange, 
Boiler Room intervenes in the real-fictional binary and illustrates the wider 
uncertainties at work in the financial economy. In the process, it undermines 
not just Wall Street's efforts at realism but also the truth claims of all narrative 
-  fictional or financial.
While Boiler Room may be composed of a ‘tissue of quotations’ from other 
financial fictions, this does not, therefore, imply that the film illustrates the 
financial economy’s final divorce from the real. Instead, the scene just 
analysed manages to underline the fact that the real is itself constituted in 
discourse -  through what Jacques Derrida might recognise as an ‘incessant 
movement of recontextualization’ in which the brokers are engaged. This 
movement of recontextualization, as noted in my introduction, describes, for 
Derrida, the ongoing inscription of the relation between text and context, or
32 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. ‘CounterfeitMoney’, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992).
33 Jacques Derrida, ‘Afterword’, trans. by Samuel Weber, in Limited Inc (Evanston: 
Northwestern Press, 1988), pp. 111-160, (p. 136).
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‘writing’ and the real. Hence, the ritualistic repetition of Wall Street in Boiler 
Room articulates not just the dependence of financial selling on story-telling, 
but the whole relationship between subjects, narratives and culture.
Consequently, this reading also recalls the Althusserian account of the 
relationship between subjects and culture, or in Althusser’s terms, ideology.34 
In order to examine the process by which ‘ideology interpellates individuals as 
subjects’,35 Althusser posits an artificial temporal distance between the act of 
interpellation, such as enacted in the scene analysed above, and self­
recognition, whereby the subject takes up the position offered. The temporality 
is artificial because, Althusser reminds us, we ‘are always already subjects, and 
as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which 
guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and 
(naturally) irreplaceable subjects’. The narrative of Boiler Room also employs 
this artificial temporality, depicting the process by which the economic subject, 
Seth, is interpellated by both his mentor, Chris, and by Wall Street itself, and 
thus begins to take up his subject-position as a workaday Gekko. Indeed, the 
emphasis on ritualistic performance and ‘acting as i f  illustrates Althusser’s 
insights regarding the materiality of ideology. The ‘concrete’ subjects depicted 
in Boiler Room may be constituted in discourse, but the reality effect of their
34 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an 
Investigation)’, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: 
New Left Books, 1971), pp. 127-186. Althusser refers to ‘the cultural’ as one of the 
‘ideological state apparatuses’ along with the ‘political’, ‘religious’ and ‘family’ apparatuses 
etc. (p. 143). I am using the term culture in the broader anthropological sense, which subsumes 
these categories.
35 Althusser, p. 170.
36 Althusser, pp. 172-3.
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endless self-narration can be measured in the ‘material practices’ and rituals on 
which their subjectivity relies.37
As though to illustrate the point, the scene immediately following the one just 
analysed sees Seth reading from a script as he cold-calls a potential customer in 
order to whet their interest in a stock. He has apparently written the script 
himself, although it is no doubt drawn from the entire discursive field in which 
he is constituted. In a recent undercover investigation into boiler room 
practices in the UK, an ex-worker for a boiler room commented:
The script is written to ignite the greed in people, greed. And the 
scripts, nobody really knows whoever wrote them. I mean everybody 
would like to say they wrote them, but what they will say is they’re 
brilliant scripts. I’ve worked in many sales organisations as a very 
successful salesman, but when I saw some of these scripts - you know 
it’s like if you can own that script, you will make an absolute fortune.38 
The script, here, functions like the cultural or ideological narratives in which 
we are constituted as concrete subjects. Having no origin, they appear 
universal; while located in discourse, they nevertheless produce real wealth. 
That an awareness of our reliance on cultural scripts does not prevent them 
from having such material effects is illustrated as the scene unfolds: Seth, 
having finally discovered the correct characterisation with which to comport 
himself in the market, ‘bags’ his first customer, who is willing to immediately 
invest ‘real’ money in the fictitious stock he is pushing. As Seth becomes more
37 Althusser, pp. 165-76.
38 ‘Money Box’, BBC Radio 4, broadcast 10 June 2006. For a full transcript see 
<httD://news.bbc.co.uk/l/shared/spl/hi/Drogrammes/monev box/transcripts/10 06 06.txt> 
[accessed 09/09/06].
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comfortable with his new subjectivity, his success grows, and he no longer 
needs to rely on the script in order to embody his character. Both his costuming 
and manner emphasise the transformation; even his hair, by the end of the film, 
is swept back in imitation of Gekko.
Boiler Room's depiction of the materiality of financial fictionality is further 
compounded by the real circumstances surrounding the origin of Seth’s boiler 
room script, which Ben Younger wrote for the film. According to a newspaper 
interview, Younger based it on his own experience as a trainee, then showed it 
to ‘some of the boiler-room brokers who had assisted him with his research’.
He was ‘subsequently horrified’, however, when he discovered that his script 
had been incorporated into their own sales calls, adding, “‘fortunately, the 
authorities shut that shop down soon after.’” Boiler Room not only worries 
the lines between fiction and reality in its depiction of financial markets, then, 
but has itself also intervened in those markets, with Younger’s script re­
entering the discursive field from which it was drawn and having real effects. 
As with the ending of Wall Street, the intervention of ‘the authorities’, here, 
seems to provide resolution to the circulation of the speculative fictional 
narrative. However, Younger’s relief at this ‘fortunate’ outcome is at odds with 
the ‘realistic portrayal’ of standard boiler room practice in his own film, in 
which Brandtley is seen scouting for new offices to which the firm can swiftly
39 Ben Younger, quoted in Beth Piskora and Jesse Angelo, ‘Life Imitates New Wall Street 
Flick’, New York Post, 20 February 2000, p. 60. A further subversion of the art/life boundary is 
related in the same article: Younger based the fictional boiler room’s name, J. T. Marlin, on his 
actual former boss, John Tepper Marlin, who was the chief economist and senior policy 
advisor in the Office of the New York City Comptroller, where Younger worked in the mid­
nineties. Marlin subsequently filed a twelve million dollar suit against Younger and New Line 
Cinema, citing injury to his reputation, which was settled out of court just as the film opened in 
cinemas. See Devlin Barrett, ‘“Boiling” Mad City Big Gets Satisfaction’, New York Post, 19 
February 2000, p. 3.
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relocate, should they be ‘shut down’. His awareness of the endless circulation 
and incorporation of previous financial film narratives within the discourse of 
financial selling also belies his faith in legal intervention. The resolution can 
only prove momentarily effective, as Boiler Room's depiction of the endless re­
iteration of Wall Street proves.
The narrative closure of Boiler Room betrays a similar dependence on ‘the 
authorities’ to re-impose the moral boundaries between legitimate and 
illegitimate market behaviour. Seth, who has finally figured out the origin of 
the stocks and is about to quit the firm, is instead arrested by the FBI for 
securities fraud, eventually agreeing to divulge everything he knows and to 
testify as their witness. In the closing sequence we see Seth return to work in 
order to copy information from the firm’s files before walking out the door and 
driving away just as the FBI raid drives in, complete with buses, to arrest 
everyone on site. As with Wall Street, then, the narrative resolution of Boiler 
Room attempts to construct a moral framework around the film’s troubling 
representation of the capacity for financial speculation to blur the boundaries 
between the legitimate and the illegitimate, or fiction and the real.
In fact, this narrative intervention is even more of an imposition in Boiler 
Room, as the final sequence was shot some months after the close of 
production, when it became necessary to change the ending in response to the 
audience reaction in test screenings. The plotline regarding the FBI remains the 
same; however, in the original final sequence Seth, having returned for his last 
day and gathered the evidence required, leaves the building only to encounter
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one of the customers he has swindled in the parking lot.40 Harry Renard is a 
middle class Midwest everyman, whose investment with Seth has lost him his 
home, nuclear family and life savings, and who represents, in Boiler Room, the 
‘real’ world upon which the fiction brokers prey. Renard is carrying a gun and 
is presumably on his way into the building to kill Seth; however, in the ironic 
original ending they meet and then pass each other by. Their virtual 
relationship was based on phone conversations in which Seth characterised 
himself as a family man; they are unrecognisable to each other in real life. The 
original ending seems to suggest a further dispersal of the troubling 
implications of Boiler Room: honest and dishonest characters are not easily 
discernible, even when encountered in the flesh. The FBI convoy, while 
imminent, does not make an appearance.
Neither ending serves to contain the troubling possibilities revealed by the plot 
and narration of Boiler Room. Wall Street may depend on an opposition 
between the real and the fictional, in order to make a moral point about market 
corruption. But, since narrative exchanges are the condition of possibility of all 
markets, this opposition between reality and fiction, or licit and illicit 
speculation, is not as clear-cut as the film implies. In Boiler Room, the strict 
opposition between reality and fiction is removed, and everyone is caught up in 
the potentially illegal credit fraud -  by the end of the film even Seth’s father, a 
judge, has become partially involved. Despite the eventual intervention of the 
FBI, and a narrative resolution similar to, though lacking the strength of Wall 
Street, it is clear that the fraud works in Boiler Room, not because J. T. Marlin
40 For original ending see BoilerRoom DVD, New Line Cinema, 2000.
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operates outside the law, but because it operates within the discursive field of 
the wider financial economy, its fictions reinforced by the everyday stories of 
financial success. While Seth may ultimately discover that the stocks he is 
selling are, indeed, fake, significantly he is reluctant to act upon the knowledge 
-  asking his girlfriend, Abby, J. T. Marlin’s receptionist, whether, in fact, it 
makes any difference. Her response: ‘I don’t know, Seth -  you tell me’, only 
defers resolution further into narrative, and prompts the continuous re-telling in 
which Seth’s conventional first-person voiceover is engaged.
Seth’s voiceover, like the first-person narration of Mark Fairfax in Trading 
Reality, is told in the past tense, thus potentially offering an external 
framework of moral reflection which could finally resolve some of Boiler 
Room's troubling implications. However, it is also constructed according to the 
‘perpetual logical rebound’ which Mark Currie finds to be characteristic of 
first-person narrative. Currie outlines the condition thus:
If I tell you that I am a liar, I create a perpetual logical rebound. If it is 
true, then it is false, so how can it be true? And if it is false and I am not 
a liar, then I am telling the truth, in which case I am lying.41 
Currie suggests that past tense narration can escape this logical impossibility 
by offering the structure ‘I used to be a liar’, which separates the narrator from 
the narrated.42 However, he also notes that the problem still returns in 
contemporary narrative form, in which self-consciousness of narrative 
construction or fictionality tends to be accentuated. The self-conscious narrator 
can draw attention to their own unreliability, but in doing so they must also
41 Mark Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 117.
42 Currie, p. 117.
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‘sacrifice the candour of narrative self-consciousness if the narrative is to be 
believed’. Thus, for Currie, all narrative potentially ‘exists in this condition of 
fictional truth, as true lies’.43 His description evokes the self-conscious 
narrative refrain of Jeanette Winterson’s The Passion'. ‘I’m telling you stories. 
Trust me.’44
Seth’s credibility as the narrator of his own story is thus ultimately 
problematised by the narrative which he relates -  a tale that he tells about his 
success as a teller of tall tales. While the use of the past tense implies that he is 
speaking from a new place of truthful reflection, this possibility is deferred by 
the film’s depiction of self-perpetuating fictional narrative as the discursive 
location of the real. As with Jacques Derrida’s description of Baudelaire’s 
‘Counterfeit Money’, Boiler Room is
a fiction the subject of which is a fictive money, a fiction of fiction; and 
if the recounted fiction also says the narrative fiction itself (if it gives 
one to think this fiction by means of emblematic or metonymic, but also 
reflexive or specular figuration), there is no end to the speculation.45 
’ This limitless play of narrative speculation is illustrated in Boiler Room’s 
closing episodes.
Significantly, as the film reaches its conclusion, two instances demonstrate that 
Seth still relies upon the persuasive storytelling practice with which he sold 
financial fictions. The first concerns his negotiation with the FBI over his
43 Currie, p. 118.
44 Jeanette Winterson, The Passion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988), p. 5 (also p. 13, p. 69, p. 
160).
45 Derrida, Given Time: 1, p. 93.
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testimony, where Seth bargains to ensure his father will not be affected by the 
scandal. The second, a scene inserted into the closing sequence in support of 
the new ending, sees Seth attempt to restitute Harry Renard’s losses. Seth first 
cons Brandtley into issuing Harry with stock in their newest IPO, and then 
persuades Chris Varick to sign a sell-ticket enabling him to sell before the price 
plummets, so that Harry will recover his money by ‘dumping’ his worthless 
stock on the open market. While this action of attempting to return Harry’s 
‘real’ money appears to suggest his own moral redemption, as in Wall Street, it 
can only be effected by further exploiting the financial marketplace. 
Furthermore, in each of these instances Seth effects the required result by using 
the same persuasive techniques learned at the boiler room, effectively 
manipulating the conversation in order to ‘close’ his interlocutor and sell them 
on his desired outcome. Seth is still reading from the script. Since both events 
occur after he has decided to quit the firm, it is clear that they issue from the 
same moral subject-position as the voiceover narrative. Having highlighted the 
extent to which, all subjectivity, not just the economic, depends on the 
production and circulation of inevitably unreliable narrative, Seth’s tale cannot 
’ escape the perpetual logical rebound which financial selling endlessly exploits. 
Both finance and narrative depend upon ‘true lies’ as their condition of 
possibility. Seth’s narrative, I wish to argue, reworks Winterson’s refrain, 
perpetually appealing to the viewer: ‘Trust me. I’m selling you stories.’
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Chapter Five
‘Speculating into the Void’: Narrative and Financial Uncertainty in Don 
DeLillo’s Cosmopolis.
Speculation on the stock exchange, capitalism at its peak, with its 
perplexed and paradoxical logic, seems to undo the oppositions 
between the virtual and the real, the rational and the irrational, the 
predictable and the aleatory, the real and the simulated, the material and 
the intangible and so on.1
Like Mark Fairfax in Trading Reality, Eric Packer, the protagonist of Don 
DeLillo’s Cosmopolis, is a man beset by uncertainties which, in Packer’s case, 
prevent him from sleeping. The opening sentence of the novel, curiously 
couched in the shifting temporality of a downward progress chart, relates: 
‘Sleep failed him more often now, not once or twice a week but four times, 
five.’ Packer’s deteriorating capacity for sleep is linked in this opening passage 
to a problem of expression -  he could call a friend to share his trouble, but: 
‘What was there to say? It was a matter of silences, not words’ -  a problem 
which causes the narrative to momentarily falter, just five lines after it has 
begun.2
1 Jean-Joseph Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality in Postmodern Capitalism’ in 
Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge, ed. by Stephen Cullenberg, Jack Amariglio and 
David F. Ruccio (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 166-81, p. 180.
2 Don DeLillo, Cosmopolis (London: Picador, 2003), p. 5. All further references are to this 
edition and will be given parenthetically in the text.
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What is there to say? The difficulties of expressing or adequately representing 
uncertainty provide one of the underlying themes of DeLillo’s novel and will 
be the concern of this chapter. I have already shown how traditional economic 
narratives often seek to contain the uncertainties of financial speculation 
through the use of conventional plot structures which attempt (not always 
successfully) to maintain the distinction between real and virtual economies in 
order to provide closure. By contrast, I will argue that Cosmopolis puts this 
uncertainty on display, and thus traditional plotlines are gradually abandoned 
as the narrative mirrors the deepening financial and representational crisis 
which faces both the central character and the reader of the novel form. This 
representational crisis is also a matter of concern for economic theory, I wish to 
argue, which has sought throughout its history to tame the uncertainty at the 
heart of economic knowledge through its efforts to adequately explain or 
account for risk. These efforts have increasingly relied upon the tools of 
economic theorising -  charts and models which, as Deirdre McCloskey and 
others remind us, are themselves representative forms, employing metaphorical 
structures. The temporality of the opening sentence of Cosmopolis is not 
insignificant therefore, as the narrative charts a kind of progress from 
knowledge to uncertainty, accompanied by the accumulation of data typical to 
financial reporting, while questioning the possibility of predictable outcomes.
This relationship between knowledge and uncertainty is hinted at in the 
opening pages, where we meet Eric Packer, the twenty-eight year old 
billionaire financial speculator, struggling unsuccessfully with his insomnia.
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We learn, through dense layering of detail, that Packer is an exceptional 
character who lives in a forty-eight-room Manhattan apartment with his own 
gymnasium, lap pool and meditation cell, and who, when he cannot sleep, 
reads haiku poetry, or Einstein in both English and German, who studies bird 
anatomy on a passing interest, and has ‘mastered the steepest matters in half an 
afternoon’. And yet, Packer’s apparent mastery is troubled in this opening 
section as the narrative is punctuated by his ennui, by the interrogative 
structure (‘What did he do? [...] He tried... ’), and by the refrain: ‘He didn’t 
know what he wanted’ (5-7). The plot finally begins when Packer decides that 
what he wants is a haircut, and embarks, in his white limousine, on a cross-city 
journey to his dead father’s barber in Hell’s Kitchen. This single-day odyssey 
takes place, as the intertitle informs us, ‘In the Year 2000, A Day in April’ and 
forms the entire timeframe of the novel.
Despite the importance differences which will be discussed below, it is 
nevertheless clear from the outset that much of the established lexicon of 
financial storytelling is still present in Cosmopolis. As with Trading Reality, 
Boiler Room, or Wall Street, the narrative focuses almost totally on a young 
man who works in the gendered world of financial trading, and whose 
character seems to correspond to the stereotype of homo economicus or rational 
economic man.3 Similarities persist in the visual detail as, in the dawn of his 
fateful day, Packer gazes out over the New York landscape and ruminates on
3 Packer also bears evident similarities to earlier depictions of the financial speculator in 
American fiction, such as Frank Cowperwood in Theodore Dreiser’s novels The Financier,;
The Titan; and The Stoic. For a discussion of the money trope in Dreiser’s fiction see Walter 
Benn Michaels, The Gold Standard and the Logic o f Naturalism: American Literature at the 
Turn o f  the Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
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the ‘kinds of archaic business just beginning to stir’, on the bread vans and 
produce trucks rolling out of markets (6), drawing a self-conscious contrast 
between the financial markets and more traditional forms of market exchange. 
The description mirrors the opening sequence of Wall Street, where dawn shots 
of the New York skyline and scenes of garbage trucks are cut with shots of 
Bud Fox riding the subway to work. More Gordon Gekko than Bud Fox, 
however, Eric Packer views the scene from his position high above the city, as 
befits a twenty-eight-year-old self-made financial genius whose interests are 
connected, in a mystical manner not explained by the text, with worldwide 
financial institutions, and upon whose movements the fate of much of the 
global banking system depends.
Also like Gordon Gekko in Stone’s Wall Street, Packer displays modem art on 
his walls in order to intimidate others, preferring anti-representational paintings 
‘that his guests did not know how to look at’ (8). These ‘large canvases that 
dominated rooms’ are mainly white or ‘color-field and geometric’(8) and find 
their equivalent in the ‘spare poems sited minutely in white space’ (5) which he 
reads late into the night. These references to geometric paintings persist 
throughout the novel: Packer later has sex with his art-dealer lover (another 
Wall Street reference) up against a wall drawing consisting of a minimalist grid 
executed with ‘measuring instruments and graphite pencils’ (25). This 
description prefigures the novel’s other obsession with the grids and charts of 
financial data. Remembering that, for Gekko, abstract art served as evidence of 
a magical rupture in representational forms whereby ‘the illusion becomes
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real’,4 which echoed his ability to create wealth out of nothing, it is tempting to 
find similar parallels here between minimalist or anti-representational art-forms 
and the obscure yet austere world of currency speculation of which Packer is a 
master. In either case we will see that Cosmopolis raises doubts about the 
stability of the signifiers of both art and finance, and with them the 
corresponding structures of language and economics.
These apparent lexical parallelisms evoke the historical analysis of economic 
critic Jean-Joseph Goux, who, in Symbolic Economies and The Comers o f  
Language, claims to ascertain homologies between the money form and other 
cultural or signifying forms of any particular historical period.5 Goux’s area of 
interest can probably best be termed symbolic systems of exchange: those of 
meaning (language), representation (culture), and value (economics). For each 
of these systems to operate a symbol (or signifier in Saussurean terms) must be 
substituted for the thing symbolized, thus, words are substituted for things or 
ideas, paintings and novels stand in place of real objects or events, and money 
represents value, or purchasing power in terms of the commodities which can 
be bought with it. Goux is not, of course, the first to draw attention to the 
similarities between language and money in this vein. The analogies between 
words and coins have long been drawn. Marc Shell, for example, remarks upon 
the seductive similarities between economic and verbal tokens of exchange, 
which have led many historical thinkers to comment on the similar functions
4 Wall Street dir., Oliver Stone, 1987.
5 Jean-Joseph Goux, Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud, trans. by Jennifer Curtiss 
Gage (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); The Coiners o f  Language, trans. by Jennifer 
Curtiss Gage (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994).
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performed by ‘words and coins as stores and transmitters of meaning and 
perception’.6 In ‘White Mythology’, Jacques Derrida also points to the analogy 
drawn in classical philosophy between the original meaning or etymon of 
words and the original stamp effaced from a coin or token.7 If such similarities 
are to be believed then the symbolic structure of money should be subject to 
similar theoretical scrutiny as that of language or literature.
Drawing upon theories of language, then, Goux pays attention to the system by 
which money means, as well as to its varying historical manifestations. He 
does so by borrowing the Marxian analysis of the multiple functions of gold- 
money from the third chapter of Capital. Money, Marx finds, has the ability to 
function in three different ways: as a common measure of values (usually 
termed general equivalent); as an instrument of exchange; and as a means of 
hoarding or payment.8 While Marx specifies that gold typically embodies all of 
these functions simultaneously, this cannot be said of all money forms 
throughout history. Goux argues that it is only during periods of political 
stability such as that of classical Greece and Rome, or again from the 
Renaissance onwards, that the three functions can be said to really co-exist. It
6 Marc Shell, The Economy o f  Literature (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), p.
3.
7 Jacques Derrida, ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’, in Margins o f  
Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 207-71 (pp. 
210-19).
8 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique o f  Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), pp. 188-244, discussed (amongst others) in Jean-Joseph 
Goux, Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud, trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 47-50 and in Jean-Joseph Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, 
and Reality in Postmodern Capitalism’ in Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge, ed. by 
Stephen Cullenberg, Jack Amariglio and David F. Ruccio (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 166- 
81. Marx and Goux both subsume the monetary function of payment with that of hoarding, as 
in both cases what is in question is hard cash -  money which also embodies the value that it 
claims to represent.
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is in these periods that we find the general circulation of gold money at such a 
rate and to such an extent that it was present in the imaginary, as an ideal 
measure of values; in the symbolic, as a common medium of exchange; and in 
the real, with gold present as a means of both payment and hoarding. At other 
periods, such as after the collapse of the Roman empire, stocks of coinage 
become depleted or hoarded so that money no longer functions as a circulating 
medium and some elements of a barter society return. In these cases gold 
money may still function as an ideal measure of values which is referred to but 
is no longer present during transactions.9
Alternatively, in periods such as that of the American civil war a fiat economy 
was introduced, where tokens made of paper or baser metal were circulated in 
place of gold, for which they were purportedly exchangeable. Accordingly, 
token money claims to represent the value of gold but is not gold itself. The 
stability of the signifying structure of money is, thus, for Goux, subject to 
change over time (and may, in fact, be inherently unstable). Pointing, for 
example, to the ‘resemblance between the [realist] modes of representation of 
the Greco-Roman world and the modem world since the Renaissance’,10 Goux 
suggests that the changing relationship between the money form and the value 
it represents is mirrored in our changing understandings of the signifying 
structure of language, and accompanying representative forms. Like 
perspectival painting, a gold money system seems to offer a unified vision of
9 Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality’, pp. 169-76.
10 Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality’, p. 171.
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the world where all values converge on a single unit of measure to which we 
are given unmediated access.11
In correspondence to realist art and the circulation of gold money, then, Goux’s 
model posits the nominalist theory of language. Like the apparently 
unproblematic relationship between gold money and its material value as part 
of a gold reserve, nominalist theory conceives of words unproblematically as 
namers of things, in what Goux refers to as the naive model of linguistics.12 
This model was ultimately unravelled by the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
who replaced it with the more structural model of language as system. 
Language, for Saussure, is not composed of lists of words which correspond to 
lists of things; rather it is a system based on interrelated elements, each one 
drawing its value from its difference to the other elements in the system. In 
Saussure’s words, ‘in language there are only differences without positive 
terms' P  By locating meaning in the differential relationship between terms 
Saussure debases the link between words and things to the level of the 
arbitrary, rather than the natural. In his 1988 article, ‘Banking on Signs’, Goux 
likens this move to the process, in the early part of the twentieth century, by 
which the convertibility of paper money to gold was abandoned such that paper 
money no longer relied on a permanent, natural gold reserve to determine its 
value.14 This ‘dematerialization’ of money allows for a new floating system of
11 Jean-Joseph Goux, ‘Banking on Signs’, Diacritics, 18 (1988), 15-25, p. 21.
12 Goux, ‘Banking on Signs’, pp. 22-3.
13 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Wade Baskin (London: 
Fontana, 1974), p. 120.
14 Goux is referring to the abandonment of the gold-standard in France and England during the 
First World War. England returned to a gold-standard in 1924, while France followed in 1928. 
However, convertibility was no longer everyday, in France, for example, it was reserved for
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exchange values as well as, according to Goux, homologous shifts in the fields 
of literary or artistic representation exemplified by the new instabilities of 
modernist experimentation.
As we have seen then, Goux finds that modernist experimentation with the 
rules of realism in art and literature has its corollary in the concurrent shift to a 
paper currency no longer grounded in the real or intrinsic value previously 
embodied by metal money-forms.15 Goux’s work would appear to be borne out 
by much of the economic criticism of the last twenty-five years. Sandra 
Sherman, for example, finds parallels in the signifying mode of the monetary 
and literary forms of the early eighteenth century, arguing that new regimes of 
value were developing simultaneously in the speculation in paper money and in 
the birth of the novel.16 Like Goux, Sherman does not claim that this homology 
is straightforwardly causal, with one field simply determining the other in a 
Marxian base-superstructure model. Thus, by placing emphasis on both art and 
money as modes of signification which may (or may not) display similar
1 7tendencies within any particular ‘sociosymbolic moment’ , Goux’s work 
offers one method for exploring the apparent disciplinary borderlines with 
which I am concerned.
wholesale transactions; both countries abandoned the gold-standard again in the 1930s (See 
Glyn Davies, A History o f  Money: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, rev. edn. (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 1996), Britain, pp. 369-382; France, p. 443; pp. 562-3). More 
importantly for Goux’s model, the ‘dizzying novelty of inconvertibility’ introduced during 
World War I could never simply be erased (Goux, The Coiners o f Language, p. 21).
15 Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality’.
16 Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality in the Early Eighteenth Century: Accounting for  
Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
17 Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality’, p. 181.
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My inquiry, then, has been into the form this homological relationship between 
art and money might take in current (or relatively recent) cultural texts. What 
effect, for example, does the abstraction of paper through the development of 
electronic money (sometimes referred to as cybercapital) have upon Goux’s 
model? Having examined in prior chapters the possible relationship between 
financial speculation and realist narrative, I now turn to Cosmopolis in order to 
further question Goux’s assumption that the development of electronic money 
may be accompanied, in the cultural field, by a postmodern aesthetic.
Gesturing towards the rise of electronic money, and the apparent contemporary 
domination of share capital -  of the virtual or symbol economy -  over the 
‘real’ economy, Goux asserts that a further shift has now taken place, whereby 
‘money is no more than a mere trace in the indefinite circulation of a debt’,18 
ushering the economy into a ‘deconstructive regime of the sign, of value, of the 
real and time -  and, maybe, in the long term, the deconstruction of economy 
itse lf.19 Thus, Goux finds a contemporary homological encounter between the 
dematerialized functioning of the current virtual economy and the 
poststructuralist philosophy of Jacques Derrida, whose account of the deferral 
of meaning in language Goux draws upon as expressive of the ‘sociosymbolic 
moment’ of postmodern capitalism.20 It is important to note here that, for 
Derrida, meaning is constitutively dependent on differance -  on the dual 
movement of differentiation and deferral -  and this is not a matter of the latest 
stage in the historical development of language. Thus, whilst resisting the kind 
of developmental narrative to which Goux seems occasionally inclined, I wish
18 Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality’, p. 179.
19 Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality’, p. 180.
20 Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality’, p. 180.
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to question whether this apparent historical conjunction between language and 
money is accompanied by similar shifts in the field of contemporary cultural 
representation. Recalling what Eric Packer says about his art collection: ‘The 
work was all the more dangerous for not being new. There’s no more danger in 
the new’ (8), I suspect that the answer will lie in the troubling of older 
representational forms, such as DeLillo enacts with the apparently conventional 
narrative of Cosmopolis, rather than in the radical new practices Goux seems to 
expect.
Packer’s apparent misgivings about the worth of newer art forms is strangely 
uncharacteristic, however, as his attitudes towards language and money -  the 
other important signifying fields with which the novel is concerned -  are 
characterised by an obsessive faith in the future. This confidence is prefigured 
by the recurring theme of obsolescence in the novel, as earlier signifying 
systems are seen to be increasingly losing their grip in the face of twenty-first- 
century technological developments. At several points in the narrative Eric 
muses on both words and coins as archaic hangovers from an earlier period. On 
descending from his apartment in the morning, he ponders the ‘anachronistic 
quality of the word skyscraper’, a term which ‘belonged to the olden soul of 
awe, to the arrowed towers that were a narrative long before he was bom’ (9). 
The clumsiness of both the vocabulary bom of earlier technological 
developments and the technology itself seems to particularly vex him. His hand 
organizer is potential junk, an ‘object whose original culture had just about 
disappeared’ (9), his bodyguard’s gadgets, such as his ear bud or handgun are 
‘vestigial [...] degenerate structures. Maybe not the handgun just yet. But the
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word itself was lost in the blowing mist’ (19). The prevarication here is, of 
course, premonitory; the actual handgun remains hanging on the narrative wall 
now, in order that it may be put to use later on in the plot. In part, of course, 
this narrative of linguistic obsolescence, which Packer refers to obsessively, is 
designed to maintain his position as predictor of future events. His wealth was 
originally built on his success as an internet stock forecaster and our 
knowledge of this, as well as the young age at which he achieved success, are 
part of what gives the novel its sense of accelerating time. Packer’s status as an 
apparent visionary who seems to, literally, see the future will be discussed 
further below.
Returning to the handgun, however, the impossible schism marked here 
between word and thing (or signifier and referent in Saussurean terms) is 
intriguing, and exemplifies the sense in which the novel, as a whole, troubles 
the stable certainties of signification without lapsing into either experimental 
language or absolute silence. As with Moo in chapter one, this ‘troubling’ is 
achieved in Cosmopolis through the recurrent use of free indirect discourse. 
Extensive slippage between the levels of omniscient third person narration and 
Eric’s interior monologue mean that a word can be both deployed and 
undermined in the novel without a clear indication of who is speaking. In the 
following, similar, example I have artificially broken up the text through the 
use of italics: ‘A nurse and two armed guards were on constant watch at three 
monitors in a windowless room at the office. The word office was outdated 
now. It had zero saturation’ (15). Uncertainty over narrative voice creates a 
doubling effect here whereby in either one of two possible readings the narrator
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or Eric could be separately offering the information about on the one hand, the 
personnel in the office or, on the other, musing on the obsolescence of the term 
office (section in italics). In either case, due to the separation of voice, the 
word ‘office’ would retain enough signifying power to be simultaneously 
deployed and erased. Due to the use of free indirect discourse the narrative 
levels are not made distinct, however, and a further two possible readings 
emerge, whereby either only Eric, or only the narrator, is speaking. But this 
sets up an impossibility -  an abyssal structure whereby the word office is 
simultaneously made to mean, and claimed to be empty of meaning. The 
dissolve of narrative voice brought about by the use of free indirect discourse 
contains this troubling impossibility but does not erase it altogether.21
Narrative voice is further problematised in Cosmopolis by the retrospective 
interjection into the text of two short sections entitled ‘The Confessions of 
Benno Levin’, which purport to be the writings of Benno Levin, Packer’s 
would-be assassin. These sections are entitled ‘Night’ and ‘Morning’ and refer 
to the same day as the framing narrative, with the exception that we read them 
in reverse chronological order. Thus, we read first of Levin’s night during the 
morning of the framing story, and read later of his (earlier) morning, although 
this is not immediately apparent to the reader, blessed with traditional 
expectations of linear time. Levin turns out later in the book to be Richard 
Sheets, an apparently crazed ex-employee of Packer Capital, who now lives as
21 Roland Barthes describes a moment of indeterminacy over narrative voice in the classic 
realist text as a ‘dissolve, leaving a gap which enables the utterance to shift from one point of 
view to another, without warning’ (Barthes, S/Z, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1974), p. 41).
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a drop-out in an abandoned tenement and has made a ‘credible threat’ (107) on 
Packer’s life. Unlike the rest of the book, the Confessions are written as an 
autobiography -  entirely in the first person, and addressed to a future reader. In 
attempting to record his life and his reasons for his intended assassination of 
Packer, however, Sheets consistently manages to undermine his own project. 
His intention, we are told on his first page, is to write ‘a spiritual autobiography 
that runs to thousands of pages’ (149), where he will ‘write my way into truth’ 
(151). This seems ironic, in light of the assumed name, the irony compounded 
by his concern that the attempt will be inevitably derivative: ‘I didn’t know if it 
was me that was writing so much as someone I wanted to sound like’ (60).
Only ten pages after beginning he admits defeat: ‘But already I see that I’m
00repeating myself. I’m repeating myself (57). The entire Confessions amounts 
to only a scant fourteen pages, divided between two perfectly symmetrical 
seven-page sections.
Sheets’ failure to achieve his objective seems to relate to his increasing 
uncertainty about the power of language to convey truth: ‘But how can you 
make words out of sounds? These are two separate systems that we miserably 
try to link’ (55). This comes shortly after the first section we encounter while 
reading the novel, entitled ‘Night’, approximately one quarter of the way 
through the book as a whole, which begins with Levin’s first, enigmatic words, 
‘He is dead’ (55). ‘Night’ thus presents the reader with information which they 
are, at this stage, unable to assimilate -  the knowledge of Packer’s death by the
22 The page numbers here refer to the point at which Levin’s text appears in the novel and run 
counter to the narrative time of the Confessions themselves.
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end of the day. The curt delivery, ‘He is dead’, also marks the first intrusion of 
the unpresentable into the text. Faced with the apparent realisation of his own 
introspective plans, Sheets’ narrative struggles and falters, ending with the 
question ‘all the thinking and writing in the world will not describe what I felt 
in the awful moment when I fired the gun and saw him fall. So what is left 
that’s worth the telling?’ (61).
This question, which could be directed towards the book as a whole, effectively 
undermines the process of representation as we learn simultaneously of the end 
of Packer’s masterful career and of Sheets’ efforts to master uncertainty by 
‘writing his way into truth’. However, as with the novel’s opening question, 
‘What was there to say?’ (5), the narrative difficulty is here overcome. In this 
case, this is brought about due to the complexity of the narrative time, so that 
the full import of Sheets’ question is not comprehensible at the moment we 
read it, ignorant as the reader is at the time of who is dead and what it was 
Sheets had hoped to achieve. Taken chronologically, ‘what is left that’s worth 
the telling?’ is, in fact, the last word on the narrative action of the entire novel, 
but it appears only a quarter of the way through the novel and half way though 
our reading of the Confessions. Apparently much more is left that is worth the 
telling. By subverting traditional expectations of narrative time, then, 
Cosmopolis manages again to trouble representative structures rather than 
radically reject them.
What remains to be told in Cosmopolis is the story of the novel’s engagement 
with the question of economics as narrative. As the above discussion shows,
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the concern with unreadable, unstable or obsolete signifiers in Cosmopolis 
relates to a post-Saussurean questioning of the representative certainties of 
realism, a concern which Goux traces through the history of monetary 
signification also. In Cosmopolis both Eric Packer and Richard Sheets live and 
have worked within the world of electronic money, wherein monetary 
signification is reduced to fleeting intangible figures on a screen, which claim a 
relation to real things of value but whose representative structure seems to 
never be entirely stable. For Sheets, his demotion from the world of currency 
speculation has led him to fetishise token-money -  coins and notes -  in the 
same way as he fetishises the tools of writing -  his legal size paper, ‘white with 
blue lines’ (57), as though in the desperate hope that the tools themselves retain 
a trace of their former charismatic link to the real. In this vein, he recollects 
that he ‘used to lick coins as a child’ and still does so, sometimes (154), or he 
searches Packer’s dead body for his pocket money, not for its value but ‘for its 
personal qualities, [...] I wanted its intimacy and touch, his touch, the stain of 
his personal dirt. I wanted to rub the bills over my face to remind me why I 
shot hijn’ (58).
Packer’s pockets are, of course, empty, as he has long since denounced the 
clumsy deficiencies of settlement by paper or coin in favour of the fluidity of 
electronic transactions. Despite himself, Packer is also impressed, however, by 
what Goux might call the charismatic possibility of gold money -  in this case 
by the power of precious stones to take on monetary functions -  as his musings 
on passing through the city’s diamond district show:
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Hundreds of millions of dollars a day moved back and forth behind the 
walls, a form of money so obsolete Eric didn’t know how to think about 
it. It was hard, shiny, faceted. It was everything he’d left behind or 
never encountered, cut and polished, intensely three-dimensional. 
People wore it and flashed it. They took it off to go to bed or have sex 
and they put it on to have sex or die in. They wore it dead and buried. 
(64)
Despite Eric’s identification with electronic exchange, the romantic lure of the 
‘intensely three-dimensional’, here, cannot be entirely erased. Disturbed, Eric 
tries to contain the power of precious stones within his narrative of 
obsolescence by exoticising this archaic form of exchange. Thus, he refers to 
the deals made in doorways with a Yiddish blessing as giving a sense of ‘the 
Lower East Side of the 1920s and the diamond centers of Europe before the 
second war’ (64-5). The district’s thriving twenty-first century presence cannot 
be entirely erased however, and so he seeks to repudiate altogether its reminder 
of the persistence of alternative market systems: ‘This was the souk, the shtetl. 
Here were the hagglers and talebearers, the scrapmongers, the dealers in stray 
talk. The street was an offense to the truth of the future.’ Nevertheless the 
attraction remains, and Eric, despite himself, ‘responded to it. He felt it enter 
every receptor and vault electrically to his brain’ (64 -5). Both this response 
and that of Sheets’, above, mark an interest in the text in the desire for 
representative forms which promise access to the real, as diamonds here appear 
to do so. This desire is typically sublimated, for Eric, through his sexual 
conquests or his attempts to transcend the instabilities of signification 
altogether through the mastery of financial information. It is in these efforts at
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transcendence that interesting parallels to developments within the history of 
economic thought are displayed.
As stated earlier, the character of Eric Packer appears to retain much of the 
characteristics of the rational economic subject outlined in earlier chapters. 
Packer is a kind of rational economic superman, however, inhabiting a world 
beyond the trading floors of Mark Fairfax, and his role in the financial 
marketplace is not to spot openings as Bud Fox does, but to create wealth 
through the manipulation of currency. He does this through the careful 
management of knowledge, and thus his newly-acquired wife, Elise Shifrin, 
herself the poet heiress to a venerable European banking fortune, having asked 
him, ‘What do you do exactly?’, answers her own question with:
‘You know things. I think this is what you do [...] I think you’re 
dedicated to knowing. I think you acquire information and turn it into 
something stupendous and awful. You’re a dangerous person [...] A 
visionary.’ (19)
Packer’s,danger, however, is not derived from the same cause as Gordon 
Gekko’s malevolence in Wall Street, where the manipulation of insider 
information, along with ramping of stocks, exploited market forces so that 
Gekko could get rich at others’ expense. As discussed previously, Wall Street, 
while raising unsettling questions about the ease with which markets can be 
abused, manages however to preserve the distinction between licit and illicit 
market behaviour through Bud Fox’s eventual fall from grace and the 
intervention of the justice system as the resolution of the narrative conflict. In 
Cosmopolis however, such distinctions no longer seem to be in question.
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Packer is not dealing in insider information, in fact his information is 
apparently derived from, on the face of it, fairly typical, and presumably legal, 
methods.
On several occasions we hear of Packer analysing data: in the business annex 
of his apartment there are mundane ‘currencies to track and research reports to 
examine’ (7); his car is equipped with an elaborate technological bank of data 
screens, all with ‘flowing symbols and alpine charts, the polychrome numbers 
pulsing’ (13). There are repeated references to the representation of financial 
information at the level of the signifier -  to patterns, indexes, ratios, 
collectively referred to as charts, which Eric and his colleagues study in order 
to divine the market movements which will affect Packer Capital. While 
currency traders typically rely upon charts their efficacy is constantly debated; 
the ability to scientifically predict market movements has of course never been 
achieved (who ever did so would be insanely rich) and over-reliance upon them 
is often derided as evidence of a herd mentality. Thus, in Wall Street Gordon 
Gekko ridicules Bud Fox’s efforts to predict future stock movements by 
analysing charts, telling him ‘charts are for sheep’. This position seems 
confirmed by former trader Michael Lewis, who, in his Wall Street memoir, 
Liar’s Poker, claims, ‘actually, there was one good reason for using the charts: 
everyone else did. If you believed that large sums of money were about to be 
invested on the basis of a chart, then, as dumb as it made you feel, it made 
sense to look at that chart.’23 Charts, in Lewis’ account are self-fulfilling
23 Michael Lewis, Liar’s Poker (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), p. 192.
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prophecies, which only work on the basis that traders are, in Gekko’s terms, 
‘sheep’.
Despite Gekko’s dismissal, the workings of the financial economy are heavily 
dependent on the publication of financial information in the form of charts and 
graphs, such as those analysed by Packer. Indeed, Marieke de Goede argues 
that the historical development of the production and analysis of financial data, 
such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, first published in the 1880s, was ‘an 
important step in the emergence of a professional domain for financial 
participants’. Thus, statistical averages and charts provided the arena of 
legitimate intellectual activity which distinguished the ‘moral superiority’ of 
the speculator from the gambler.24 Further, the history of statistical analysis 
shows that, while the development of statistical measurement was motivated by 
observation of, particularly social, regularities, it typically resulted in the 
production of laws which sought to prove the workings of a regularly-ordered 
universe. As Ian Hacking notes, ‘routinely gathering numerical data was not 
enough to ipake statistical laws rise to the surface. The laws had in the 
beginning to be read into the data. They were not simply read off them.’25 The 
development of statistical analysis also has particular resonance for the history 
of economics, especially during the twentieth century, when econometric 
analysis has come to dominate the profession. Ingrid Rima has criticised the 
consequent shift in economic theory towards deductive reasoning and away
24 Marieke de Goede, Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A Genealogy o f  Finance, Borderlines Series,
24 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 89.
25 Ian Hacking, The Taming o f Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 3-
4.
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from induction in the production of economic knowledge.26 While this 
development arose from a ‘disenchantment’ with statistical observation, it has 
not resulted in the disappearance of quantification from the arena of economic 
discourse. Rather, there has been ‘an extensive borrowing of mathematical 
formulas by economists to facilitate the development of economics as a logical 
deductive science [...] capable of yielding empirically testable conclusions’, a 
development which has culminated in economics becoming a ‘predictive 
science’.27
While Packer may appear to owe his success in predicting market movements 
to the examination of charts, it is nevertheless clear from his conversation with 
his wife that he has powers of analysis bordering on the visionary, while his 
head of finance reminds him that he has a reputation for ‘never be[ing] 
influenced by the sweep of the crowd’ (53). Packer’s relationship with 
financial data is at once unique and metaphysical, then, and it is soon revealed 
that he believes in the power of complex data to reveal truth. His gift is in 
making unusual predictions by discerning patterns in economic behaviour 
which others cannot see. Specifically, he bases his financial speculation on data 
derived from analysing nature, believing that the organic patterns evident in 
naturally occurring phenomena such as diagrams of shells or bird-wings are 
mirrored in the movements of markets, which, he seems to suggest, are 
similarly derived from natural forces. Thus, in the following compelling
26 Rima, Ingrid H., ‘From Political Arithmetic to Game Theory: An Introduction to 
Measurement and Quantification in Economics’, in Measurement, Quantification and 
Economic Analysis: Numeracy in Economics, ed. by Ingrid H. Rima (London: Routledge, 
1995), pp. 1-21.
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paragraph he eschews conventional understandings of financial information as 
a mere record of human wants -  as charts of aggregate supply and demand -  in 
favour of their more metaphysical qualities:
It was shallow thinking to maintain that numbers and charts were the 
cold compression of unruly human energies, every sort of yearning and 
midnight sweat reduced to lucid units in the financial markets. In fact 
data itself was soulful and glowing, a dynamic aspect of the life 
process. This was the eloquence of alphabets and numeric systems, now 
fully realized in electronic form, in the zero-oneness of the world, the 
digital imperative that defined every breath of the planet’s living 
billions. Here was the heave of the biosphere. Our bodies and oceans 
were here, knowable and whole. (24)
Packer imagines a romantic fusion between electronic data, itself part of the 
‘life process’ and all of those elements of life which data previously 
represented thrqugh clumsier structures of signification. Beyond the simplistic 
models of nominalist representation then, beyond even the eloquent but 
inadequate efforts of linguistics or mathematics to encode the complexity of 
reality, we have here digitized economic data which, having realized virtuality, 
is somehow able to provide unmediated access to real phenomena -  ‘knowable 
and whole’. The passage recalls the sense of omniscience which was evident in 
Mark Fairfax’s description of ‘Bondscape’ -  the virtual reality system which 
represented the market in Trading Reality. It also resonates with Marieke de
27 Rima, p. 9.
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Goede’s account of the intensification of the production of market information 
during the twentieth century, when publishers such as Dow believed that 
‘technological progress and calculative sophistication were all that were 
needed to arrive at a true and undistorted representation of market value’.28 
Packer’s romantic transcendence of clumsy realist models of representation is 
here complete -  perfect knowledge is imminent and possible.
This dynamic fusion between the real and the virtual, in Cosmopolis, is bom of 
Eric Packer’s hallmark confidence in the possibility of pure and certain 
knowledge brought about by the twenty-first-century marriage of technology 
and capital. Nevertheless, such confidence is reminiscent of twentieth-century 
economic theory’s attempts to understand and analyse financial phenomena 
such as risk, probability and uncertainty. In Postmodern Moments in Modern 
Economics, David Ruccio and Jack Amariglio assert that from the 1920s and 
‘30s onwards ‘economists set out to “explore,” and in some cases to “conquer,” 
the hitherto unknown “continents” represented by uncertainty and related 
notions’. This conquest, Ruccio and Amariglio claim, paradoxically produced 
both a greater awareness of the troubling uncertainty which undermined the 
truth-claims of economic science and a greater dependence on scientific 
methods in an effort to master it. Most significantly, for Ruccio and Amariglio, 
it is, thus, an anxiety about the limits to knowledge which accounts for the 
dependence on mathematical formalism in contemporary mainstream economic 
thought. Writing on DeLillo’s earlier novels Mark Osteen finds that a recurring
28 de Goede, p. 117.
29 David F. Ruccio and Jack Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 56
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theme in DeLillo’s work is a faith in science as a form of magic which will 
‘quell our terror of mortality,’30 and this oscillation between a faith in the 
possibility of certain knowledge, and a fear of what is ultimately unknowable is 
also present in Cosmopolis. Once Packer’s faith is abandoned, his mortality 
must be reckoned with, as we will shortly see.
Of all of the references to financial data in Cosmopolis the most significant is 
the recurring report on the status of the yen which streams through the novel 
like a stock-market ticker, injecting tension as the yen repeatedly rises ‘against 
expectations’ (8).31 This tension relates to Eric’s unstable financial position, 
rather than to any conflict between economic models as in Wall Street. 
Following customary market procedures, Packer Capital’s investments are 
financed by debt, using money which it does not own per se, but has simply 
borrowed at low interest rates. The rationale is that the return on the 
investments will be higher than the cost of the loan, leaving Packer Capital 
with an overall profit once the loan is paid back. Significantly, however, the 
loan in this case is in yen, which had been performing poorly against the dollar, 
making the loan very cheap. As the yen strengthens, the dollar price of yen 
‘rises’, with the result that the ‘enormous, enormous sums’ (21) borrowed will 
cost more to pay back, and will outweigh the profits earned from investing 
them. As this continues, Packer Capital’s overall financial position comes 
under threat, along with the worldwide financial concerns with which it is
30 Mark Osteen, American Magic and Dread: Don DeLillo’s Dialogue with Culture 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), p. 63.
31 The term ‘rise’ is confusing as it seems to refer to an increase in the amount of yen per 
dollar. In fact it refers to a strengthening of the yen against the dollar and therefore an increase 
in the dollar price of yen , thus a reduction in the amount of yen you can get for a dollar.
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connected. Eric is increasingly ‘speculating into the void’ as his currency 
analyst, among others, reminds him (21). This void marks the centre of the 
novel’s economic action, and the cause of Packer’s insomnia. As the yen rises, 
so Eric’s capacity for sleep fails. It is not straightforward anxiety over his 
leveraged assets which is keeping Eric awake at night however, but concern 
over the persistence of irrational thought which threatens both his world picture 
and subject-position in relation to it.
As his state of the art marble-floored limousine progresses incrementally
f hthrough the cross-town traffic down 47 street several of Eric’s aides join him 
to confer on the impending crisis. These cautionary prophets employ 
conventional market-speak in an attempt to persuade him to stand down or to 
‘ease off and take a loss’ (53) but Eric resists them, insisting that the yen 
cannot go any higher, that ‘the yen itself knew it could not go higher’ (84), 
claiming ‘it charts’, even if it is beyond ‘the borders of perception’ (21).
Despite the apparent normalcy of Packer’s dependence on financial data, then, 
his insistence on continuing the gamble marks his difference from the 
conventional financial wisdom of hedging bets and playing safe. He is aware, 
as Vija Kinski, his chief of theory, remarks, that such action ‘would not be 
authentic. It would be a quotation from other people’s lives’ (85).
In the midst of these encounters, however, doubt begins to impinge upon Eric’s 
world. His moody chief of technology greets him in the morning with the 
prescient question ‘Do you get the feeling sometimes that you don’t know 
what’s going on?’ adding,
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‘[all these] patterns, ratios, indexes, whole maps of information. I love 
information. This is our sweetness and light. It’s a fuckall wonder. And 
we have meaning in the world. People eat and sleep in the shadow of 
what we do. But at the same time, what?’ (14)
Eric is unable to muster a reply. Later, however, when his lover surprises him 
by suggesting that an ‘element of doubt’ has begun to enter his life, his 
response is swift and insistent: ‘Doubt? What is doubt? [...] There is no doubt. 
Nobody doubts anymore’ (31) Despite such protestations it becomes clear that 
Eric has been learning to doubt the organic models upon which his predictions 
are made, based on evidence which has literally, if you’ll excuse the 
expression, grabbed him by the balls. In a passing conversation during his daily 
medical examination, his doctor -  himself a kind of prophet -  mentions, 
without elaboration, that Eric’s prostate is ‘asymmetrical’ (54) and the meaning 
of this apparently random occurrence troubles and ultimately eludes him.
As I have discussed, the mastery of financial or economic knowledge is based 
on the assumed ability to accurately model, hence represent, the phenomena 
which one seeks to analyse. However, as Philip Mirowski argues, when 
mathematic models draw their inspiration from nature, they often incorrectly 
assume nature to be more standardized than it actually is. This is also the case 
in Cosmopolis. When apparently random phenomena such as the inexplicably 
rising yen, or his ironically asymmetrical prostate disturb Eric’s analysis, a 
crisis is provoked, both in terms of his impending financial meltdown and in
32 Philip Mirowski, ‘The When, The How and The Why of Mathematical Expression in the 
History of Economics Analysis’, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, 5 (1991), 145-57 (p. 154).
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terms of the representative structure upon which his idea of certain knowledge 
is predicated. When Vija Kinski suggests that it is merely a parable that there 
are foreseeable trends and forces which he can uncover, he resists, insisting 
that there is ‘an order at some deep level, [...] that wants to be seen’ (85-6). 
Nevertheless, he is impressed by her insistence that ‘in fact it’s all random 
phenomena. [...] The frenzy is barely noticeable most of the time. It’s simply 
how we live’ (85).
While maintaining that she cannot understand what any of it says, Kinski is, 
like Packer, fascinated by financial data, although, in contrast to Packer, she 
sees in it the collapse of the signifying structure upon which his knowledge 
depends. Imbued with uncertainty, and looked at through her eyes, data 
becomes, for Packer, like his paintings: opaque and self-referential. The 
‘hellbent sprint’ of data streaming around buildings is, he now sees, ‘pure 
spectacle, or information made sacred, ritually unreadable’ (80). Echoing
the historical analysis of Jean-Joseph Goux, Kinski explains to Packer that a 
shift has occurred whereby ‘money has lost its narrative quality the way 
painting did once upon a time. Money is talking to itself (77).
As monetary signification becomes self-referential spectacle the crisis 
provoked by Eric’s gamble on pure and certain knowledge takes effect. Due to 
Eric’s influence and the interdependence of the global marketplace, currency 
markets spiral out of control, while banks and financial institutions crumble in 
the ensuing frenzy. Inexplicably, Eric continues to borrow yen, into which he
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plunges all of Packer Capital, including his own and his wife’s private fortunes, 
losing everything and hastening the worldwide crisis. After the final splurge, 
and apparently penniless although not noticeably changed, he finally turns off 
the data screens freeing himself, he says, to begin ‘the business of living’
(107). Or the business of dying, as Eric then embarks upon a series of 
apparently random acts designed to hasten his own death. These include the 
(possibly unintentional) murder of his bodyguard, which frees him to go in 
search of the assassin who, he has been told, has made a threat on his life.
These inexplicable actions mark the novel’s own crisis of narrative, its own 
loss o f ‘narrative quality’.
Writing on the tendency for both narrative and finance to promise delivery of a 
future pay-off which they nevertheless depend upon deferring, Gillian Beer 
draws an analogy between the market analyst and the reader of narrative form. 
‘Like an actuary’, Beer claims, ‘we measure probabilities and come to our own 
conclusions, [...] We speculate. We propose other futures.’34 Seeking the 
conventional regularities established within the lexicon of conventional 
financial storytelling, the reader of Cosmopolis is confounded as the plot 
gradually unravels. We are left unable to find any clear psychological 
imperative for Eric’s actions and are incapable either to predict or even 
adequately describe the outcome of events. We never learn, for example, why 
the yen repeatedly rises or why Eric seeks his own death. In order to 
interrogate the predominance of the rational economic subject, the novel
33 My emphasis.
34 Gillian Beer, ‘Credit Limit: Fiction and the Surplus of B elief, Comparative Criticism, 24 
(2003), 3-14 (p. 6).
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abandons the model of rationality altogether and thus Cosmopolis manages to 
trouble not just traditional narrative form but also the act of reading, the literary 
homology to market speculation.
In an earlier article on the shift in social value regimes heralded by the 
speculative world of financial trading, Goux’s lengthy description of the ‘stock 
market paradigm’ seems to point towards the kind of crisis enacted by the plot 
of Cosmopolis:
there, you can apprehend matters of the weightiest economic 
consequence being staked on the riskiest venture; there you can see the 
work of patient calculated prediction compromised by the chanciest, or 
most frivolous gamble; there one can appreciate the impossibility (or 
the difficulty) of drawing a line between the licit and the illicit; there 
one can see the unravelling of distinctions between the true and the 
fictitious, the real and the unreal, the act and its simulacra; there one 
can see the difference between what is assumed as rational and what is 
apprehended as irrational collapse.
It is in this ‘unravelling’, then, rather than a radical rupture, where the 
difference between DeLillo’s novel and the more traditional narratives I have 
examined can be appreciated. It is an unravelling which may also provide the 
‘deconstruction of economy itself,36 in terms of the distinction between the 
economic and the literary, with which this thesis is concerned.
35 Jean-Joseph Goux, ‘Values and Speculations: The Stock Exchange Paradigm’, Cultural 
Values 1 (1997), 159-77 (p. 165).
36 Goux, ‘Ideality, Symbolicity, and Reality in Postmodern Capitalism’, p. 180.
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Conclusion
In their bestselling self-help investment book, The One Minute Millionaire, 
authors Mark Victor Hansen and Robert Allen claim to have created a ‘hybrid’ 
text.1 They explain their ‘unusual’ format thus:
This is not a typical book. In fact, it’s two books in one—a nonfiction 
book [...] and a novel. You may be wondering why we designed such 
an unusual hybrid. After having coached tens of thousands of people to 
financial success, we’ve learned that people have different learning 
styles. Generally, they are either ‘artists’ or ‘engineers.’ The artists 
among you are right-brain ‘visual’ learners. You engineers are left- 
brain ‘logical’ learners. [...]
Therefore, [...] the book will be divided into distinctly different left- 
and right-side pages. The right-side pages will tell the fictional tale of a 
single mother, Michelle Ericksen, who is faced with a terrible dilemma. 
She needs to earn a million dollars in 90 days in order to reclaim her 
two children. [...] The left-side pages are organized into nonfiction 
Millionaire Minutes—stand-alone lessons condensed into one- or two- 
page digests.
The One Minute Millionaire is a motivational manual which claims to induct 
the reader in the techniques and philosophies necessary to become a millionaire
1 Mark Victor Hansen and Robert G. Allen, The One Minute Millionaire: The Story That 
Transforms Your Life and Makes You Rich (London: Ebury Press, 2002). Both authors had 
previously achieved success in the areas of popular inspirational or investment writing. Hansen 
is probably the better known of the two, his Chicken Soup for the Soul series has sold over 80 
million copies in North America. Robert Allen is best known for his real-estate speculation 
handbook No Money Down.
2 Hansen and Allen, p. xii.
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within a few short months. The authors claim that this task requires that the 
reader be not just informed, but ‘transformed’,3 an effect produced by the text’s 
combination of narrative and logic.
The account of storytelling offered here seems to indicate that narrative plays 
the greatest role in this transformative effect. Thus, the novel offers the 
opportunity for the reader to ‘get swept up in the story of Michelle’, to identify 
with the protagonist and ‘imagine what you would do in her place’. While this 
effect is apparently life-changing, it is by no means necessary: the informative 
left-hand pages still ‘stand alone’, offering factual investment lessons: ‘the 
actual step-by step guide for becoming an Enlightened Millionaire’.4 The 
fictional narrative thus merely acts as an entertaining supplement to the logical 
guide. By enclosing these two knowledge-forms within the covers of one book, 
The One Minute Millionaire may seem to enact a kind of radical transgressive 
gesture, necessary for the production of the hybrid text. However, it is clear 
from the extract quoted above that this is far from the case. Instead, the 
‘distinctly different’ ‘learning styles’ each remain in their rightful place, 
situated on opposing pages, so that the hybrid, is, in fact, just ‘two books in 
one’.
The One Minute Millionaire thus enacts the popular separation between 
‘factual’ economics and ‘fictional’ narrative with which this thesis has been 
concerned. Fact and fiction are presented in Hansen and Allen’s book as 
entirely separate and separable modes of thinking and knowing — with the
3 Hansen and Allen, p.xii
4 Ibid.
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logical opposed to the aesthetic, the coolly rational versus the emotionally 
involved. By examining the representation of economics as narrative it has 
been my task in this thesis to unsettle this opposition. In chapter one I argued, 
in relation to the narrative turn in economics, that narratives are constitutively 
characterised by a plurality of voices, so that they cannot simply function as an 
explanatory or transformative addendum. Nevertheless, this account, whereby 
narrative functions as ‘a technique for getting coherence’ is the predominant 
mode of narrative analysis practiced outside of literary studies, according to 
Cristopher Nash, and is exemplified, in the field of economics, by the work of 
Deirdre McCloskey.5 Instead, this thesis tries to show that fictional narratives 
which represent the financial economy are always ‘working out’ the 
borderlines between text and context, between the fictional and the real, or 
between the rational and the irrational. They do so because, I have argued, it is 
precisely this series of apparent oppositions which both narrative and finance 
endlessly subvert.
My earlier chapters on financial narrative focused on instances where the 
narrative structure worked to contain this subversion inherent to both narrative 
and finance. Nevertheless, by paying close attention to the way in which binary 
narrative structures deconstruct (themselves), I have tried to show that the 
narrative representation of economics also destabilises such oppositions. Thus, 
both Wall Street and Trading Reality may rely upon distinctions between real 
and fictional economies, or rational (masculine) and irrational (feminine) 
subjects, but close consideration of their narrative structure reveals such
5 Cristopher Nash, ed., Narrative in Culture: The Uses o f  Storytelling in the Sciences, 
Philosophy, and Literature (London: Routledge, 1994), p. xiii.
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oppositions to be perpetually subject to collapse. In each of these readings the 
text’s adherence to a classic realist narrative structure proves its undoing, as 
either the ‘real’ economy or the ‘rational’ economic subject is shown to be 
constituted in discourse, thus undermining the realist text’s pretension to 
unproblematically represent conditions existing outside it.
In the final two chapters I have tried to take account of the inevitable 
uncertainty which attends the deconstruction of text and context perpetuated by 
economic narrative. This uncertainty is figured in all of the texts I have 
examined by the tendency for financial speculation to exploit the unstable 
binary between narrative and fact, or the fictional and the real. While my 
earlier texts contained this uncertainty though their dependence on a binary 
structure and their adherence to a linear narrative tending towards closure, both 
Boiler Room and Cosmopolis put this inevitable uncertainty on display. While 
Boiler Room illustrates the discursive field in which both finance and narrative 
reside, Cosmopolis exposes the indeterminacy from which that field is 
constituted. The novel thus reveals the limits to any predictive act of 
signification or representation, such as that performed by the economist, the 
speculator, or the reader of narrative form.
It is perhaps inevitable that any act of narrative analysis, every act of reading, 
will result in the production of another narrative, another transformative 
addendum. Thus, it seems that, like Cosmopolis, I have been charting a 
narrative from knowledge to uncertainty, or, in Barthes’ terms, from ‘readerly’ 
to ‘writerly’ texts. I do not wish to rest, however, on this new opposition, as
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though to suggest, in the manner of Goux, that the representation of the 
financial economy in contemporary culture inaugurates a new aesthetic, one 
characterised by the performance of uncertainty. As I have tried to show, 
knowledge and uncertainty operate in relation to each other; consequently, just 
as it is possible for close reading to reveal the destabilising uncertainty which 
constitutes more conventional narratives, unconventional texts can also be 
shown to recuperate indeterminacy, as much as to display it.
Other possible stories circulate within and across the one I have produced, 
providing openings for further enquiry. I have been guilty, for example, of 
reducing the ‘economic’ down to the ‘market’ and hence have focused this 
discussion mainly on those texts which represent the financial economy. 
Consequently, future work on the representation of economics in contemporary 
culture could broaden this analysis to texts which seek to negotiate the effects 
of the financial marketplace, particularly in its globalised or transnational form. 
An alternative route to investigate lies in my discussion of narrative analysis. 
As the narrative turn in economics shows, the expansion of narrative analysis 
to traditionally non-narrative fields has often resulted in an overly-simplified 
account of what narrative does, reducing what Royle calls its ‘strange nature’,6 
to explanatory supplement. When storytelling is used as a model for everything 
from organisational analysis to cognitive psychology, it may be time to revisit 
the strangeness of narrative, focusing on its unruliness instead of its order.
6 Nicholas Royle, ‘The “Telepathy Effect”: Notes Toward a Reconsideration of Narrative 
Fiction’, in Acts o f  Narrative, ed. by Carol Jacobs and Henry Sussman (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 93-109 (249n).
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The structure of the One Minute Millionaire also displays narrative’s unruly 
tendency to overrun the limits ascribed to it. Thus, despite the steadfast 
separation of left- and right-side modes of thought, stories, in the form of 
illustrative anecdotes, regularly invade the factual side of the book’s enforced 
partition. Equally, the practice of storytelling invades the financial lessons 
which the authors claim to impart. Writing on the persuasive skills necessary to 
be a successful ‘creative’ investor (in the field of real-estate speculation, for 
example) the authors place emphasis on the use of storytelling to paint a 
‘compelling word picture’ in order to get your audience to do as you suggest.7 
A conscious awareness of narrative construction is thus the secret of financial 
success according to the One Minute Millionaire, and this is a lesson learned 
by the protagonist of the fictive narrative also. Having carefully cultivated her 
‘multiple streams of income’, Michelle’s first success comes from the creation 
of her own financial advice e-book, Money Loves You, compiled from articles 
read on the internet, and marketed through that same source. Despite the 
book’s separation of the two spheres, narrative not only supplements financial 
logic, but constitutes it, so that the financial pay-off the book promises depends 
upon the perpetual circulation of economic narrative.
7 Hansen and Allen, pp. 232-6.
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